

# Denkwürdigkeiten



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## LEADOFF

### Liebe Mitglieder,

diese **zweisprachige Sonderausgabe** steht ganz unter dem Eindruck unser Berliner Konferenz **Atlantische Beziehungen auf dem Prüfstand/ Atlantic Relations under Review** am 12. und 13. März. Die Konferenz setzte inhaltlich eine Reihe von Akzenten, die nicht nur in den Köpfen und Herzen der Vortragenden und Seminarteilnehmer nachhallen, sondern mehr noch unsere außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Debatten prägen werden. Mehr dazu in den nachfolgenden Beiträgen.

Das amerikanische Team, bestückt mit hochrangigen Mitgliedern/ Aspiranten der neuen Administration, ehemaligen Beratern von Ex-Präsident Bill Clinton und herausragenden Mitgliedern amerikanischer Think Tanks unter Führung des Beratungsgurus und Direktors der europäischen Programme des **Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)** Dr. Simon Serfaty konnte sich sehen lassen. Umgekehrt zeigten sich diese beeindruckt von Programm, Vortragenden und **pmg**-Konferenzteilnehmern.

Diesen Vertretern der jüngeren und mittleren Generation deutscher Außen-, Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftspolitik wollen sie gerne wieder begegnen.

Die Gespräche haben sich gelohnt, mehr noch – sie waren erforderlich. Ganz so wie die alten Flaggschiffe der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik den Herausforderungen der veränderten Sicherheitslandschaft einer zusammenwachsenden Welt – bei aller verbliebenen Bedeutung – nicht mehr allein erfolgreich begegnen können, braucht auch der transatlantische Dialog neue inhaltliche Impulse und zukunfts-trächtige, persönliche Verbindungen.

Sicher ist, diese Form des transatlantischen Dialogs wird fortgesetzt. Weitere Dialog- und Kooperationsfelder werden erschlossen. Bereits in naher

Zukunft wollen wir mit unseren amerikanischen Freunden – in kleinerem Rahmen – einen regelmäßigen strategischen Dialog zur Rolle Chinas beginnen. Einen kritischen Eingangsakzent setzt Knut Dethlefsen mit seiner Analyse möglicher US-Waffenlieferungen an Taiwan.

*Ralph Thiele ist Gründungsvorsitzender der pmg.*

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# Atlantische Beziehungen auf dem Prüfstand

## Atlantic Relations under Review

Berlin, 12. Und 13. März 2001

### Konferenzprogramm

**Welcome** by *Ernst Cramer*,  
Chairman Axel-Springer-  
Foundation

#### Panel 1:

#### **New Perspectives, Common Tasks, Different Approaches?**

US-Chair: *Dr. Simon Serfaty*

GE-Chair: *O i.G. Ralph Thiele*

#### **Defining the Agenda**

Panelists: *Bruce Jackson*

*Vincent Morelli*

**Discussion** with *Michael Steiner*,  
Foreign Policy and National Se-  
curity Advisor to the Federal  
Chancellor

#### Panel 2:

#### **The European Pillar – ESDI/ CFSP**

Speaker: *Dr. Klaus Scharioth*,  
Political Director, Ministry of For-  
eign Affairs

Panelists: *Mr. Anthony Blinken*

*Dr. Kori Schake*

US-Chair: *Dr. Simon Serfaty*

GE-Chair: *Dr. Ulrich Schlie*

#### **Dinner at the Bavarian Berlin Residence**

Keynote Speaker:

*Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble (MP)*

"Deutschland – Die Zukunft"

#### Panel 3:

#### **New Structures and Capabili- ties for a New Partnership**

Speaker: *GM Friedrich Wilhelm  
Ploeger*, Head of Division, Poli-  
tico-Military Affairs and Arms  
Control, Federal Armed Forces  
Staff III, MoD

Panelists: *Dr. Cathleen Fisher*

*Dr. Hans Binnendijk*

US-Chair: *Amb John K. Korbblum*

GE-Chair: *BG Manfred Lange*

**Conclusions** – *Dr. Simon Ser-  
faty / O i.G. Ralph Thiele*

## Notizen vom Potomac

Kein Zweifel: Das 2. *pmg/CSIS* Seminar in Berlin war ein nachhaltiger Erfolg. Die Begegnung mit Michael Steiner, dem außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Berater des Kanzlers, bot den amerikanischen Gästen die außergewöhnliche Chance, den Schröder-Besuch in Washington am 29./30. März inhaltlich vorzubereiten.

Wolfgang Schäubles Vortrag zur Zukunft Deutschlands in Europa stimmte alle Konferenzteilnehmer nachdenklich. Der Politische Direktor des Auswärtigen Amts, Klaus Scharioth, und der neue Leiter FÜS III, Generalmajor Ploeger, überzeugten durch Professionalität und Sachkunde. Berlin gewinnt in der Sicherheitspolitik ein unverwechselbares inhaltliches und persönliches Profil.

Deutlich wurde allerdings auch, daß die strategische Debatte über NMD und ESVP sowie unterschiedliche Auffassungen zur künftigen Streitkräftestruktur und -finanzierung erhebliches transatlantisches Konfliktpotential in sich bergen. Dies gilt auch für die Öffnung der Allianz nach Osten. Hier entwickelten unsere amerikanischen Partner sehr ehrgeizige Ziele.

Die enorme Durchschlagskraft, die sich aus der Verbindung politischer Visionen mit wirtschaftlichen Interessen ergibt, wird durch innenpolitische Kalkulationen des US-Kongresses noch verstärkt. Sicherlich hat Moskau bei der Öffnung der Allianz kein Veto-Recht. Dennoch liegt es im Interesse aller künftigen und bisherigen NATO-Mitglieder, die Türen zur Allianz behutsam zu öffnen und in langfristiger Perspektive auch offen zu halten. Auf Dauer wird es nur mit und nicht gegen Rußland Sicherheit für alle in Osteuropa geben. Dies sollten unsere amerikanischen Freunde bedenken.

