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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

das Thema Drohnen ist derzeit sehr prominent im öffentlichen Diskurs. Es offenbart eine erschreckende sachliche Ahnungslosigkeit vieler Beteiligten und nicht zuletzt auch die Dominanz von Gesinnungsethikern. Im Fall des Euro Hawk fragt man sich, ob wir im Kalten Krieg im Falle eines Angriffs des Warschauer Paktes vor dem Einsatz unserer Luftkriegsmittel auch die Zustimmung und Zertifizierung der eigenen, vielleicht gar der gegnerischen zivilen Flugsicherheitsbehörden hätten suchen sollen? Bizarrr!!! Militärisch kann und darf der Euro Hawk fliegen. Ihm fehlt – bis auf weiteres – die zivile Lizenz. Daran zu arbeiten ist erforderlich, allerdings nicht nur für den Euro Hawk, sondern auch für Tausende weiterer Drohnen, die für militärische und zivile Aufgabenstellungen eingesetzt werden (sollen). Insbesondere für hybride Einsatzszenarien, in denen Frieden, Krise, Krieg und Wiederaufbau alles gleichzeitig und in vernetzten Räumen stattfinden, sind Regelungen zu etablieren, die ein sicheres Miteinander von luftgestützten Luftkriegsmitteln und ziviler Luftfahrt verbindlich festlegen. Was wir in Deutschland nach dem LAPAS-Desaster Ende der 80er Jahre nun schon zum zweiten Mal verlieren, ist die Fähigkeit signalerfassender Aufklärung aus großen Höhen. Das macht Einsätze fern der Heimat für deutsche Soldaten noch lebensgefährlicher, als diese ohnehin schon sind.

Lebensgefährlich – das ist auch die Überleitung zu den Kampfdrohnen, insbesondere wenn diese den Soldaten im Einsatz nicht zur Verfügung stehen. Hier geht es ausdrücklich nicht um die Jagd auf Terroristen durch zivile Sicherheitsbehörden und Nachrichtendienste nach dem U.S.-Vorbild. Derartiges ist in der deutschen parlamentarischen Demokratie nicht nur nicht vorstellbar, sondern auch schlicht ungesetzlich. Im militärischen Einsatz sind die Alternativen zu Kampfdrohnen, Piloten bemannter Kampfflugzeuge. Diese haben häufig nur den Bruchteil einer Sekunde, um ihre Einsatzentscheidung zu treffen. Die Schützen von Artilleriegeschossen und Raketen sehen gar nichts. Die Piloten

unbemannter Drohnen hingegen kleben ihren Zielen minuten-, stunden-, manchmal gar tagelang auf dem Pelz. Ihr Einsatz kann und wird gewissenhaft und sorgfältig geprüft (werden). In der Not – z.B. wenn Soldaten am Boden in einen Hinterhalt geraten – müssen diese nicht erst langwierig angefordert und gerufen werden. Und das soll schlecht und unverantwortlich sein? Denkt nach, liebe Verantwortungsträger und Publizisten!

Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender

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THEMEN

Kampfdrohnen, Krieg & Moral

Aktuelle Debatte: Unbemannte Luftfahrzeugsysteme, umgangssprachlich meist als „Drohnen“ bezeichnet, sind derzeit politisch wie medial ein häufig adressiertes und in aller Regel einseitig negativ konnotiertes Thema. Während in den letzten Tagen insbesondere das kostspielige Scheitern der Beschaffung der strategischen Aufklärungsdrohne Euro Hawk für die Bundeswehr die Gemüter bewegte, so sorgt ansonsten insbesondere das geheimdienstliche, d.h. nicht-militärische, „Drohnenprogramm“ der amerikanischen CIA zur gezielten Tötung von Terrorverdächtigen in entlegenen Weltregionen, für ethisch-moralische,

völkerrechtliche wie auch politische Kritik. Dieser Punkt beherrscht die Debatte um bewaffnete sogenannte „Kampfdrohnen“ hierzulande in dem Maße, dass deren eigentliche, und für Deutschland einzig mögliche Zweckbestimmung, nämlich der als eines militärischen Mittels im Rahmen des bestehenden Aufgaben und Einsatzspektrums der Bundeswehr, nahezu vollständig aus dem Blickfeld gerät, beziehungsweise entsprechend diskreditiert wird. Möglichkeiten und Chancen, wie auch Notwendigkeiten, die sich aus dieser neuen Technologie für die militärische Auftragserfüllung im Dienst an Sicherheit und Frieden, sei es im Kontext internationaler Krisenbewältigung und Konfliktverhütung wie auch im Rahmen der Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung, ergeben, werden hierbei weitgehend ausgeblendet.

