

# Denkwürdigkeiten



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## LEADOFF

### Liebe Mitglieder,

während sich die Reform der Bundeswehr Zug um Zug im Detail ausprägt und dabei auch neuen Diskussions- und Justierungsbedarf offenbart, bringt die strategische Neuausrichtung der USA in Richtung Asien mit dem von Präsident Obama im Januar 2012 vorgestellten Papier „Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense“ zusätzlich zur Finanzkrise weitere Dynamik in die ohnehin schwindsüchtigen Verteidigungsbudgets der europäischen Nationen. ‚Weiter wie bisher mit etwas weniger‘ – die Devise der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte ist nicht mehr zukunftsfähig. Ressourceneffizienz, Systemfähigkeit im multinationalen Verbund, Wirksamkeit und Akzeptanz werden zu entscheidenden Prüfkriterien für valide, umfassende Sicherheitsvorsorge. Die Beiträge dieser Denkwürdigkeiten befassen sich vor diesem Hintergrund mit der Bundeswehrreform, dem anstehenden NATO-Gipfel in Chicago und der wachsenden chinesischen Bereitschaft, sich sicherheitspolitisch etwas weiter vor der Haustür zu engagieren.

*Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender*

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### **Bundeswehrreform: Stückwerk ohne Politikreform**

Ob im Einsatz oder im Inland – überall ist in der Bundeswehr zu spüren, dass sich was ändern muss. Einsatzfähigkeit und Motivation werden durch Überbürokratisierung und Ausrüstungsmängel behindert. Auch wenn es manche nicht mehr hören können: Ein neuer Reformanlauf war überfällig. Minister zu Guttenbergs „Schnellabschaltung“ der Wehrpflicht schaffte zunächst mehr Verwirrung, weil die Nachwuchsgewinnung noch nicht umgebaut war. Minister de Maizière ging seriöser an die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr heran. Auf dem Boden der Haushaltstatsachen sollen Struktur und Ausrüstung der Bundeswehr solide werden.

Entscheidungen zur neuen Struktur, zu Stationierung und Beschaffungsvorhaben sind notwendig, aber nicht ausreichend. Eine Reform, die endlich länger halten soll, muss mehr beinhalten. Ihr Realismus darf sich nicht in der Berücksichtigung der absehbaren Haushaltslage und Bevölkerungsentwicklung erschöpfen. Sie muss zugleich Antworten finden auf eine doppelte Krise, in der die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr stecken, vor allem der in Afghanistan:

- In einer Wirksamkeitskrise: trotz des vorbildlichen Einsatzes vieler Soldaten hat die NATO das Ziel eines stabilen Umfeldes nicht erreicht;
- In einer Akzeptanzkrise: die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung lehnt des Afghanistaneinsatz ab – und auch die Soldaten stellen seinen Sinn zunehmend infrage.

Eine zukunftsfähige Bundeswehrreform geht nicht nur die Angehörigen der Bundeswehr und das Verteidigungsministerium an, sondern die Politik und die Gesellschaft insgesamt. Außer bei der Stationierungsfrage ist davon bisher nichts zu spüren.

Absolut notwendig ist zuerst ein klarer **Auftrag für die Bundeswehr**. Ein Umding ist, dass der seit bald zwei Jahrzehnten erweiterte Auftrag – Teilnahme an internatio-

naler Krisenbewältigung – nicht ausdrücklich im Grundgesetz vorkommt. Das Grundgesetz muss hier genauer formuliert werden, etwa in dem Sinne, dass *bewaffnete Streitkräfte jenseits der Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung nur eingesetzt werden dürfen, wenn im Rahmen der UNO Gewalt eingedämmt und internationales Recht durchgesetzt werden soll*. Mit einer solchen **Grundgesetzänderung** würde ein Trennungstrich gezogen zu einem schrankenlosen Verteidigungsbegriff und einem Interventionismus für Einzelinteressen. Entsprechend müsste man auch die Eidesformel der Soldaten ändern.