Auch sonst zeigten sich unterschiedliche Langzeitperspektiven. Die USA wollen den

dunklen Schluchten des Balkans rasch den Rücken kehren. Der kostspielige ökonomische, politische und militärische Stabilitätstransfer bleibt für sie Sache der Europäer. Hier steht die Solidarität der Allianz auf dem Spiel, denn Dayton und das Kosovo-Regime wurden unter maßgeblicher Beteiligung der USA entworfen. Für alle Alliierten gilt deshalb der Grundsatz: Zusammen rein, zusammen raus!

Die wirtschaftliche, politische und soziale Einbindung der Türkei in die westliche Zivilgesellschaft wird von unseren amerikanischen Freunden ebenfalls als vorrangige EU-Aufgabe gesehen. Die instrumentelle Bedeutung der EU für die amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik fällt hier besonders auf: Washington erscheint es einfach, Brücken über den Bosphorus zu schlagen, denn die Baukosten sollen von anderen getragen werden.

Diese kritische Feststellung ändert nichts daran, daß Deutschland ein vitales Interesse an einer stabilen, prosperierenden und demokratischen Türkei besitzt. Unsere türkischen Mitbürger und NATO-Partner haben ihre Zukunft entweder in Europa oder Europa sieht einer unsicheren Zukunft entgegen.

Die sicherheitspolitische Meinungsbildung ist in Bewegung geraten, am Potomac und an der Spree. Jetzt kommt es darauf an, das Wasser auf die richtigen Mühlen zu lenken. Die atlantische Agenda der Zukunft muß aus Berlin, Brüssel und Washington wegweisende Impulse erhalten.

Im März 2002 soll die nächste *pmg/CSIS*-Konferenz in Washington ihren konstruktiven Beitrag zur atlantischen Meinungsbildung und Entscheidungsfindung im Vorfeld des Prager NATO-Gipfels leisten.

atlanticus, Washington

## THEMEN

## Genuine concerns and mutual misunderstanding

At a time when Europe and the United States appear to be heading in opposite directions in their respective security policy decisions and priorities, disagreements over trade issues, the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and U.S. plans for the deployment of national and theater missile defense systems are gaining in significance. Yet, more often than not, such disagreements are a reflection of genuine concerns and mutual misunderstanding rather than of any desire for "decoupling" or renewed "isolationism."

Congressional priorities and the new administration's agenda are likely to shift the focus to problems outside Europe, but this will not come at the expense of a strong Euro-Atlantic partnership. To the surprise of many Europeans, the United States has recently become a strong supporter of Europe's new security identity. But the "healthy" skepticism among some Americans regarding ESDP stems from a European failure to adequately convince its ally about the benefits of its ambitious project.

With European defense budgets flat and unlikely to rise in coming years, Europe's expectations for improved burden sharing and for narrowing the capabilities gap within the alliance appear unrealistic. Germany's decision to maintain current defense budget levels (about 1.5 percent of GDP) until 2006 raises some doubts about the ability of its armed forces to meet the demands of a rapidly changing security environment. "Creative reshuffling" within existing budgets will quickly reach its limits, and any future European calls for renewed U.S. engagement in the continent are unlikely to find many sympathetic ears in a Republican-dominated Congress.

Conversely, U.S. observers are often either too slow to understand or too impatient to await the tremendous changes currently underway in Europe. With EU enlargement proceeding at full speed, a heated debate about Europe's *finalité*, and frenzied preparations for the official introduction of the euro next year, security is hardly the sole priority on the EU agenda. More significantly, the success or failure of these other EU efforts, as well as any developments in the ongoing U.S.-EU trade negotiations, will have a significant impact on the nature of the future transatlantic security relationship.

The future of the U.S.-German relationship will be shaped by events within both Europe and Germany. EU enlargement is set to elevate Germany's status as a central power in Europe, and, in the future, no EU project will be conceivable without active German participation. But Germany's continuing ambivalence about what it means to be a "partner in leadership" is proof that the country still has to get to grips with its new European identity.

In an increasingly "heterogeneous" world, the issue is not so much lack of transatlantic consensus on the types of future threats but rather of common approaches to dealing with them. Unlike in the past, a comprehensive approach is needed to address the future challenges facing the transatlantic alliance. Despite "competing priorities" between the two partners, Europe and the United States will need to adjust to each other's changed and changing realities. An institutionalized EU-NATO framework would facilitate closer and more frequent consultations on issues ranging from NATO enlargement, arms control, nuclear weapons, and terrorism to multilateral trade, environmental degradation, and respect for human rights

Christina Balis, CSIS,  
Washington

## THEMEN

## New Structures and Capabilities for a New Partnership

The transatlantic relationship is by no means determined solely by its security and defence dimension. Other, equally important policy aspects are economic and social policy, as well as ecological and cultural issues. One of the key reasons America and Europe have become more closely knitted together is the rapid increase in the exchange of information. This, on the one hand, results in closer co-operation and more profound relations, but, on the other, also bears the potential for greater friction.

Today, more than 10 years after the Berlin Wall fell, after Nato's successful engagement in the Balkans, after the revitalisation of our relations with Russia and, last but not least, after fundamental new developments in Europe's security and defence policy, we still can firmly rely on NATO as an alliance which has been standing all along for freedom, peace, stability and co-operation.

At the beginning of this new and young millennium I would like to offer you some considerations on how new structures and new capabilities may change the transatlantic partnership in a positive way to a more balanced and equal one. In this context I'd like to touch on NATO and the transatlantic link, on the far-reaching positive developments on the European side as well as enhancing defence capabilities within Europe as a whole and in Germany in particular as a means to underpin this new partnership.

### NATO and the Transatlantic Link

The bedrock and anchor of our transatlantic security is and will remain NATO. Over the past years we have witnessed how it has reformed itself in nearly all essential aspects. The Alliance has given itself a new Strategic

Concept and a new command structure, and it has opened the door to new members. With the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the Allies are adapting the means of their armed forces to changed or new security challenges.