Krieg als Risiko: Dass auch zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts kriegerische Gewaltkonflikte unverändert ein Teil der politisch-gesellschaftlichen Realität sind bedarf keiner näheren Erörterung. Der anhaltende Bürgerkrieg in Syrien, die Interventionen in die innerstaatlichen Gewaltkonfliktlagen von Afghanistan (ab 2001) über Libyen (2011) bis Mali (2013), wie auch der russisch-georgische Krieg (2008), der Krieg Israels gegen die Hisbollah im Libanon (2006) und nicht zu vergessen der Feldzug des amerikanischen Präsidenten Bush II. gegen Saddam Hussein (ab 2003) mit anschließender langjähriger Aufstands- und Aufstandsbekämpfungsphase sind lebhaft Beispiele hierfür. Vielfältige Versuche den Krieg abzuschaffen oder zu eliminieren, sei es philosophisch (Kant), friedentheoretisch (Senghaas, Galtung) oder organisatorisch (Vereinte Nationen) waren bisher nicht von durchschlagendem Erfolg gekennzeichnet. Auch wenn sich die Welt nicht mehr in einem Hobbeschen Naturzustand des permanenten „Kampfes aller gegen Alle“ befindet, so ist der „ewige Frieden“ Kants doch unverändert weit davon entfernt Realität zu sein. Krieg und kriegerische Gewalt, auch in ihrer potenziellen, u.

a. kalten oder „eingefrorenen“¹ Form, sind daher auch weiterhin als Risiken und Gefahren mit zu denken, wenn es gilt politisch-gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse und eine friedliche Zukunft zu gestalten.

Streitkräfte und Technologie: Zur Vorsorge gegen potenzielle Bedrohung durch kriegerische Gewaltanwendung oder entsprechende Erpressung durch Dritte, wie auch zum Schutz der eigenen Bürgerinnen und Bürger bedarf ein moderner Staat daher nach wie vor professioneller Streitkräfte. Da die Leistungsfähigkeit von Streitkräften aktuell mehr denn jemals zuvor in der Geschichte des Krieges durch den rasanten und dynamischen Wandel von Technik und Technologie bestimmt wird, müssen sich jene, um ihren Auftrag erfüllen zu können und damit überhaupt erst relevant zu sein auf einem technologisch angemessenen und aktuellen Stand befinden.

Kampfdrohnen – ein dynamischer Trend: Dass dazu, angesichts des sich weltweit vollziehenden Paradigmenwechsels in der militärischen Luftfahrt², bereits heute und in steigendem Maße in Zukunft auch Kampfdrohnen gehören, demonstriert niemand deutlicher als die führende Militärmacht der Welt. Bei mehr als 7.000³ ferngesteuerten Flugsystemen insgesamt verfügen die USA bereits heute über eine aus mehr als 250 schweren Kampfdrohnen bestehende militärische „Drohnen Streitmacht“ und planen diese mit der Beschaffung von ca. 500 weiteren Systemen entsprechend auszubauen.⁴ Seit beinahe einem Jahrzehnt befindet sich diese Waffenkategorie in ihren Arsenalen. 9% aller bewaffneten Flugeinsätze über Afghanistan wurden Ende 2012 bereits mit unbemannten Systemen durchge-

führt. Über 30 Mal pro Monat kommt es in Afghanistan zum Einsatz drohnengestützter Luft/Boden-Raketen.⁵ Die im Rahmen der Libyenkampagne geflogenen Luftangriffe der USA, wurden ausschließlich Mittels unbemannter Systeme durchgeführt.⁶ In mehr als 85 Staaten befinden sich Drohnen bereits heute in der militärischen Nutzung.⁷ Während bisher neben den USA, als eindeutigen Vorreiter, nur von Israel und Großbritannien bekannt ist, bereits militärische Kampfdrohnenangriffe durchgeführt zu haben⁸, sind aktuell ca. 45 Staaten dabei eigene bewaffnete „Drohnen-Streitkräfte“ aufzubauen.⁹ 26 Staaten verfügen schon heute über größere Systeme, die entweder bewaffnet sind oder von denen bewaffnete Varianten bereits eingesetzt wurden.¹⁰ Dieser militärtechnologische Trend wird durch das Bestreben nach entsprechender ziviler Nutzung mit dem Ziel unbemannte Flugsysteme u. a. in die zivile Luftfahrt zu integrieren ergänzt und erweitert.¹¹ Er setzt sich fort in unbemannten Land- und Wasserfahrzeugen und kann als militärischer Vorbote einer möglicherweise viel größeren Robotikwelle gesehen werden, von der bisher zwar der Beginn erahnt nicht aber das Ende abgesehen werden kann.