Um die Aufgaben der Bundeswehr klarer festzulegen und falschen Erwartungen vorzubeugen, müssen die **Auslandseinsätze systematisch ausgewertet** werden – das ist schon lange überfällig. Wie sicher ist das Umfeld in Afghanistan, wie stabil sind die Strukturen? Nur so können Bevölkerung und Politik beurteilen, was Streitkräfte leisten, wo ihre Grenzen liegen, was andere besser können – und letztlich, ob ein Einsatz sinnvoll ist. Bisher sträubten sich politisch Verantwortliche, eine unabhängige Wirksamkeitsbewertung von Auslandseinsätzen durchzuführen. Die Folge davon waren Realitäts- und Glaubwürdigkeitsverlust.

Erfüllbare Einsätze brauchen künftig als erstes realitätsnähere und überprüfbare Ziele. Die bisherigen guten und hehren Ziele der Bundestagsmandate reichen da nicht aus.

Eine grundsätzliche Erfahrung von Kriseneinsätzen ist, dass sie nur Aussicht auf Erfolg haben, wenn sie ein **Gemeinschaftsunternehmen** zwischen zivilen, polizeilichen und militärischen Kräften unter dem Primat der Politik sind. Wo Politik ihre Führungsaufgabe vernachlässigt und zu wenig die politische Konfliktlösung unterstützt, wo nur wenige Polizeiberater an stabilen Sicherheitsstrukturen arbeiten, da ist der Einsatz von Streitkräften einer gegen Windmühlenflügel. Damit der Anspruch des vernetzten Ansatzes auch Wirklichkeit wird, sind ressortgemeinsame Lageerfassung,

Planung und Auswertung sowie ausgewogene Fähigkeiten der verschiedenen staatlichen Ressorts eine Grundvoraussetzung. Auch das Bundesinnenministerium und das Entwicklungsministerium brauchen schnell verfügbare, stehende Kräfte. Sonst können die besonders wichtigen Startmonate eines Einsatzes nicht genutzt werden, und die Aufgaben landen doch wieder beim Militär. Bei der jetzigen Bundeswehrreform bleiben diese zivil-militärischen Missverhältnisse völlig unberücksichtigt.

Die Verankerung der Bundeswehr in Demokratie und Rechtsstaat ist eine historische Errungenschaft sondergleichen. Dazu gehört, dass Auftrag und Einsätze der Bundeswehr von der großen Mehrheit der Bevölkerung akzeptiert werden. Um Akzeptanz zu erreichen, ist eine **breite sicherheitspolitische Debatte** und Verständigung unabdingbar. Zu dieser seit Jahren geforderten, aber nicht erreichten Debatte müssten vor allem beitragen: Verteidigungsminister, die endlich ihre Grundlagendokumente nicht nur erlassen, sondern vorher zur Diskussion stellen sollten; Einsatzpraktiker, die ohne Maulkörbe ihre konkreten Erfahrungen und Kompetenzen in die öffentliche Debatte einbringen; friedens- und sicherheitspolitisch interessierte Organisationen, die eine Querkommunikation zwischen ihren Diskussionszirkeln aufbauen; schließlich und vor allem die politisch Verantwortlichen, die ihre bisherige sicherheitspolitische Selbstgenügsamkeit überwinden und Strategiefähigkeit entwickeln müssen.

Wo die Krise der Auslandseinsätze in erster Linie eine politische ist, muss jede Bundeswehrreform auch in eine **Reform der Sicherheitspolitik** eingebettet sein. Eine bloße Ressortreform greift zu kurz und bleibt Stückwerk. Ein seriöser Minister de Maizièere ändert nichts daran, dass hier Kabinett und Koalition insgesamt in der Verantwortung stehen.

Winfried Nachtwei

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Erstmals erschienen im JS-Magazin – Die Evangelische Zeitschrift für Junge Soldaten, Januar 2012, hier mit punktuellen Ergänzungen.

## THEMEN

### Making Security Smart A Turning Point

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen introduced Smart Defence as a concept at the 2011 Munich Security Conference. The idea is simple. Smart Defence is about nations building greater security with more collaboration and more coherence. In a couple of weeks President Obama will welcome Allied Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Chicago. A key deliverable for Chicago relates to Smart Defence.