It goes without saying that the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a shift in the distribution of global power. This could not leave the Alliance unaffected and with it, the transatlantic partnership, too, must continually be adapted to the changing environment of our security.

The fact that the continent of Europe can present itself today as a haven of freedom, peace and security is partly a result of far-sighted US foreign policy. Without the United States' presence in Europe, without their decade-long commitment to a free and democratic Europe, the historic project of European unification would never have come so far. And the reunification of Germany would certainly never have been achieved either, if the US had not taken such an unconditional and straightforward stand for the right of self-determination for the German people. The US maintain a presence in Europe to this day; they are a "European power" and ought to remain so in the future.

But to assert shared values and interests in this area they will also continue to require strong democratic partners. Different from the very beginning of the Alliance European countries and Europe as a whole are economically as strong as Northern America. They are mutually indispensable economic partners. The European Union will grow over the next decade to the world's biggest single market.

Europe has in a way come of age and plays nowadays a more prominent political role on the global scene than 30 years ago. This development too effects the transatlantic partnership of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The EU is America's largest trading and investment partner. (The two-way trade in 1999 was val-

ued at 507 billion USD and the EU investments in the US totalled more than 481 billion USD at the end of 1998, while the US had more than 433 billion USD invested in the EU.)

With this in mind, we must re-evaluate the relationship of Europe with its American partners. We cannot expect our US friends to always maintain all the capabilities which we Europeans lack, be it for financial or other reasons.

This is why the European and American goal of increasing Europe's capacity for action serves as a basis for a long-term sustainable partnership. When Europe, in its own best interests, bears more responsibility for safeguarding peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, America will be relieved of some of its burdens.

We intend to achieve this goal by adapting NATO as required and by building up a European Security and Defence Policy under the aegis of the European Union. If the EU continues to grow by approximately 12 new countries in the next years, it will comprise the world's largest single market, with some 500 million citizens and an economy significantly larger than the one of the United States.

#### **Co-operation between NATO and EU**

The USA has regularly called for action to be taken by the Europeans to strengthen the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic Alliance. Now, Europe is answering this call and America should be confident that no one is aiming at reducing Nato's importance. The purpose of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI is to establish the conditions enabling the Europeans to in future collaborate politically and militarily with their transatlantic partners in the prevention of conflicts and management of crises on a fair burden-sharing basis.

The increase in capacity for action on the European part will form the foundation for a long-term viable partnership – it is a

goal pursued by the Europeans and Americans alike.

The most important strategic objective today is therefore to render the European Union capable of action in security policy matters too. This calls for a common security and defence policy with efficient decision-making mechanisms and military capabilities. The foundations thereto were laid at the EU – Council meetings in Cologne, Helsinki and Nice.

*The further development of NATO and the implementation of the European policy on security and defence are two mutually enhancing processes.*

*In future there will be available two organisations for crisis management tasks. Often it will only become clear in the course of such a crisis which of the two should take the initiative and whether the EU will have to resort to NATO assets and capabilities or will be able to deal with the situation solely with its own means.*

To be prepared for such a case, we need an ongoing and intense dialogue on security issues between NATO and EU and their military bodies. Thus, we can maintain credibility, ensure transparency and complementarity and enable those European NATO states which are not members of the EU to take part in the implementation of this policy. This is imperative, because recourse to NATO assets and capabilities is likely to be the rule rather than the exception in EU-led operations.

Starting under the Portuguese Presidency, arrangements were made to ensure, among other things, that consultations take place between the EU, the non-EU NATO states and the candidates for accession on a regular basis at least twice during the six months a presidency lasts. Two further meetings, one at the ministerial level, are to be held with the European non-EU NATO states.

Should these states support an operation by providing military

forces, they will have the same rights and obligations as the participating EU member states. If they express interest, other non-EU states may also be invited by the Council to take part in operations.

The issue of the participation of non-EU states is closely linked with the arrangements for consultation between NATO and the EU. Framework agreements must be established in this respect. Germany is undertaking substantial efforts to help make the European security and defence policy a success.

Our objective is to ensure that, by the end of the year 2001, the EU has workable decision-making structures and military capabilities and thus the initial operational capacity for action which it needs in the context of the lower spectrum of Petersberg tasks. Thereafter it should be able to enhance this capacity as planned.

### **An Effective European Security and Defence Policy**

The completion of European integration is a central objective of German foreign and security policy. Overcoming nationalism by integrating countries and their interests has guaranteed Europe an unprecedented period of peace, prosperity and stability and made it possible for Germany to attain reunification in agreement with its partners and neighbours. The EU is the most successful European peace project of this century and we Germans, in particular, have a keen interest in keeping this project moving.

The most important strategic goal today is the expansion of the European Union. It is in our own best interest to swiftly enlarge the area of stability in Europe. However, the desired expansion must neither undermine nor paralyse the Community.

The successful conclusion of the intergovernmental conference, which was the aim of the Nice summit, is therefore important in order to guarantee the capacity for action of the expanded Euro-

pean Union in matters of foreign and security policy by practicable co-ordination mechanisms. We have already made significant progress over the past two years:

**First:** The European Union will be able to act on its own in matters of crisis management when NATO as a whole chooses not to become involved.

By cultivating and concentrating the military and non-military machinery of crisis management, the European Union will be able to avail itself of the entire spectrum of crisis management and crisis control tools; these range from diplomacy, humanitarian aid and economic measures through non-military police operations to peacemaking military operations. The political and institutional foundations for this are currently being laid in the EU.

Since last March, interim bodies created for this purpose in Brussels have been devoting a great deal of time and effort to the establishment of EU crisis management structures. In the future, a Political and Security Committee, a European Military Committee, a European Military Staff and a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management will make it possible for Brussels to carry out crisis management tasks.

The permanent structures will be implemented in the course of the next months so that the bodies will be functional in the first half of this year. *In any case*, however, collective defence of all Alliance members and their territories remains solely the responsibility of NATO. It also retains its important role in crisis management.