Ein Eintreten Deutschlands für die weltweite Ächtung dieser waffentechnologischen Entwicklung, wie mitunter gefordert¹², und ein einseitiger Verzicht Deutschlands auf die Beschaffung von Kampfdroh-

⁵ Vgl. Dean, Sidney a. a. O. S. 20-21.

⁶ Vgl. Singer, Peter W.: *Die Zukunft ist schon da. Die Debatte über Drohnen muss von Realitäten ausgehen.* In: Schlachtfeld ohne Mensch, IP Internationale Politik, Mai / Juni 2013, Nr. 3, 68. Jahr. S. 9. Laut Singer führten die USA hierbei ca. 145 Drohnenangriffe durch. Darunter auch den, der zur Ergreifung von Muammar al-Gaddafi führte. Den bemannten Teil des Einsatzes überließen sie ihren Europäischen Partnern.

⁷ Vgl. dazu Singer a. a. O. S. 8-9.

⁸ Vgl. dazu Singer a. a. O. S. 9.

⁹ Vgl. Krech, Hans: *Al-Quaida in Afghanistan/Pakistan.* Der Mittler-Brief. Informationsdienst zur Sicherheitspolitik, 28. Jg., Nr. 1/1. Quartal 2013, Mittler Report Verlag GmbH, Bonn 2013.

¹⁰ Vgl. dazu Singer a. a. O. S. 9.

¹¹ Vgl. dazu Singer a. a. O. S. 12.

¹² Vgl. *Friedensgutachten 2012. Stellungnahme des Herausgebers und der Herausgeberinnen: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Empfehlungen.* Lit Verlag, Berlin 2012, S. 12.

¹ Wie beispielsweise der Territorialkonflikt zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan um Bergkarabach.

² Vgl. dazu Thiele, Ralph: *In jeder Situation den Überblick behalten. Ganz nah dran – mit Unmanned Aircraft Systems.* In: Zeitschrift für Innere Führung if, Nr. 4 / 2012, Berlin Oktober 2012, S. 8.

³ Vgl. Thiele a. a. O. S. 8.

⁴ Vgl. Dean, Sidney E.: *Umstrittener Kampfdrohneinsatz der USA.* In: Europäische Sicherheit und Technik, 4/2013, S. 20.

nen, wäre daher heute für die globale Situation nahezu bedeutungslos. Zu glauben, man könne damit die Gesamtentwicklung beeinflussen oder gar rückgängig machen geht an der Realität vorbei. Verweise auf „vermeintliche Erfolge“ bei der Ächtung von Waffensystemen, wie zum Beispiel von Landminen, verkennen, dass jene i.d.R. nur vor dem Hintergrund einer nicht mehr vorhandenen politisch-militärischen Interessenlage der entscheidenden Handlungsakteure an dem jeweiligen Waffensystem, überhaupt möglich waren. Eine solche Interessenkonstellation ist heute mit Blick auf bewaffnete Drohnen eindeutig nicht gegeben. Die Dynamik und Entwicklung von Kampfdrohnen, insbesondere in den USA und Israel aber auch in Ländern wie Großbritannien, Russland, Indien, China oder dem Iran, ist heute bereits viel zu ausgeprägt und fortgeschritten und das politische wie ökonomische Interesse an dieser neuen Technologie viel zu groß.¹³ Israel, als der aktuell größte Exporteur auf diesem Gebiet, hat bereits 24 Länder mit Drohnen im Wert von ca. 4,6 Milliarden Dollar ausgerüstet.¹⁴ Auch die italienischen Luftstreitkräfte verfügen bereits über schwere Kampfdrohnen-Systeme des Typs MQ-9 Reaper.¹⁵ Mit einem Rückstand auf die Spitze dieser Entwicklung von mindestens ca. einem Jahrzehnt¹⁶ hat Deutschland darüber hinaus auf diesem Feld keinerlei richtungsbestimmenden Einfluss. Ein einseitiger Verzicht auf die Beschaf-

fung von Kampfdrohnen würde daher lediglich die notwendige Modernisierung der eigenen Streitkräfte in fahrlässiger Weise gefährden.