The dynamically changing global security environment has been a key parameter for the reorientation of security forces and security business in the past years. The financial crisis has put public budgets under severe pressure. Public spending has been cut. Defence budgets have been cut. Few countries spend enough on defence capabilities. At the same time the crisis has led to the withdrawal of those resources that have enabled Ministries to conceal inefficiencies in the security sector. This situation will continue and escalate rather than the reverse.. The financial crisis poses a serious risk to national and transatlantic security and to the security business. It also offers opportunities as shrinking budgets increase the pressure on key actors to cooperate and seek innovative ways to improve the security situation.

Senior NATO officials have recently looked to multinational cooperation as a way of maintaining and even enhancing military capabilities in times of austerity. Role specialization, pooling and sharing of capabilities and multinational procurement programs have been tried before with some success, but with many more have

proved disappointing, often with more costly results.

One prevalent feature of the majority of multinational collaborative defence programs has been the focus on large, expensive and platform-based systems, such as the Eurofighter. Many decision makers have been paralyzed by managing huge platform programmes that governments and private actors no longer need – in terms of quantity and quality – nor are able to afford. Such programs, conceived during the Cold War, have arguably outlived their operational purpose. Their continuation is to a large extent fuelled by considerations of sunk costs and the desire to preserve jobs and international cooperation as well as contractual obligations. In many cases, cancelling a programme will incur such high penalty-fees for the government that it makes more sense to continue it. The potential of developing synergetic systems has been ignored. This has led to institutionally and conceptually fragmented capabilities that do not meet existing security challenges. In fact, institutional and conceptual coherence is at the core of required systemic capabilities – nationally, internationally, as well as in private and governmental business.

### The Challenge

Recent operations have driven the shift towards more expeditionary forces. The transformational dimensions of *network-enabled capabilities*, the *effects-based approach to operations* and the *comprehensive approach to security* will drive developments over the next decade. Addressing new challenges such as cyber, ballistic missile defence, and space will require allocation of additional defence resources. All these initiatives will have to be found within the given financial framework and will gradually consume a greater proportion of ever more scarce resources. While long-term savings might follow ongoing reforms, first of all it will cost money in order to save the same.

Working together in NATO will become increasingly difficult when the capability gap across the At-

lantic keeps on growing while the ability to operate together remains underdeveloped. These deficiencies impact directly on transatlantic political cohesion. Consequently, future collaborative programs are the key to success. These will be evaluated rigorously on their ability to deliver real cost savings and produce significant operational capabilities that are developed independently. Civilian and military security forces as well as the security business need to come up with meaningful contributions to a comprehensive national and transnational security system while taking far-sighted, cross-government and international action in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders including government institutions and private business.

### The Vision

Transferring these challenges into a viable, multinational security capability that also pays off on national and global markets is the core of meeting complex security requirements and succeeding on the national and international markets. Nations should focus their security contributions on plug-to-operate capabilities that have the capacity to generate an easy-to-comprehend, efficient and effective Situational Awareness Environment (SAE). Via architecture, processes, and tools it could provide for informed, responsive decisions in an interagency and international security environment that includes the services of government actors and private business.

Politically this approach requires serious leadership. Industrially it builds on the concept of *Lead System Integration* as an important and viable operating model with rapidly increasing success on global markets. This vision is reinforced by two recent important developments in NATO:

- With the **Afghan Mission Network** for the first time in Alliance history a common C4ISR network has been established for all ISAF forces and operations consisting of the ISAF-Secret network as the core with national extensions. In times of austerity cuts these national extensions have an enormous shaping impact on national C4ISR structures.
- The Afghan Mission Network supports a **NATO Common Operational Picture**. Soon it will provide NATO commanders and operational staffs with essential and reliable information presented that enables their understanding of comprehensive security environments
- in order to improving situational awareness and supporting rapid decision-making.

Both developments will serve in a global scale as **best-practice-examples** for security forces and security business. Consequently they will shape both requirements and markets.