**Second:** A European Armaments Agency is to be established as soon as possible in order to harmonise planning and procurement. We hope that this will enable us to enhance economic efficiency when we equip our armed forces and to give interoperability a new prospect in the European context.

**Third:** According to the goals of the European security and defence policy, we will complement crisis management capabilities with the civilian sector. In Feira, a target for civilian police capabilities was defined. By the year 2003, the EU should be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for crisis management tasks. Similar targets are being defined with a view to strengthening civilian administration, the judicial system and disaster relief capabilities. We expect that further progress will be made on these issues under the Swedish Presidency. *The European Union will thus be able to pursue a comprehensive approach having at its disposal the full range of crisis prevention and management capabilities.*

And last but not least, **fourth:** In 2001 we will complete the reorganisation of the Western European Union, whose only functions will then be to fulfil its commitments under Article 5 and to continue the work of its Parliamentary Assembly. The Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies will be incorporated into the European Union as agencies. The ISS could maintain the dialogue with the United States in the framework of the transatlantic forum.

I hope it has become very clear that the EU's policy on security and defence, as I have just outlined, is to strengthen but not to replace the Alliance. It will provide America with much more capable European partners able and willing to take on more responsibility.

### **Defence Capabilities Initiative**

Now let us turn to measures to be taken in NATO itself to address the transatlantic balance. In this perspective, the new US administration will focus on strengthening the Alliance and improving its capabilities in accordance with the new Strategic Concept and the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The implementation of these 1999 Washington Summit decisions will remain a key concern for the US. With all respect to ESDP, the USA will keep a particularly close

eye on the direction in which the Europeans' limited resources flow. I shall come back to this.

Conflict prevention, crisis management, partnership and co-operation have been reformulated in Nato's new Strategic Concept as key means of enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. They have meanwhile become the tasks the Alliance is more likely to be called upon, in contrast to the less likely contingency of collective defence in response to an act of large-scale aggression. So there has been a clear shift of emphasis in favour of these new tasks, though an assured defence capability remains the basis for both.

The idea behind DCI is to adapt Nato's military capabilities to the changes in the strategic requirements that have been taking place for more than ten years now and to improve interoperability throughout the Alliance, notably in the field of C3I.

Under DCI, the allies have undertaken to and adapt their capabilities in the key areas of "command, control and information systems", "deployability and mobility", "effective engagement", "sustainability and logistics" and "survivability" to the entire spectrum of tasks from conflict prevention and crisis management to collective defence. These capability shortfalls became particularly evident in the operations in Kosovo and are undoubtedly more pronounced within the armed forces of the European member states of NATO than within the US forces.

We have identified strategic transport, strategic intelligence and command, control and communications as the three priority areas in which improvements will particularly help to both enhance the national capabilities and strengthen the European pillar of NATO. And by deciding to procure a new European transport aircraft (Airbus A 400) and refit the Airbus 310 fleet for the dual role of tanker and transport, we have already taken initial concrete steps.

The procurement of a radar satellite system – the catch-word is Synthetic Aperture Radar, SAR magnifier – not only means that we will for the first time be acquiring a national strategic intelligence capacity. Far more important is the fact that this system will be combined with the French optical reconnaissance satellite currently under development to form the nucleus of a European space borne reconnaissance system.

The ability of the Europeans to autonomously collect information on a global scale by means of satellite-based reconnaissance is a key prerequisite for effective crisis management and conflict prevention. The completion of the SAR magnifier programme and the potential for improvement within the European context will give Germany and Europe this core capability, hence not only increasing our region's independence in the decision-finding process, but also establishing the precondition for it to adopt the position of an equal in the intelligence market.

In my view the existence of a so-called technology gap between the USA and Europe is indisputable. Europeans are now trying to overcome this through intensified defence co-operation. The transatlantic relationship could contribute more to keep Europe technologically abreast, and it should be improved in this regard.

#### **The European Headline Goal and the Reform of the Bundeswehr**

The improvement and strengthening of European defence capabilities is directly linked to the further development of the European Headline Goal and on our German side to the Reform of the Bundeswehr.

By 2003, the EU will be provided with a rapidly available land force totalling around 60,000 soldiers as well as appropriate naval and air forces. They will be able to be deployed within 60 days and to sustain complex crisis manage-

ment operations for at least a year.

It is important to underline the fact that the "European Headline Goal" neither aims at the creation of additional armed forces nor a European army. Instead, existing multinational and national staffs as well as formations will be further developed into a set of forces with the help of the NATO force planning process.

At the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on the European Headline Goal, Member States made a suitably sized commitment of approximately 100,000 soldiers, 400 aircraft and 100 ships; this alone fulfils quantitative requirements. With the transfer of stability in mind, we are especially pleased with the contributions from third-party states which are not or not yet members of the EU. In this way, they have shown their willingness to support the EU in possible future crisis management operations.

The Federal Republic of Germany will make available to the EU a force pool of around 30,000 soldiers to be selected. In an EU-led operation, we would contribute a maximum of 18,000 soldiers from this pool – that is to say approximately 12,000 Army soldiers including supporting forces as well as approximately 6000 soldiers from the Air Force, Navy and Medical Service. This is a formidable challenge in terms of both quantity and quality. These forces will not be made permanently available to the EU but will be provided only when required.

In line with international commitments and the new requirements Germany is undertaking a structural realignment of the Bundeswehr which coincides with the European Headline Goal.

Let me mention the main elements of our reform:

- The size of our readiness forces will be substantially increased to 150,000, and our equipment will be adapted to meet the re-

quirements of both NATO and the European Union.