Das heißt umgekehrt noch lange nicht, dass man sich über internationale Normen, Standards und entsprechende Regelungen bezüglich des Umgangs, der Kontrolle oder der Proliferationsverhinderung mit Blick auf diese neue Waffenkategorie keine Gedanken machen sollte oder müsste. Ganz im Gegenteil sind diese Fragen dringender denn je. Entscheidend ist jedoch dies in einem ganzheitlichen Kontext, ideologiefrei und auf der Basis von Realitäten zu tun.¹⁷

Krieg und Gewalt: Dass Krieg seinem Wesen nach ein „Akt der Gewalt“ mit der „Tendenz zum Äußersten“ und zur Eskalation ist, verdeutlichte bereits der preußische General und Kriegstheoretiker Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) in seinem Werk *Vom Kriege* (1832).¹⁸ Die Form des Krieges ist der bewaffnete Kampf, der darauf abzielt einen Gegner physisch und moralisch, in welcher Form auch immer, zu bezwingen. Die politische Zweckbestimmung des Krieges ist mit Zwang verbunden. Krieg als solches kann daher auf Grund seiner Gewaltsamkeit nicht human sein. Das gilt selbst dann, wenn der Krieg, wie bei Clausewitz, auf das übergeordnete Ideal des Friedens ausgerichtet ist und für eine noch so gerechte sowie ethisch-moralisch wohl begründete Sache geführt wird.

Technologie und Gewalt: Krieg war auch noch nie human, gleich wie viele Jahrhunderte oder Jahrtausende man in seiner Geschichte zurückblickt und unabhängig davon wie viele waffentechnologische Entwicklungsstufen man ungeschehen machen wollte. Wer die besondere Grausamkeit, Brutalität oder Häufigkeit des Krieges primär aus einem jeweils fort-

schriftlicheren Stand der Waffentechnik ableiten will, verkennt daher diesen grundsätzlichen in der Natur der Sache liegenden Aspekt des Phänomens.

Sogar vor dem Hintergrund und dem persönlichen Miterleben der menschenverschleißenden napoleonischen „Volkskriege“, mit ihren bis dahin ungekannten Streitkräftenumfängen, Opferzahlen wie auch den spezifischen Brutalitäten des Guerilla- und Partisanenkrieges in Spanien und Russland, gelangte Carl von Clausewitz zu der Einschätzung, dass die Kriege der „gebildeten Völker“, zu denen er zweifelsohne auch Frankreich zählte, viel weniger grausam und zerstörend seien als die der ungebildeten.¹⁹ Ob man dieser Einschätzung, insbesondere mit Blick auf Massenvernichtungsmittel, heute noch uneingeschränkt folgen kann, ist sicherlich zu hinterfragen. Durch das Abstrahieren bestimmter Stufen waffentechnologischer Fortschritte ergibt sich jedenfalls nicht automatisch eine humanere Form der Kriegführung und Krieg wird damit auch nicht seltener. Wer wollte beispielsweise schon die an Völkermord grenzende Dauerkriegführung des römischen Imperiums, beispielsweise unter Julius Caesar in Gallien, als humaner bezeichnen als die moderne Kriegführung, nur weil jener weder über Feuerwaffen, noch über Panzer oder Kampfdrohnen verfügte.

Selbst in seiner traditionellen vorstaatlichen Form, ohne militärische Streitkräfte und auf einem steinzeitlichen Technikniveau, war Krieg keineswegs eine seltene, ritterliche oder gar humane Angelegenheit. Die traditionelle Kriegführung, beispielsweise von Clan- oder Stammesgesellschaften war mitunter sogar weit blutiger und forderte, weil es sich hierbei um einen chronischen Dauerzustand handelte, in dem der Frieden praktisch nicht existent war, prozentual und auf die Zeitspanne beispielsweise eines Jahrhunderts gesehen weit höhere Opferzahlen einer Population als dies selbst mit Blick auf das 20. Jahrhundert und die durch die beiden Weltkriege am

¹³ Vgl. dazu u. a. Altmann, Jürgen: *Unbemannte bewaffnete Systeme – Trends, Gefahren und präventive Rüstungskontrolle*. In: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung: *Unbemannte bewaffnete Systeme: Verändert der rüstungstechnologische Wandel den Umgang mit Konflikten? Eine friedliche Perspektive*, Beiträge zum Parlamentarischen Abend der DSF am 25. September 2012 in Berlin. ISSN 2193-7958. S. 19.

