

Denkwürdigkeiten



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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

dieses Mal hatten wir unsere amerikanischen Freunde in Berlin zu Gast! Die CSIS-Delegation konnte zu keinem bessern Zeitpunkt kommen. Die neue Bundesregierung unter Dr. Angela Merkel stand kurz vor der Amtseinführung. Und die pmg konnte einige Mitglieder aufbieten, die an der Durchführung der neuen Politik mitwirken werden. Der Fragenkatalog war klar: Wie werden sich die transatlantischen Beziehungen entwickeln? Wird Berlin seine sicherheitspolitischen Positionen überprüfen?

Die Konferenzberichte in dieser Ausgabe der **Denkwürdigkeiten** zeigen, dass der Dialog zwischen der pmg und dem CSIS auf hohem Niveau statt findet und die gemeinsamen Anstrengungen voranbringt.

Mit den besten Wünschen für ein gutes Jahr 2006!

Heinz Schulte ist Vorstandsmitglied der pmg

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Change and Continuity: Impressions from Berlin

As the new German chancellor goes to work, the central questions in her country's relationship with the United States are not about what will or will not change from Schröder to Merkel, but rather how to understand the changing parameters of the past decade and a half. German and U.S. interests, perceptions and priorities have never been identical, but were usually similar enough throughout the Cold War, and into the final term of Helmut Kohl, to impart a sense of comfortable predictability to the bilateral relationship. Now, in the post-9/11 world, there is an increasingly palpable sense that Germany and the United States are diverging in their global priorities, and that our perceptions of one another bear a diminishing resemblance to how we think of ourselves.

Viewed from the United States, German foreign policy is an ever more confusing blend of the old principle-based, NATO- and EU-centric identity with a newly found assertiveness in pursuing national interests. Viewed from Germany, the rationale behind many U.S. policies has become impossible to relate to, as the American people appear to embrace an equally unfathomable brand of evangelicalism and conservative politics in growing numbers.

For all this, the significance of divergence need not be overblown by exaggerated perceptions. The bedrock of the relationship remains solid and deep, anchored in our economic interdependence and overwhelmingly shared cultural values. Although the invasion of Iraq inflamed concerns of growing U.S. unilateralism to come, both states remain committed to NATO as the central pillar around which Euro-Atlantic cooperation on security issues revolves. Germany continues to be a key partner to the United States on the ground in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, and in the wider

campaign against terrorism. The German military is in the midst of an intense transformation designed to maintain the relevance of its forces alongside their American counterparts in the 21st century security environment. Where we diverge, it is more often than a not a dispute over means, or even strategy, but not over ultimate goals. This is a strong foundation upon which to stand.

But do we face, nevertheless, creeping estrangement made inevitable by a changing world? As we have seen, questions of how to go from "here" to "there" can be dramatically polarizing, even when we agree on where "there" is. And there remains no shortage of such questions to be addressed urgently, starting with how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions, how to balance reform and stability in the Greater Middle East, and how best to counter the threat of Islamist terrorism, to name but a few. The danger is that coordinated transatlantic action on these issues will be mired in irresolvable debates over method, hindering joint pursuit of common interests and thus making success less likely. This makes the challenge one of how to transform such irreconcilable differences from contradictory into complementary approaches.

Those who assumed the election of Angela Merkel would be enough to realign U.S. and German worldviews failed to fully appreciate the degree of structural change that has occurred in the past fifteen years. Individual personalities—Gerhard Schröder or George W. Bush—do not adequately explain why Americans and Germans increasingly view the same subject through a different lens. Certainly, some aspects of this phenomenon—attitudes about the use of force, for example—stem from long before the end of the Cold War. In a world freed from the constraints of rigid bipolarity, these factors suddenly became significant, and therefore more noticeable. We have still not grown wholly accustomed to the notion that we may not be able to convince one other

to see things our own way when it really matters.

But dumbfounded Americans must find perspective on how profoundly Germany's circumstances and identity have been in flux since the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the domestic level, the social and economic consequences of reunification have not nearly run their course, as conditions in many eastern regions continue to lag far behind those in the west. Germany's European context too often receives insufficient attention from U.S. observers, not allowing for the magnitude of the Maastricht Treaty, the exchange of the deutsch mark for the euro, or the eastward enlargement of the European Union. Any one of these monumental tectonic shifts on its own necessitates a preoccupying process of redefinition and reexamination that cannot be concluded within a matter of a few years. Taken all together, even spread over the course of a decade, such a barrage of events overtakes the ability, from either side of the Atlantic, to accurately comprehend their full import.