- The increase in our readiness forces will enable the Bundeswehr to participate in one major operation with up to 50.000 soldiers for a period of up to one year or two medium-sized operations, each with up to 10.000 soldiers, for several years. Looking at the 7.500 men currently deployed in the Balkans this is indeed a significant improvement.
- We will eliminate the separation between main defence forces and crisis reaction forces. Our forces will be composed of readiness forces and a basic military organisation for a force build-up and peacetime operations.
- The overall strength of the standing armed forces will be 255,000 plus 22,000 posts for training and qualification. The overall peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr will be approximately 360,000.
- The equipment of the Bundeswehr will undergo a complete modernisation and will be rapidly tailored to the changed operational requirements.
- We will focus on improving key capabilities such as strategic transport, strategic reconnaissance and command and control.
- Our command and control organisation will be restructured and adapted to the requirements of joint and combined operations.
- We will establish a permanent Joint Operations Command that will also be available as an Operation Headquarters for EU-led operations.
- We will streamline the structure of our forces by establishing a Joint Support Command for all joint, territorial and supporting functions.
- As many other NATO and EU countries have done in the past, we have opened up

our armed forces to women on a voluntary basis.

- We will retain the conscription of young men for operational reasons. This will give us the flexibility necessary to respond to external uncertainties. Conscripts will continue to be needed – albeit fewer than at present.
- We will intensify co-operation with trade, commerce and industry in order to improve cost effectiveness and economic efficiency and to create new financial leeway for investing in equipment and maintenance.

### Conclusions

In summarising I would like to present to you two theses which from my point of view are dominating factors concerning new structures and capabilities for a new partnership.

#### **First: Continue to develop the Euro-Atlantic Community and the indispensable Transatlantic Link.**

Even though Europe has undergone significant political changes the transatlantic partnership remains the cornerstone of our security. Common security in Europe without the North American anchor in Europe is impossible. The nations on both sides of the Atlantic ocean are interconnected in a broad variety of economical, cultural, political, historical and security political ties which result in common strategies. In this regard we are obliged to further develop the transatlantic link on all levels to lay the basis for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### **Second: Strengthen Europe's abilities to act**

Within a new Europe there is a need for extend abilities to react for the European Union but also for the European members of the Alliance. Last year the EU has taken a number of important decisions to make Europe a more capable institution. In the future also the EU will be able to carry out independent military crisis management operations when NATO as a whole is not engaged. European countries

are undertaking big efforts to improve their capabilities thereby strengthening Europe and at the same time the European pillar of the Alliance.

Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger, Stabsabteilungsleiter FüS III, BMVg, Berlin

## THEMEN

# Deutschland – Die Zukunft

1. Überlegungen über Deutschlands Rolle in der Zukunft müssen im Jahre 1989/1990 ansetzen, beim Fall der Mauer und der Wiedervereinigung. Bis zum Ende der europäischen Teilung und des Ost- West-Gegensatzes war Deutschland nicht nur geteilt, sondern auch nicht uneingeschränkt souverän. Für Deutschland und Berlin als Ganzes waren die Vier Mächte verantwortlich und für die Sicherheit und Freiheit von Berlin-West die drei westlichen Schutzmächte.

Nach dem totalen Zusammenbruch 1945, der Zerstörung des Landes durch den Krieg und der Verwüstung der Menschen durch die Grauen der Nazibarbarei, angesichts von Millionen Toten und Kriegsgefangenen, millionenfacher Flucht und Vertreibung konzentrierten sich die Deutschen zunächst auf den wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau mit unerwartet großem Erfolg.

Allmählich lernte man, die Früchte zu genießen, und das alte Vorurteil, die Deutschen lebten nur um zu arbeiten, wurde zunehmend widerlegt. "Weltmeister im Reisen" und "Freizeitgesellschaft" wurden Stichworte. Im Übermaß genossen wird bekanntlich alles auch zur Plage, und so wuchs mit dem Konsum nicht in gleichem Maße Zufriedenheit, sondern eher Verdrießlichkeit. Außenpolitisch war die Verantwortlichkeit ja eingeschränkt.

Für Frieden und Sicherheit waren letztlich die Verbündeten, insbesondere die Amerikaner, zuständig, was den Deutschen

ein umso schärferes Urteil ermöglichte, was die anderen jeweils richtig oder falsch machten. Durch eigene Erfahrungen scheinbar eher geläutert, ersetzte man Verantwortung gerne durch Betroffenheit.

2. Damit war 1989/1990 Schluss. "Germany United and Europe transformed", wie der Titel des berühmten Buches von Zelikow-Rice lautet, ein vereintes Deutschland in einem veränderten Europa, das stellte neue Anforderungen an die Deutschen.

Die erste Reaktion war eine intellektuelle Debatte, ob Deutschland nun nicht wieder Zentralmacht in Europa sei und sich aus Bindungen der europäischen und atlantischen Integration zugunsten einer Mittlerrolle zwischen Ost und West oder einer neuen Führungsrolle in Europa löse. Die Befürchtungen, die nicht nur Margret Thatcher und Francois Mitterrand nach dem Fall der Mauer hatten, waren ganz ähnlich.

Allzu viel Resonanz fand die Debatte in Deutschland nicht, sowie sich auch die Besorgnis unserer europäischen Freunde nicht bestätigte. Umgekehrt mussten sich die Deutschen daran gewöhnen, dass gleiche Rechte auch gleiche Verantwortung bedeuten.

Dass die Deutschen im Umgang mit militärischer Macht kein unbefangenes Verhältnis mehr haben, ist nach den Irrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts nicht nur verständlich, sondern für alle unsere Partner im Zweifel das geringere Übel. Aber weil Frieden noch immer ohne militärische Mittel dauerhaft nicht überall, nicht einmal in Europa, gesichert ist, mussten wir Deutsche lernen, uns zu beteiligen. Golf-Krieg 1991, Bosnien 1995, Kosovo 1999 lauteten die Stationen.

Zwischen Ost und West keimte in Deutschland zunehmend Verdrießlichkeit auf, weil an die Stelle der Euphorie des wundersamen Jahres nach dem Fall der Mauer die Mühsal des Alltags getreten war und weil wir besser

begriffen, dass in Ost und West nicht nur die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Ergebnisse dramatisch unterschiedlich geworden waren, sondern dass wir in über vier Jahrzehnten Teilung in zwei ganz unterschiedlichen Welten gelebt hatten und durch ganz andersartige Erfahrungen geprägt wurden.