### The Benefits

Instead of huge platform programmes a **Situational Awareness Environment Program** would allow for a plenitude of na-

## Transatlantic Relations 2.0 Comprehensive Security and Business via unmatched Situational Awareness



### Afghan Mission Network

- Network Architecture and Infrastructure
- Functional Area Systems Integration
- Enterprise Services (E-mail, VoSIP, XMPP Chat)
- Joint ISR/ IJC COP
- IP based Interoperable secure VTC Services
- Deployable CIS Nodes/ Micro-POPs
- Network Operations/ Service Management
- Information Assurance



### NATO Common Operational Picture

- provide NATO commanders and operational staffs with essential and reliable information
- presented in an easy to comprehend format that enables their understanding of the higher commander's intent and situation within the battle space in order to
- support their rapid decision-making

tional and international security, research and business initiatives and foster a broad participation of large, medium-sized and even small-sized companies in a transatlantic collaborative approach. It focuses on optimization at the systems level versus the platform level. It does not favour any particular technology or platform. It enables the trading of risk, cost and capability, and it opens competition at multiple work levels, giving small and large companies from around the world equal opportunities to compete.

The Situational Awareness Environment would provide the framework for a multitude of industries that could enable the SAE with services and applications mastering all kinds of information, knowledge, evaluation etc. Sensors, effectors and other platforms and actors could be plugged in. The SAE could be scaled and tailored to individual/national requirements. It would support by its structure, processes and services, national and international security requirements and foster integrative, global business.

Creating greater coherence within NATO through situational awareness requires closer links with the private sector. In the past, military Research and Development put defence at the cutting edge of technology, with the civilian sector eventually taking advantage of those innovations. Today, in many areas, the situation has reversed. Industry has a wealth of expertise, including cyber defence, fuel cell energy and light logistics. We must find better ways through public-private partnerships to explore the military potential of emerging technologies, and involve industry sooner and more closely. A strong, strategic NATO-EU partnership would deliver many benefits, in political and operational terms, as well as financially.

In doing so, it encourages, indeed demands, *best of industry* solutions and innovation. This would strengthen

- National security of involved nations
- Euro Atlantic security

- National, regional and global business

This would directly benefit security forces, taxpayers and private industry alike.

*Ralph Thiele*

Ralph Thiele ist Gründungsmitglied und Vorstandsvorsitzender der pmg.  
Der Beitrag gibt die persönliche Auffassung des Autors wieder.

## THEMEN

### How Pakistan's Unstable Tribal Areas Threaten China's Core Interests

With all eyes focused on the consequences for the United States and NATO of the accidental air strikes, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, little attention has been paid to another big player who will be greatly impacted by Pakistan's refusal to go after militants that are using the country as a refuge: China. Pakistan-based militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are increasingly a threat to China's core interests: national stability and territorial integrity. In July, Turkestani Islamic Party (TIP) militants trained in FATA launched yet another attack against China with bomb explosions in Kashgar, Xinjiang, ahead of China's launch of "China-Eurasia Expo" in Urumqi under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). TIP wants Xinjiang to be an independent Islamic state and the China-Eurasia Expo is a centerpiece of China's Eurasia strategy of developing its western provinces and rebuilding the Silk Road of trade and commerce across the Eurasia heartland (Beijing Review, September 15, 2011; China Daily, September 6, 2011; Xinhua, September 1, 2011). Outraged at Pakistan's inability to clean up its own backyard, Chinese Communist Party-controlled press was immediate and harsh in decrying this incident (China Daily, August 12, 2011; Xinhua, August 1, 2011). This quickly prompted a

scurrying of Pakistani leaders – military intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and President Asif Ali Zardari – to Beijing to mend relations with its patron (Dawn, August 25, 2011; New York Times, August 1, 2011).