¹⁴ Vgl. Rühle, Hans: *Die Zukunft gehört den Kampfdrohnen*. In: *Die Welt*, 08. Juni 2013. <http://www.welt.de/116943930>, S. 1.

¹⁵ Vgl. Winter, Manuel: *Zukunftsfeld UAS. Der Fähigkeitsaufbau aus Sicht der Luftwaffe*. In: *Europäische Sicherheit und Technik*, 6/2013, S. 32.

¹⁶ Gemessen an der Tatsache, dass Israel bereits seit den 1980er Jahren und die USA seit Beginn der 2000er Jahre bewaffnete Drohnen einsetzen und Deutschland aktuell noch nicht einmal die Entscheidung zur Beschaffung eines Kleinkontingents zu Versuchs- und Übungszwecken getroffen hat. Vgl. dazu u. a. Altmann a. a. O. S. 10.

¹⁷ Wie Peter W. Singer sehr treffend betont ist dazu der Kenntnisstand von Technologie und Markt von vor fünf Jahren nicht als ausreichend zu betrachten. Vgl. Singer a. a. O. S. 14.

¹⁸ Vgl. dazu Clausewitz, Carl von [1832]: *Vom Kriege*: Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz: 19. Aufl., Dümmler, Bonn, 1980, I, 1, S. 191-195.

¹⁹ Vgl. *Vom Kriege*, I, 1, S. 192.

stärksten betroffenen Nationen der Fall war.²⁰ Die Vorstellung eines Jean-Jacques Rousseaus (1712-1778) vom „edlen“ im Dauerrfrieden lebenden „Wilden“ kann daher, von Ausnahmen abgesehen, nur als romantische Fehlperzeption anderer Kulturen und Zivilisationen bezeichnet werden. Die überwiegend mit Macheten begangene Massakrierung der Tutzi-Bevölkerung Ruandas (1994), mit mehr als einer halben Million Todesopfern innerhalb nur weniger Monate, liefert einen erschreckenden Beweis für die Zerstörungskraft und das Vernichtungspotenzial von mit einfachsten Mitteln ausgetragenen Gewaltkonflikten.

Aus diesen Überlegungen ist zu folgern, dass der waffentechnologische Fortschritt nicht per se oder automatisch zu einer größeren Häufigkeit oder Brutalisierung von Krieg und Gewaltkonflikt führen oder dazu beitragen muss. Gleichzeitig gilt es festzuhalten, dass kriegerische Gewalt, Grausamkeiten und Brutalitäten bis hin zu Völkermord keinen besonderen Stand waffentechnologischer Entwicklung und schon gar keine militärisch organisierten Streitkräfte erfordern. So bedauerlich es auch ist: Verwerfungen dieser Art sind auf jeder Entwicklungsstufe möglich.

Waffentechnologie und Ethik: Stellt man sich die Frage nach ethisch-moralisch besonders verwerflichen waffentechnologischen Entwicklungen so sind hierbei insbesondere Massenvernichtungsmittel zu nennen. Diese lassen weder eine Unterscheidung zwischen Kombattanten und Nichtkombattanten, Schuldigen und Unschuldigen noch zwischen militärischen und nichtmilitärischen Zielen zu und sie sind von ihrer Idee her potenziell auf die gezielte und bewusste Vernichtung ganzer Populationen ausgerichtet. Das ist an Brutalität und Inhumanität kaum noch zu steigern. Bewaffnete Drohnen mit ihrer Fähigkeit zur gezielten, dosierten, punktgenauen und kontrollierbaren Präzisionswirkung stellen waffentechno-

logisch und von ihrem potenziellen Einsatzspektrum her betrachtet so ziemlich das exakte Gegenstück zu Massenvernichtungsmitteln dar.