Noch heute gibt es deshalb in alten und neuen Bundesländern signifikante Einstellungsunterschiede zu europäischer Einigung oder atlantischer Integration, aber auch etwa in der Offenheit gegenüber Nachbarn oder Ausländern. Wer das kritisiert, verkennt die Wirkung von vierzig Jahren Mauer und Stacheldraht. Bedenkt man die Ausgangslage, dann haben die Deutschen in zehn Jahren einen gewaltigen Lernprozess mehr als achtbar bewältigt.

3. Die Aufgabe, die Deutschlands Zukunft uns stellt, lautet, eine neue Balance zu finden zwischen den Anforderungen, die an uns als ein für europäische Verhältnisse relativ großes Land in der Mitte des Kontinents gelegen, mit grundsätzlich gleichen Rechten und Verantwortlichkeit gestellt werden, und den Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, die nicht nur das Grauen der Naziverbrechen und die Zerstörung des Zweiten Weltkriegs umfassen, sondern auch den Ersten Weltkrieg, das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik und die über vierzig Jahre Teilung.

Die fünfundsiebzig Jahre von 1914 bis 1989 wirken vielfältig weiter, und nur vor diesem Hintergrund kann ein Nichtdeutscher überhaupt verstehen, was für Streitigkeiten man in Deutschland über sonst so selbstverständliche Fragen wie Identität, Patriotismus oder Leitkultur führen kann.

Wenn wir mit unseren niederländischen Nachbarn über Sterbehilfe diskutieren wollen, spürt man das auch. Die Niederländer verwenden das Wort "Euthanasie" ganz unbefangen; in Deutschland geht das nicht und hoffentlich niemals wieder. Was aber beileibe nicht heißen

kann, dass wir Grund hätten, uns anderen moralisch überlegen zu fühlen.

4. Um das Gleichgewicht zwischen Erfahrung aus der Geschichte und Verantwortung für die Zukunft zu halten, ist die erste Aufgabe, Verständnis für die existenzielle Bedeutung von Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft und in der politischen Prioritätensetzung zurück zu gewinnen. Schwärmerische Betroffenheit reicht nicht aus, realistisches Handeln ist gefordert. Und dazu gehört auch das Wissen, dass wer handelt, immer auch schuldig wird.

Entsprechendes gilt auch für die Wahrnehmung von Bedrohungen, wo wir die Extreme von hysterischer Übertreibung und realitätsverweigernder Vergesslichkeit meiden und zu realistischer Analyse finden müssen.

5. Die wichtigste Antwort heißt dabei für uns europäische Einigung. Ein großes, starkes, einigtes Europa ist für uns Deutsche die beste Vorsorge für die Zukunft. Europäische Einigung aber ist nicht Alternative oder Ersatz für atlantische Partnerschaft, sondern der wichtigste Beitrag, um sie dauerhaft wirkungsstark zu halten. Die Amerikaner haben lange und zu Recht einen stärkeren europäischen Pfeiler in der Atlantischen Allianz gefordert, sie sollten ihn jetzt nicht fürchten.

Den einen oder anderen unserer Freunde in Europa werden wir dafür noch gewinnen müssen. Aber für uns Deutsche bleibt klar: Europäische Einigung und Atlantische Allianz sind zwei Seiten derselben Medaille. Das bedeutet auch, dass die Europäer bereit sein müssen, schrittweise mehr globale Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Atlantische Partnerschaft kann auf Dauer sich nicht auf Europa beschränken. Partnership in leadership bot Präsident Bush (sen.) 1991 den Deutschen an. Ich habe schon damals gesagt, dass Partner der Amerikaner besser ein starkes Europa ist und dass die Deutschen in genau diese Richtung ihren Beitrag leisten.



Als alleinige Führungs- und Ordnungsmacht in der Welt werden die Amerikaner auf Dauer den Versuchungen, sich entweder überfordert zu fühlen oder sich selbst zu überschätzen, nicht widerstehen können, und deshalb brauchen die USA ein starkes Europa als Partner, zunehmend auch in globaler Verantwortung.

Aber die erste Aufgabe der Europäer ist die Sicherung von Freiheit und Stabilität in Europa selbst, und deshalb ist die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union die wichtigste Aufgabe. Sie ist nicht nur Ergebnis einer moralischen Verpflichtung aus der Vergangenheit, sondern sie entspricht vor allem unserem wohl verstandenen Eigeninteresse. Damit die Europäische Union diese Aufgaben bewältigen kann, muss sie Verständnis und Unterstützung der Menschen behalten und verbessern.

Effizienz, Transparenz und demokratische Legitimation sind die Ziele, die eine europäische Verfassungsdebatte erfordern. Sie wird nur gelingen, wenn das richtige Verhältnis zwischen Nation und Europa bewahrt wird, und das heißt Stärkung der Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union einerseits und Stärkung der verbleibenden Eigenverantwortung der nationalstaatlich verfassten Mitgliedsstaaten andererseits. Das geht nur nach den Prinzipien von Dezentralisierung, Subsidiarität, Föderalismus.

6. Dezentralisierung bedeutet auch, ein überzogenes Maß von Regulierung und Bürokratisierung abzubauen. Auf diese Weise stärken wir Innovation und Flexibilität in einer sich durch die ungeheuren Beschleunigungen von Naturwissenschaften und Kommunikation immer schneller verändernden Welt. Erfahrungen aus zurückliegenden Jahrzehnten haben nicht nur, aber besonders in Deutschland auch zu einer spezifischen Variante von Sicherheitsdenken geführt, nämlich einer Tendenz zunehmender Verrechtlichung aller Lebensbereiche. Verwaltungshandeln etwa wird oft zu stark auf Gesetzesin-

terpretation beschränkt. Darin liegt eine Versuchung zur Verantwortungsminimierung, weil für den jeweils Zuständigen die Einhaltung von Vorschriften wichtiger wird als das Ergebnis seiner Entscheidung. Eine Rückführung der Regulierungserwartungen an den Staat und eine Rückgewinnung von Entscheidungsräumen auch für Verwaltung verbessert die Zukunftsfähigkeit. Deregulierung statt zentralistischer Bürokratie.