In these meetings, China allegedly demanded to set up military bases in FATA or in the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) that borders Xinjiang province (Asia Times, October 26, August 10, 2011). After the bombing, the Chinese government reportedly deployed at least 200,000 security personnel to pursue Uyghur terrorists in the region, more than the 140,000 coalition troops currently in Afghanistan (Asia Times, August 31, 2011). China also is revising its anti-terror law to possibly allow military intervention abroad (Xinhua, October 27, October 24, 2011). One official commentary warned that "If the violent forces in Xinjiang gain ground, China may be forced to directly intervene militarily in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but this is clearly not the situation China would like to see" (Xinhua, September 27, 2011; "China and Pakistan: Evolving Focus on Stability within Continuity," China Brief, November 30, 2011). While these reports may be speculative, taken together, they suggest Beijing's concerns – especially with a less active U.S. presence in Pakistan – may be rethinking fundamental tenets of its security policy.

#### FATA-Based Militants' Threat to China's Core Interests

That Beijing might demand a military base in this hotbed would underscore its view on the gravity of the FATA threat against China's core interests: realizing its western development strategy across Eurasia; continued economic growth for Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s legitimacy and survival; and sovereign control over Xinjiang to deter "splittism" in other parts of the country, such as Tibet and Inner Mongolia as well as to preserve its claims on Taiwan. Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie spelled out China's core interests at the IISS 10th Asia Security Summit last June:

*“The core interests include anything related to sovereignty, stability and form of government. China is now pursuing socialism. If there is any attempt to reject this path, it will touch upon China’s core interests. Or, if there is any attempt to encourage any part of China to secede, that also touches upon China’s core interests related to our land, sea or air. Then, anything that is related to China’s national economic and social development also touches upon China core interests”* (Straits Times, June 6, 2011).

China also fears TIP’s close ties with al-Qaeda in FATA and increasing Chinese “Turkistanization” of al Qaeda. Trained by al-Qaeda in FATA, TIP already has claimed a number of attacks in Xinjiang as well as against Chinese economic interests in Pakistan. The extent of TIP militants’ network of terrorist activities in Pakistan was revealed in 2009 when they threatened the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad through a letter to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers. In a video on August 1, 2009, TIP leader Abdul Haq al Turkistani urged Muslims to attack Chinese interests to punish Beijing for what he described as massacres against Uyghur Muslims during their uprising in Xinjiang (Asia Times, August 10, 2011). Abdul Haq had been appointed a member of al-Qaeda’s majlis-e-shura or executive council in 2005, but was subsequently killed in a 2010 U.S. drone strike and succeeded by Abdul Shakoor Turkistani, a Chinese Uyghur well known for his friendly terms with major Taliban groups in Waziristan (Asia Times, October 26, 2011). A few weeks before the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda appointed him as new commander of its Pakistan forces and training camps (Times of India, May 11, 2011). Beijing thus has legitimate fears that Pakistan’s inability to crack down on TIP and al-Qaeda in FATA will undermine China’s hold over Xinjiang and sabotage China’s access to strategic minerals and markets across the Eurasian heartland.

### **Political Dimensions of the Threat**

It was not surprising therefore when Beijing dispatched its elite commando forces, the Snow Leopard, near Pakistan’s borders in the aftermath of the Kashgar bombing and stepped up its “Strike Hard” campaign (China Daily, August 13, 2011). Xinjiang is a strategic region for China. Three times the size of France and one sixth of China’s land area, it share borders with eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. It is rich in energy resources and a key transport corridor for China to access energy and strategic minerals from Central Asia, Caspian region and the Middle East [1].

Instability in Xinjiang is a threat to CCP credibility and legitimacy. Senior CCP officials seem to think that if the government is seen as weak and unable to control Xinjiang, this may encourage separatism in other regions, such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Taiwan and potentially elsewhere. Moreover, the CCP needs continued access to energy and strategic minerals in Central Asia to help feed its voracious economic growth. The SCO is China’s vehicle to project its influence across this pivot of the Eurasia heartland.

In 1996, then-President Jiang Zemin presided over a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that addressed Xinjiang’s stability. In a document called “Document #7,” CCP issued directives to resolve regional issues. Document #7 outlined three main security concerns: (1) outside influence in destabilizing Xinjiang; (2) erosion of state’s authority as religiously-motivated groups challenge authority at the local level; and (3) economic impoverishment in the region as a catalyst for discontent. CCP’s courses of action to address these issues are threefold: (1) resolve problems of foreign influence through multilateral diplomacy with Central Asian republics; (2) crack down on challenges to state authority; and (3) promote economic development to resolve impoverishment [2]. This Document #7 served as the blueprint

for China’s “Develop the West” Silk Road Strategy to stabilize Xinjiang and spur local economic growth.