Damit werden sie per se nicht human und bedürfen, wie jedes andere Gewaltmittel auch, einer verantwortlichen politischen Kontrolle auf der Basis militärischer Expertise und ethisch-moralischer Wertmaßstäbe. Selbstverständlich ist hierbei den spezifischen Herausforderungen, Besonderheiten und Gefahren, die mit diesem Waffensystem verbunden sein können, wie zum Beispiel einem leichtfertigen politischen Gebrauch, wie auch einer Abstumpfung oder gar spielerischen Verselbständigung der Bediener mit dem System, angemessen vorzubeugen. Waffen sind grundsätzlich gefährlich.

Im Gegensatz zu Massenvernichtungsmitteln wie auch zu konventionellen Flächen-, Streu- oder Brandwaffen lassen Kampfdrohnen jedoch das gezielte Bemühen erkennen die potenziellen Opfer militärischer Gewaltanwendung auf einen kleinstmöglichen Kreis zu begrenzen. Damit bieten sie wie kaum ein anderes Mittel die Möglichkeit zu begrenzten, vergleichsweise präzisen und wohl erwogenen Eingriffen ohne zusätzliches Eigenrisiko. Diese gezielte, begrenzte und kontrollierbare Eingriffsmöglichkeit kann, im Vergleich zum Einsatz herkömmlicher Mittel, wie Flächenbombardements aus der Luft oder Artillerieschlägen, zu einer effizienteren und damit verlustärmeren Auftragserfüllung im Rahmen militärischer Einsätze, und hierbei insbesondere auch zum Schutze Dritter oder eigener Kräfte am Boden genutzt werden.

Staatliche Verantwortung: Das hiermit verbundene ethische wie auch friedenspolitische Potenzial ist in der bisherigen, stark problem- und risikofixierten Debatte in Deutschland, noch nicht einmal ansatzweise erfasst worden. Wenn ein Staat und eine Gesellschaft eigene Soldaten in einen kriegerischen Einsatz entsenden, so tragen sie auch die moralische Verantwortung dafür jene so aus-

zurüsten, dass sie ihren Auftrag erfüllen können und dabei selbst eine größtmögliche Überlebenschance haben. Das gebietet schon allein die Pflicht zur Fürsorge. Wenn ein Staat oder ein Bündnis im Namen des Friedens in den Kriegs- und Konfliktregionen dieser Welt intervenieren, so ist ein wirksames, präzises, abgestuftes wie auch begrenzbares und kontrollierbares Wirkungsspektrum Grundvoraussetzung für eine ethisch-moralisch verantwortliche Auftragserfüllung. Nur so kann Frieden auch gegen Gewaltakteure wirksam durchgesetzt und gleichzeitig sichergestellt werden, dass unbeteiligte Dritte möglichst wenig in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund, sprich mit Blick auf die besondere Art militärischer Einsätze westlicher Demokratien, insbesondere im Rahmen von Krisenbewältigung und Konfliktverhütung – gezielt, begrenzt, kontrollierbar – wie auch für die Art und Weise, wie man diese bestreiten will oder überhaupt nur bestreiten kann, das heißt mit wenig Personal und so verlust- und schadensarm wie möglich, stellen bewaffnete Drohnen ein äußerst geeignetes Mittel dar. Besondere eigene Stärken, wie die technologische Überlegenheit, können damit genutzt und die größte eigene Schwäche in Form der Opfersensibilität kann entsprechend reduziert werden. Für eine Industrienation, mit post-heroischer gesellschaftlicher Grundorientierung und einer stark rückläufigen demografischen Entwicklung wie Deutschland sind diese Punkte von ganz besonderer Bedeutung. Kampfdrohnen können entscheidend dazu beitragen militärisch handlungsfähig zu sein, wenn der Dienst am Frieden dies erfordert.

Politische Gesamtkonzeption und Strategie: Dass ein grundsätzlich wirksames und geeignetes Einsatzmittel noch lange keinen Ersatz für eine stimmige wie auch ethisch-moralisch gerechtfertigte politische Gesamtkonzeption und Strategie eines Einsatzes darstellt und daher für sich genommen noch kein Garant für Moralität oder politischen Erfolg sein kann, ist an sich selbsterklärend und darf nicht ernsthaft erwartet

²⁰ Vgl. dazu Diamond, Jared: *Vermächtnis. Was wir von traditionellen Gesellschaften lernen können*. Verlag: S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 2012, S. 165-168.

werden.²¹ Umgekehrt spricht eine unmoralische, fehlerhafte oder nicht erfolgreiche Verwendung eines Mittels noch lange nicht gegen jenes, sondern zeigt allenfalls die Unstimmigkeit oder Unmöglichkeit der jeweiligen politischen Gesamtkonzeption oder Strategie eines Einsatzes auf. Niemals, so könnte man in freier Interpretation der Clausewitzschen Zweck-Ziel-Mitte-Relation sagen, darf das Mittel ohne seinen Zweck gedacht oder gar zu diesem gemacht werden.²² Kampfdrohnen sind weder Ersatz für ethisch-moralische Abwägungsprozesse noch für politisch-strategisches Denken.

Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung: Gänzlich ausgeblendet bleibt in der bisherigen deutschen Debatte gar der Beitrag, den Kampfdrohnen im Rahmen der Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung leisten könnten. Vor dem Hintergrund drastisch reduzierter Streitkräfteumfänge, der besonderen Notwendigkeit weite Räume und Grenzen mit nur wenigen eigenen Kräften überwachen, sichern und kontrollieren zu können, wie auch mit Blick auf mögliche und reaktionsschnelle Unterstützungsleistungen für geographisch exponierte Bündnispartner ist dies ein Punkt von ganz besonderer Relevanz. Weitgehend ausgeblendet bleibt in der aktuellen Debatte des Weiteren das waffentechnologische Revolutionspotenzial dieser Schlüsseltechnologie, insbesondere mit Blick auf die Zukunft von Luftstreitkräften und den sich hierbei aktuell vollziehenden Paradigmenwechsel. Diese Zukunft wird in starkem Maße in unbemannten Systemen als einer „unverzichtbaren militärischen Zukunftstechnologie“ gesehen.²³ Dass angesichts des rasanten technologischen Wandels Streitkräfte, die sich nicht schnell genug

modernisieren und in entscheidenden Bereichen auf einem adäquaten technologischen Stand halten, ihre militärische und damit auch sicherheits-, verteidigungs- und friedenspolitische Halbwertszeit bereits in kurzer Zeit überschritten und damit ihre Relevanz verloren haben werden, sollte hierbei allen Verantwortungsträgern wohl bewusst sein. Auch die Nichtbeschaffung von Kampfdrohnen birgt friedenspolitische Risiken.

Einhegung des Krieges: Wenn Krieg und kriegerische Gewalt selbst schon nicht beseitigt werden können, so kommt es umso mehr darauf an nach Mitteln und Wegen zu ihrer Einhegung, Begrenzung und Rationalisierung zu suchen. Die Vorbeugung und Vermeidung, Einhegung und Begrenzung wie auch die Fähigkeit bestehende Gewaltkonflikte erfolgreich und möglichst rasch zu einem humanen langfristig friedenskompatiblen Ende führen zu können, sind heute als Bedingungen des Friedens so wichtig wie eh und je. Zu prüfen, welchen Beitrag dazu Kampfdrohnen als modernes militärisches Mittel leisten können, ist daher nicht nur eine verteidigungs- und sicherheitspolitische Frage von höchster Relevanz, sondern stellt insbesondere auch eine ethisch-moralische Solensforderung dar. Wissenschaft, Politik und Medien in Deutschland sind daher gut beraten diese Fragestellung aktiv und ergebnisoffen, das heißt mit Blick auf die Risiken aber auch auf die Möglichkeiten und Chancen, die diese Zukunftstechnologie zu bieten hat, anzugehen und nicht in reflexartiger Ablehnung einer neuen Entwicklung zu verharren, die global auch ohne deutsche Beteiligung längst zur Realität geworden ist.

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THEMEN

The French White Paper on Defense

A strategic defense review is only useful if it frames the strategic goals of a country in the light of existing threats and risks. The long awaited French White paper, released on 29th April, outlines both cuts and investments which reflect the current economic crisis, troubles in North Africa, and the US strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region.

The annual defense budget will fall from 1.9% to 1.7% of France's GDP, a shift away from the NATO target of 2%. It must be said that the cuts are less severe than expected and can be described as a cautious compromise which reflect the indecisive character of President Hollande and the tight budgetary constraints. Should the economic situation continue to deteriorate further cuts can be expected.

The Army will reduce the operational headcount from 88.000 troops to 66.000 and will restructure to 7 brigades. It will reduce the number of Main Battle Tanks, much as other NATO forces have done. It will, however, invest in up to 30 tactical UAV's, most likely the British Watchkeeper WK450. It will retain around 80 attack helicopters and a total of 150 support and reconnaissance helicopters.