7. Weil Regulierungserwartung auch mit egalitärem Denken zu tun hat, liegt in dem Unterschied zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Wettbewerb einerseits und bürokratischem Zentralismus andererseits die innenpolitische Wasserscheide. Die politische Linke neigt aus ihrem egalitären Gerechtigkeitsverständnis im Zweifel immer zu zentralen Lösungsansätzen, die in der Lebenswirklichkeit zu bürokratischer Bevormundung degenerieren.

Auch wenn man das jetzt Teilhabe, Konsensrunde oder Bündnis für Arbeit nennt, wird das Ergebnis deshalb nicht besser. Der Krampf um die Reform des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes belegt das ebenso wie eine tarifvertragliche Wirklichkeit, die Unternehmensleitung, Betriebsrat und Belegschaft vorschreibt, worüber sie sich einigen dürfen und worüber nicht. Dem entspricht eine Steuerreform, die durch die Benachteiligung von Einzelunternehmen und Personengesellschaften gegenüber Kapitalgesellschaften die Unternehmer in der Wahl der Rechtsform für ihre Tätigkeit beschränkt oder durch unterschiedliche Besteuerung von ausgeschütteten und nicht ausgeschüttetem Gewinn Kapitalallokation nicht dem Wettbewerb der Finanzmärkte, sondern dem Gutdünken des Steuergesetzgebers überlässt.

Die Hochschulen sind ein besonders eindrucksvolles Beispiel für zuviel Regulierung. Die notwendige quantitative Ausweitung seit Mitte der sechziger Jahre hat mit einem Übermaß an Regulierung dazu geführt, dass unsere Position in der Weltspitze von

Wissenschaft und Forschung nicht eben besser geworden ist. Wer sich damit nicht abfinden will, braucht mehr Differenzierung. Wer in der Bildungspolitik sich zu ausschließlich auf das berechnete Ziel des Ausgleichs von Benachteiligungen konzentriert, übersieht, dass Chancengerechtigkeit von unterschiedlichen Talenten und Neigungen ausgehen muss. Eine der Lasten aus der Vergangenheit, die in Deutschland nachwirken, ist eben auch die Zerstörung von Eliten und Autorität. Die aber bleiben notwendig, um in einer unübersichtlicher werdenden Welt Orientierung zu vermitteln. Das hat dann auch mit Werten und Identität zu tun.

8. Deutsches Zukunftsinteresse ist, ruhige Mitte in Europa zu sein. Das erfordert europäische Einigung und atlantische Partnerschaft, und das setzt ein entspanntes Selbstbewusstsein der Deutschen voraus. Geschichtliche Erfahrung und die Fähigkeit, daraus zu lernen, aber auch Zukunftsmut und die Bereitschaft zu realistischer Verantwortung in einer globalisierten Welt. So wird aus Deutschland ein verlässlicher Partner.

Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, MdB,  
Berlin

## THEMEN

### **NMD and ESDP: Stormy Weather or Strategic Co-operation Across the Atlantic?**

Currently, one could easily have the impression that transatlantic relations are in a crisis. Two major "hot topics" dominate the political debates across the Atlantic and it seems as if Europe and the United States cannot find consensus on security and defense issues anymore.

On the one hand, America fears that the project of creating a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with robust and flexible military forces

for the future could undermine NATO alliance. On the other hand, Europe is tempted to believe that U.S. plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD), or more recently simply referred to as Missile Defense (MD), could seriously put global strategic balance at risk by creating a new arms race. In addition to that, Europe claims, such a system would undermine the Atlantic alliance as well since it would create different spheres of security within NATO. Although both European and American claims seem valid at first glance, they call for some adjustment. Although NMD is still way in its technical and political infancy, it is the most discussed of the two programs right now.

However, for the near future both sides of the Atlantic should focus with same the intensity, if not more, on the more eminent and realizable of the two projects: that is creating capable European military forces to strengthen NATO. There is the danger that the European goal of building military capacities could too easily be lost out of sight through the overwhelming debate on NMD. But just as important as missile defense is in order to find protection against weapons of mass destruction by "states of concern", NATO will need to have a strong and ready NATO alliance for future conflict resolution.

It is therefore necessary to stress that ESDP will not undermine NATO. Since the end of the cold war, decision-makers of the U.S. have repeatedly expressed their being in favor of a Europe with advanced military capabilities. Political pressure from the U.S. as well as negative experiences during conflict resolution at local conflicts of the 90ies have significantly shaped European awareness that having own military capabilities are necessary in order to preserve and to stabilize NATO.

The U.S. as the world's only superpower cannot shape international security alone. Constant military commitments all around the globe have severely stretched U.S. forces to its limit. It needs capable partners and,

finally, Europe has understood that. To support the U.S. is truly Europe's aim. Europe has too long benefited from American protection and friendship as that it would simply destroy these important political and cultural links. Countries that extraordinarily shape this European process like Germany or the United Kingdom appreciate transatlantic relations and would not let anything drift Europe away from the U.S. In addition to that, they are realistic enough to know that Europe cannot, for many years to come, become whole and free without America's global security shield and military might.

That is why America should look at ESDP in a more relaxed and supporting manner. One point of unnecessary confusion is the American call for "no duplication of assets" since this definition is not quite accurate. The U.S. is right to urge Europe to be included in the ESDP process. Europe should guarantee America full transparency over what it does. That means the political and strategic planning process between the European Union and NATO on military issues should be merged.

However, there are going to be "duplications" but they are all but worrisome. In fact, they are necessary. Without them, a strong European military pillar within NATO is unthinkable. Just to name a few, Europe will procure a Future Transport Aircraft, the Airbus 400M, to build up desperately needed strategic airlift capabilities. Although the U.S. possesses a quite admirable airlift fleet, the procurement of transport aircraft for European armed forces poses a "welcome duplication" for NATO as a whole. The same applies for European air-refueling capacities. In order to sustain air operations abroad and to mobilize NATO troops within short time, the alliance must duplicate such efforts.