### **Economic Dimensions of the Threat**

Terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda-trained TIP potentially threaten a core tenet of China’s strategy of stabilizing Xinjiang – as an “inseparable part of China”, for resource extraction and as a springboard into Central Eurasia. More than 43 percent of investment allocated by the central government to expand domestic demand was used for projects in western regions (Xinhua, October 16, 2009). Xinjiang is also a vital section of the continental rail route, the Eurasia Land Bridge, which connects China with Europe (Beijing Review, August 11, 2011).

On April 23, 2010, in a meeting held by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, President Hu Jintao stated, “it is a major and urgent task of strategic significance for us to boost the economic and social development of Xinjiang to achieve lasting stability in the region.” According to Wang Ning, an economist with the Academy of Social Sciences in Xinjiang, the development of the region would speed up the political, economic and cultural exchanges between China and Central Asian states and contribute to regional prosperity and stability. To that end, China’s Civil Aviation Administration plans to have six new airports in the region by 2015, bringing the total number to 22. There are also plans for new flight routes to link Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi to Istanbul, Dubai, Samarkand in Uzbekistan, Yekaterinburg in Russia and Tbilisi in Georgia (Xinhua, July 2, 2010).


Kashgar, a key hub near China’s far western border, is emblematic of both Beijing’s outreach and vulnerability. Kashgar is being developed into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and together with Pakistan’s northern provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, this will form the central plank in the emerging architecture for new silk routes. There are

ideas to establish a trans-border economic zone on both sides of Pakistan and China by establishing manufacturing hubs, trade houses and clearing houses as well as the use of yuan for cross-border trade settlement (Global Times, September 18, 2011). Since FATA borders Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan and the latest terrorist attack was in Kashgar, collectively the foundational stone of China's Silk Road development strategy, China would not be able to launch this central plank if FATA militants became a more significant destabilizing force.

**Military Dimensions of the Threat**

One key aspect of Xinjiang that is sorely neglected in press coverage regarding terrorism is China's nuclear arsenal. Xinjiang hosts China's nuclear test site Lop Nur and elements of the Second Artillery Corps, China's strategic missile force. Some of the Second Artillery's vaunted tunnels – the so-called "Underground Great Wall" for hiding missiles and nuclear warheads – also surround Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang and site of the July 2009 riots that killed 200 people and injured almost 2,000 others (See map).

**Map: Nuclear Tunnels in China**



Source: The Washington Post, November 29, 2011

Persistent unrest on a national scale has left at least China's Xinjiang-based nuclear warheads vul-

nerable, like during the Cultural Revolution (Washington Post, November 29, 2011; People's Daily, July 6, 2009) [3]. Should such unrest occur again – probably on a scale even more substantial than 1989 – these weapons might become vulnerable to seizure by Uighur militant groups.

**Implications of Pakistan's Inability to Neutralize FATA Militants**

If Pakistan continues its lax attitude towards FATA militants and attacks on Chinese soil increase in severity and frequency, Beijing would likely see this as a continued threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. China already appears to be taking several courses of action to redress this problem.

*Increased PLA Presence in Pakistan*

One course of action, as mentioned earlier, is the reported demand for PLA bases in the FATA in addition to its current troop presence in northern Pakistan. When it comes to China's territorial integrity, China has a history of responding forcefully when its borders are violated or threatened: in 1950 it invaded North Korea; in 1962 it invaded India; in 1979 it invaded Vietnam; and, since the 1990s, it has confronted other

claimants in the South China Sea several times. PLA engineers have been assisting in earthquake recovery since last January; however, its not clear how long they will stay or whether the PLA contingent lacks security elements for its protection (India Today, January 4; Financial Times, November 3, 2011; Asia Times, October 26, 2011; Asia Times, August 1, 2011). Beijing has not tolerated any direct viola-