These developments are preoccupying enough, to be sure, but there is much more: Germany and Europe do not exist in a vacuum and cannot look internally to the exclusion of the outside world. The Balkan wars of the 1990s served as a rude introduction to the sometimes chaotic and brutal nature of post-Cold War security conditions. Now, in addition to dealing with problematic states such as Iran and North Korea, the members of the Atlantic Alliance must confront a new breed of amorphous non-state actors that have arisen to threaten the liberal values we commonly cherish. On the other side of the coin, globalization has revolutionized the world economy, presenting new challenges, opportunities and threats to national economies. In between, Germany, Europe, and the United States must engage a rising China and an ambiguous Russia while addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of deadly diseases, the state of the world's environment, issues of global un-

derdevelopment, poverty, and debt, and a host of other modern conundrums. In a world this complicated, it should come as no surprise, really, that even the best of friends can have different ideas of how to go about things, based on interests and perceptions that cannot possibly be identical.

How, then, are Americans to understand today's Germany? German policy does remain based on the principles that have served it so well since the end of the Second World War. Germany's outlook has also become colored as much by the lessons learned as a member state in the European Union as by its history in NATO and the experiences of its own national history. Political ideas and purposes still drive foreign policy goals. But in a changing world, Germany has found that its interests are changing too, and so must its role. Pragmatism is on the rise. The national interest is increasingly defined in economic terms, as Germans struggle with a self-image suffering from their country's lackluster economic performance in recent years. Economics propel Germany's outreach to China. Successful enterprises such as Airbus are lionized in the national psyche. Energy is unabashedly a strategic national interest, the basis of relations with Russia and Central Asia. Instability in the Middle East is a concern on political grounds, but also admittedly feared for the migrations it could trigger.

So Germany has become a "normal", if particularly multi-layered, country. Domestic and European introspections are its key priorities. This means getting the national economy growing, enacting structural reforms, lowering unemployment, and diffusing social tensions. The post-constitutional treaty political crisis of the European Union will require German leadership to get integration back on track. The United States would be well served to take more of an interest in how this crisis plays out. Yet, the demands of introspection must not excuse engagement from those international issues deemed, with justification, most urgent by the United

States. Europe may well have a keener sense of its limitations, of the finite nature of its resources, and of to what extent international events and developments can be managed. But it must continue to leverage the substantial weight it has as a counterpart to the United States. We will have our legitimate differences of opinion, perception, and interest, and these will at times be extraordinarily difficult to overcome. These must not obscure belief in partnership; there is nowhere else to turn but to one another.

By and large, these are problems for governments. Meanwhile, as U.S. force realignment drastically reduces the numbers of American troops based in Germany, a main

avenue of U.S.-German cultural exchange shrinks. Other existing routes will need to be expanded, and new ones will need to be opened. This will require dedication and effort. The number of American scholars of German history, politics and culture, of Americans who speak the German language, of Americans with more than a passing acquaintance with Germany, should not be expected to increase. They will remain a small group proportionally, but must not grow too small. The non-governmental paths of exchange we do have, institutionalized or not, take on added significance to the future of our mutual understanding and cooperation. Germans, too, need more opportunities to remember that

there is far more diversity and dynamism—that there is far more to like—among the American people and their culture than has been perceived of late. Taking the time and interest to peel beneath the surface, we may be pleasantly reminded of what we have to offer one another.

Derek Mix

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Politisch Militärische Gesellschaft e.V. (pmg)



Center for Strategic & International Studies

**2005 U.S.-GERMAN BILATERAL DIALOGUE
PMG/CSIS SEMINAR**

ENERGY & SECURITY

– AGENDA –

Monday, November 21, 2005

- 13:00 **Welcome**
Ralph Thiele, *Chairman, Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft*
Robin Niblett, *Executive Vice President and Europe Program Director, CSIS*
- 13:15 **IRAN, IRAQ AND THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST**
AMERICAN DISCUSSANT: **David Denehy**, *Senior Advisor, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Department*
GERMAN DISCUSSANT: **Dr. Heinrich Kreft**, *Deputy Head, Policy Planning Staff, Federal Foreign Office*
- 15:45 **CHINA AND RUSSIA: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF GREAT POWERS**
AMERICAN DISCUSSANT: **Dr. Robin Niblett**, *Executive Vice President and Europe Program Director, CSIS*
GERMAN DISCUSSANT: **Dr. Frank Umbach**, *Head of the Asia-Pacific Program, Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)*
- 19:00 **U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS: CREEPING ESTRANGEMENT**
Dr. Michael Inacker, *Vice President; External Affairs and Public Policy, Daimler Chrysler AG*
Dr. Ulrich Schlie, *Head of Policy Planning and Advisory Staff, Federal Ministry of Defence*