This process, however, will only lead to success if both the U.S. and Europe work together. Certainly, Europe must provide the bulk of the work this time. Only

by credibly demonstrating their ambition to strengthen NATO, they will receive the full and necessary support by the U.S.. At stake is nothing less than the future of the world's most successful military alliance. However, Europe will act credibly this time and that is for a simple reason. It is fully aware that its security was, is and will remain linked to America's security and that NATO is the institution that preserves this security. That is also why ESDP will, in the end, not undermine America's superpower status but only strengthen it.

Martin Agüera, Defense News, Büchenbeuren

#### THEMEN

## Cross-Straits Relations: Get Back onto the Political Track and Postpone Arms Sales to Taiwan

In dealing with Taiwan the new administration, has so far primarily focused on Formosa's defense. It is likely that George W. Bush will agree to sell Taiwan several sensitive weapon systems that the Clinton administration had held back on. Such a course could prove to be very dangerous, since it would be seen as an unfriendly act by China and it could easily set an arms race in motion. Weapon sales for Taiwan today will not buy security for the people of Taiwan in the future. The island's security has to be understood in broader terms. In the long run Taiwan's democracy, prosperity and well-being will depend on how Taipei and Beijing manage their relationship. Instead of further fueling cross-strait tensions with the sale of advanced military technology, the United States should develop policies that get the relationship off the military track and back onto the political track.

President Bush is currently considering whether to sell upgraded Patriot anti-missile systems and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with sophisticated Aegis battle-management systems. The decision on the sale scheduled to be made in April will be particularly sensitive and has the potential to precipitate a serious crisis with Beijing. China is very concerned about the Bush administration's policy towards Taiwan, therefore the decision on Aegis is perceived as being a verdict on the general course of U.S.-China relations. The sale of this technology would signal that the U.S. is prepared to insert itself into any conflict between Taiwan and the Mainland. It would also be seen as a sign that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice the progress it has made in slowing China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China's security experts fear the sale indicates that the United States is moving closer to the idea of including Taiwan in a missile defense network that it hopes to design for Asia. High-ranking Chinese officials have issued warnings to the new administration about the quality and quantity of the arms deal. China's leading foreign policy representative, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, is scheduled to arrive in Washington this week in order to express China's grave concerns on the issue. These concerns should not be taken lightly, as China's foreign policy makers are mainly worried about the advanced systems while they keep quiet about other parts of the deal. The Vice Premier's visit opens a window of opportunity for negotiations which Bush's foreign policy team should seize, despite all the talk about being tough on China.

Every administration has sought to keep both sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking fateful steps that could lead to conflict, but developments over the past decade have nevertheless led to increased militarization and decreased trust in cross-strait relations. Taiwan faces the People's Liberation Army's missile build-up and arms

acquisitions directly targeted against the island. In response, Taiwan upgrades defense capabilities to counter China's threat to use force. Despite the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, U.S. arms sales have been significant in the 1990s. In the 8-year period from 1992 to 1999, arms deliveries (primarily from the U.S.) received by Taiwan totaled \$20.6 billion. The cooperation between U.S. and Taiwan military establishment has grown closer. The Mainland fears that a further increase in arms supply will endorse the self-confident Taiwanese in pushing for independence and it is ready to fight any such attempt.

If this arms race continues, the potential for crisis or even outright war is going to grow and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is going to become more and more difficult. Beijing's response to an Aegis sale would be an immediate increase in the number of missiles deployed in southern China. It is also likely that the PLA would stage new military exercises off Taiwan if Washington pushes ahead with the sales. Reliance on military power will not increase Taiwan's security, because Taipei cannot compete with the Beijing in an arms race. The hard reality is that given the Mainland's size and Taiwan's location, Taiwan will probably never attain long lasting security without reaching a negotiated relationship with the Mainland. Taipei should worry less about good relations with Washington and instead work hard on fixing the broken ones with Beijing. The U.S. has committed itself to take action for Taiwan's defense should the Mainland attack Taiwan without provocation. The Taiwan Relations Act is Taiwan's true security guarantor and the U.S. will continue to provide defensive weapons and protection to Taiwan under the terms of the TRA.

Arms sales should be limited though. The upcoming deal is the litmus test on how far the new administration is willing to go on Taiwan. Cross-strait relations can not be solved by military

force – President Bush should shift his focus on this most sensitive and complex issue in U.S.-China relations to the political side. The impasse between the two sides is fraught with danger – it threatens not only U.S. interests but as well broader peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the current low level of tensions, without some common framework for managing cross-strait relations the likeliness of a crisis over even unintended incidents is all too real. The United States must make every effort to bring back the diplomatic dimensions of the relationship back to the fore.

The U.S. must insist on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and should design its policy accordingly. Such a policy should try to increase mutual trust and encourage resumption of cross-straits dialogue. Any sign of flexibility and constructive thinking should be supported. The relatively positive rhetoric coming from both Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian and opposition leader Lien Chan are indicators of such momentum. Recently Qian Qichen has also shown some flexibility in the Mainland's position on the future of cross-straits relations by saying that "anything could be discussed." The Bush administration should take advantage of this opening and move even beyond urging both sides to seek meaningful dialogue; it should privately offer to facilitate it. The U.S. has to caution Beijing about its arms build-up against Taiwan; at the same time it would serve Taiwan's security interest best by rethinking the most sensitive arms sales to Taipei in order to give the recent positive signs a chance to mature. This being said, President Bush should also make clear to Beijing that if the PRC refuses dialogue with the current leadership in Taipei and continues its military enhancements, the administration will be forced to do more for Taiwan on arms sales and other issues.

At the moment it is crucial to take the visit of Vice Premier Qian Qichen very seriously and listen carefully to what he has to say. President Bush should offer a postponement of the arms deliveries to Taipei against Beijing's commitment to stop stationing short and medium range missiles at the Taiwan Strait. This would give the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship grounds for meaningful dialogue.

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Knut Dethlefsen, Washington

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