tion of its territorial integrity (outside of compromises in territorial dispute negotiations). suggesting it might attempt to deal with FATA militants more effectively within Pakistan if Islamabad cannot. The recent fallout between the United States and Pakistan also suggests Pakistani weakness that could spur Beijing to act or pressure Islamabad to boost the Chinese presence in the country. Islamabad's demands of Washington correspond almost point by point with the Taliban's list of demands in November as conditions for entering into peace negotiations: Pakistan's review of its U.S. ties, suspension of NATO supply lines and closure of Shamsi Air Base (Asia Times, December 3, 2011; Long War Journal, November 28, 2011; Associated Press, November 21). This further underscores Pakistan's weakness in face of militants and could prompt China to pressure Islamabad to support Chinese bases in the FATA or FANA. On January 4, Chief of Army Staff General Afhaq Parvez Kayani left for Beijing on a five-day official visit at the invitation of Chinese authorities to discuss the complete range of Sino-Pakistani security and defense relations (Pakistan Today, January 4,). This visit deserves some scrutiny to assess how Beijing sees Pakistan's security situation and what, if anything, China can do to protect its interests.

*Slowing Future Chinese Investments in Pakistan*

Another course of action is further withdrawal and deterrence of future Chinese investments in Pakistan. On November 22, militants targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in a bomb attack in Balochistan. In September, China's Kingho Group withdrew from a \$19 billion coal deal in Balochistan after bombings in Pakistan's major cities. In November, Pakistan sent a large delegation from Sindh to Beijing to try to garner Chinese investments. Downplaying security concerns, the delegation reiterated how Pakistan has taken special measures to protect China's 120 projects and over 13,000 staffers throughout Pakistan (Xinhua, November 22, 2011; Global Times, November

18, October 25, 2011; Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2011). China's massive investment losses in Libya and evacuating its 36,000 workers however are still fresh in Chinese minds – reminding them of the high cost of investing in highly unstable countries, especially in one that is the central base of several dozen terrorist organizations. With TIP's close links with al-Qaeda that explicitly targets Xinjiang and Chinese citizens and al-Qaeda's cooperation with other terrorist organizations, Beijing has legitimate fears that the status quo in the FATA is increasingly unsustainable.

### Conclusion: Pakistan between a Rock and a Hard Place

In light of recent U.S./NATO-Pakistani fallout, Islamabad is trying to play the China card and their "all weather friend" as an alternative to the United States. However, upon closer scrutiny, Chinese aid pales in comparison to U.S. aid and is not a feasible replacement in the near or medium term. Nor does Beijing want to take on the U.S. burden. For example, Center for Global Development published a report in May revealing that average recorded grant assistance to Pakistan for FY2004-2009 from China was \$9 million compared with the United States at \$268 million. Oxford University also published a report in February that revealed U.S. FDI flow in Pakistan averaged 28 percent of total share from 2001-2009, while China stood at a meager 2 percent of total share in the same period. As for military aid, a few defense deals between China and Pakistan is no comparison for U.S. military assistance at \$2.5 billion in addition to economic assistance at \$1.8 billion in 2010 [4].

There also is growing perception in Beijing that it must take proactive measures to protect its interests abroad (Asia Times, December 17, 2011; "Mekong Murders Spur Beijing to Push New Security Cooperation," China Brief, November 11, 2011). Its willingness to deploy paramilitary forces to patrol the Mekong in December in response to the October killing of 13 Chinese sailors underscores

how changing security pressures may lead Beijing to diverge from its previous policies of "nonintervention" and deploying troops abroad. China has long contributed to UN peacekeeping missions overseas, but this is the first time it will carry out sustained operations in another country without a UN mandate. By deploying more than 300 armed police to the lawless triple-border area of the Golden Triangle (Laos, Thailand and Burma) in a joint patrol, coupled with its new domestic anti-terror laws to pave way for military intervention abroad, this may be an indicator of how China will address TIP militants in the lawless AfPak border area of FATA to safeguard its growing economic interests if Pakistan fails to control its militants.

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