Tuesday, November 22, 2005

- 8:00 **TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY SECTOR**
AMERICAN DISCUSSANT: **David Scruggs**, *Fellow, Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, International Security Program, CSIS*
GERMAN DISCUSSANT: **Heinz Schulte**, *Vice-Chairman, Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft (pmg) and Editor, GRIEPHAN*
- 10:15 **THE STATE OF EU-NATO COOPERATION**
AMERICAN DISCUSSANT: **Julianne Smith**, *Deputy Director, International Security Program, CSIS*
GERMAN DISCUSSANT: **LTC (GS) Peter Härle**, *Head of Division, Security Policy/Military Strategy Division, Bundeswehr Transformation Center*
- 12:00 **Concluding Remarks**
Robin Niblett, *Executive Vice President and Europe Program Director, CSIS*
Heinz Schulte, *Vice-Chairman, Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft (pmg) and Editor, GRIEPHAN*

THEMEN

Viel Glück Angie – or the Return of Grand Strategy Energy & Security in Transatlantic Relations

The Need for Revitalized
Cooperation
The Need for a Holistic and
Global Focus

Coming together in Berlin as Germany's new *Kanzlerin*, Angela Merkel, took the oath of office, participants in the **pmg-CSIS Annual Conference** drew one main conclusion:

Germany and America must rebuild the basis for their cooperation, and this on a broadening range of global issues.

Maps and Mindsets

The interdependence of globalization's opportunities and threats left many in the group calling for a "holistic" approach. More than information sharing, the participants wanted a "common assessment" of the world in which we live. Comprehensive, combined and joint—such an assessment would lay out a map of the world that America and Europe will need to navigate. The global potential for spreading security and liberty and prosperity would be the central focus.

One might call such a common assessment an Atlantic Road Map—though where the Atlantic ends and the world starts is hardly clear. Such a map would begin with the "European Neighbourhood", the crucial and expanding periphery of the Euro-Atlantic world—but it would not end there. The Atlantic Community needs a global framework. It must be one that captures the reality of a world where some 430 million North Americans and 450 million Europeans are increasingly dependent on the fate of the planet's other, rather less prosperous, billions. Chinese, Indians, Africans, Latin Americans—opportunities and dangers abound. To anticipate and address these is the common challenge—so the view of one observer.

Stability and Change in the Mideast

Turning first to the Mideast, participants noted the dilemma between stability and change. Discussion indicated a growing consensus around the need for dramatic change, as a tactic, if not a strategy. Riding the whirlwind, managing that change, seemed to be the order of the day. The question of stick and carrot focused quickly on Iran and the Bomb. Violation of human rights,

support for terrorism, and rejection of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, if not the existence of Israel, being, for the moment, counts two, three and four of the indictment. The absence of transparent, democratic decision-making "process" in Tehran as well as in Arabic countries on the other side of the Persian Gulf and beyond seemed to lie at the source of these crimes. Keeping the US and the EU on a complementary and effective track in regard to the challenge of Iran will only become important.

Democracy Dilemmas

The Dilemmas of Democracy found an airing, those double-standards involved when Democracies team up with non-Democracies. A policy of differentiation, with one approach for Musharref and another for Ahmadinejad, found common support. That a Democracy might do itself in, voting away the power to vote (like once upon a time in Berlin) would be the one prohibition. Elections as the minimal check on the excesses of government power would become increasingly mandatory. Call it the Brezhnev Doctrine Backwards, or maybe, the Berlin Doctrine. Whether Civil Society, that de Tocquevilleian agent of change and resilience, would provide an entirely peaceful solvent remained contested. Some spoke

of entrenched elites and vested interests who would not give up without a fight.

Russia and China

The United States and the European Union may see both Russia and China as common challenges, but the respective approaches vary. By the same token, while Russia and China are fundamentally different, the questions they pose are clearly intertwined. In this context, both the EU and NATO will need to take a more global approach that focuses more centrally on how the rapidly growing Asian demand for energy will shape the world system. Nor should the EU's growing dependence on imported in energy be overlooked. Past EU faith in market mechanisms to secure access and prevent crisis will be sorely tested. In the same way that many participants felt both NATO and EU should be more involved in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, they argued that a common policy aimed at making China a stakeholder in global peace and prosperity would mean being more engaged with China. It would also mean involving China more actively in the affairs of the Middle East. China's cooperation on health and the environment will also be a vital interest for the US and the EU.

Global Energy Security

Participants emphatically underlined the importance of energy to the security and prosperity of Europe and America and the world beyond. Political fires in Mideast oilfields remain a taxing problem, even as the war in Iraq no longer dominates the German-American agenda—much to the satisfaction of the conference attendees. New energy challenges compound the old ones. Russia and Central Asia combine vast energy reserves with strong-armed centralized planning—and a resulting lack of investment. India and China, with their voracious appetite for energy, including Mideast oil and gas, add one more complicating dimension to the Mideast chessboard—each Asian nation a giant with over a billion consumers anxious to shop

and drive and live the good life. The conference heard how fragmented, how national, and how dysfunctional, European energy markets and policies were—in a way not unlike the *Waffen-schmiede*, the arms markets, the security sectors of Europe. That the security sector and the energy sector were becoming increasingly intertwined in a vulnerable and interdependent world was clear to conference participants.

Interest and Appreciation in German-American Relations

German interests in the lands across the Mediterranean found a listing, if not a prioritization. Berlin's interests would be: energy access; security in the face of terrorism and WMD; Israeli-Palestinian peace; population movements; and the geopolitical unity of the European Union. The EU's Barcelona project, participants agreed, was in need of a big rethink—and resync with the other engaged international institutions—all of which seem to be getting more involved in Mideast democracy-building, if not terrorist-hunting.

The vexing nature of German-American relations came up repeatedly, whether in the Axel Springer Haus or over dinner at the Hessian Representation in Berlin. All agreed: Bush has not made it easy for America's friends in Germany. Some would add: Schröder did not make it easy for Germany's friends in America. *Viel Glück, Angie!*

A little more common appreciation might be in order. Relations can not be based on gratitude or sentimentality alone, one often hears. All the same, appreciation for what has been achieved since the end of the Cold War, if not since 1945, might help put some of the current quibbles in a more humble and historical perspective. Appreciation for what is being achieved today—in building a Europe whole and free and prosperous and safe—is often wanting, so one participant. At a minimum, such acknowledgement of common success would add a little lubrication to the many frictions that arise across the dense

web of interaction that is 21st Century German-American relations. An appreciation for how much each can help the other, not only today, but tomorrow, in facing up to the challenges of globalizing prosperity, of a rising Asia, and of the world's profound vulnerability in age of rapid technological innovation—such an appreciation should again become part of the German-American discourse.

Transformation and Grand Strategy

What was once a revolution in military affairs is now Transformation—a new coin for the realm. The only constant: Transformation's transformation. Nothing endures but change, Heraclites might have said. Disruptive technology generating obsolescence—paradigm-shifting revolutions. With the ideas go the resources. Money follows mind. From sorties per target to targets per sortie. Not just of degree but of kind. Do you buy aircraft carriers or nano-gnats? And at the end of the day: seeing all does not mean knowing all. We may find the enemy. Knowing why he will do what he does is another matter. Cultural sensitivity, mindset, intellectual interoperability—these count. Is this the Transformation of combat—or the return of Grand Strategy?

Globalized Defense Industry

The globalized defense industry is a maker and taker of Grand Strategy, the sector's primes and subprimes, national and global, set to move in new directions. The world's defense industry is fragmented, national, provincial and lacking the economies of a globalized supply chain. If Transformation is the coin of the realm, national sovereignty is the tight-fisted bank. States covet their sovereignty over the defense industry. Still, money speaks. Pressure on governments for international cooperation goes up as defense spending goes down. When deep efficiencies can be found, as with EADS, added value can trump unimpinged sovereignty. At any rate, the US industry will again be looking for added mar-

ginal value in Europe. Hardware, platforms, systems, solutions, networks, public, private, war and beyond war, fifty thousand contractors in Iraq—system integration is now a multi-dimensional chess game. Black boxes compete with open architecture. It is about man and machine and mindset. Ultimately, it is about the will to common cause.

Institutions and Opportunities

Institutions can channel political will; they cannot be its source. Institutions are important, complex and controversial. They always show room for improvement; they will never be perfect. No nation will wield all the influence it would seek; no nation will be sufficiently "multilateral" for another. Intelligence sharing, information sharing, assessment sharing, mitigation sharing, cost sharing—institutions are about sharing both burden and influence. Burden borne and influence enjoyed—two not entirely unrelated notions, also in the relationship between the EU and NATO and their respective members. Consensus building is hard work, it is urgent work, particularly between Germany and America. Differences abound. So do connections and common interests. Needed is a renewed vision of a renewed relationship across the Atlantic, where the willingness to appreciate and compromise is commensurate with the enormity of the opportunity and challenge.

Dr. Andrew Denison

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