The Navy will finally abandon the construction of a new aircraft carrier and a further Mistral – Class Assault ship. It will also reduce its fleet of First Rank Frigates from 18 to 15 and FREMM frigates from 11 to 8. Following the decommissioning of the Cassard class frigates and the cancellation of the FREDA frigates the French navy will only have two dedicated air defense frigates in the fleet, pointing to a close cooperation with the Royal Navy and the Type 45 air defense destroyers. These would be able to provide wide and close area defense for a French carrier group. On the plus side the Navy will receive 6 Barracuda-class Submarines and will retain its fleet of nuclear attack and missile

²¹ Vgl. dazu Friedman, George: *Hellfire, Morality and Strategy*. Stratfor, 19. Februar 2013. Friedman hält die gezielte Tötung jihadistischer Führungskader durch amerikanische Drohneinsätze zwar weder für illegal noch für unmoralisch. Er betrachtet dieses Vorgehen jedoch als ineffektiv mit Blick auf die strategische Zielsetzung der USA die terroristische Bedrohung durch den Jihadismus zu beseitigen. Der Kern dieser Auseinandersetzung sei ein ideologischer und dieser könne nicht mit Hellfire Raketen gewonnen werden.

²² Vgl. *Vom Kriege*, I, 1, S. 210.

²³ Vgl. u. a. Rühle a. a. O., S. 2.

boats. Since the publication of the White Paper French defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced that France will develop and build a new anti-ship missile with the UK. French designation for this helicopter-borne missile is ANL, in the UK it is dubbed FASGW. This decision has been eagerly awaited and will pave the way for a mutual interdependence between France and the UK in weapons technology and ease the reorganization of the missile's maker MBDA.

The Air Force will reduce its fleet of fast jets from 300 to 225, consisting of Rafal fighters and Mirage 2000-D strike aircraft. It will continue to operate a slim fleet of 7 AEW&C aircraft and will order up to 12 A330 tanker and 50 tactical transport aircraft.

The cuts and investments reflect the lessons learned from last year's Libyan operation and ongoing operations in Mali. The investments in air to air refueling capability, intelligence gathering and heavy lift assets are a direct response to the deficiencies unmasked by both operations. They are also a confirmation of the French axis of power projection which ranges from the eastern Atlantic, through the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. At the same time the steps outlined in the White Paper are very much in the spirit of the Lancaster House agreement between the UK and France.

The publication of the paper has not attracted much interest in the German press. This is understandable, if regrettable, as Germany no longer seems to be a reliable partner when it comes to French defense policy. In part this is just one of the consequences of Germany's decision to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council in the run-up to intervention in Libya in 2012. Germany's reluctance to engage in such operations makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to include Germany when it comes to the pooling of resources. This situation is not new and has accelerated Anglo-French cooperation at the expense of German interests.

Germany's last defense white paper was published in 2006 and was dominated by the very domestic issues of conscription and the use of the Bundeswehr within Germany. It paid lip service to issues such as comprehensive approach or global threats. What it failed to recognize was that diplomatic solutions only work when the ability and willingness to resort to force is apparent to the other party. Both the UK and France recognize this.

A further significant difference between the German 2006 paper and the French 2013 paper is the make-up of the drafting committee. The German white paper was written by the Verteidigungsministerium and edited by politicians for political correctness. The French White Paper was drafted by a wide range of experts from the armed forces, security services, politics, industry, think-tanks and the Foreign Service. Significantly the British Ambassador to France, Sir Peter Ricketts, and the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, were a part of the team which drafted the report. This shows clearly that France clearly understand the need for a comprehensive approach to defense issues and has understood that Europe must become a producer of defense rather than a consumer of security. That message has clearly not been understood by the German public, nor by a number of politicians. The debate regarding the use of the Bundeswehr is far removed from questions of military requirements and necessity and is concentrated on questions of ethics, morality and international law. It is unfortunate that those who are acting against us ignore international law and have little respect for western ethics and morality.

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THEMEN

China's Soft Power Strategy in Africa

The Problem

China is spearheading a remarkable diplomatic and economic push into Africa as worries mount that it pays little or no attention to human rights, democracy, labor standards, and environmental protection on the continent.

China-Africa bilateral trade increased from \$12 million in 1950 to \$114 billion in 2010. At the end of 2008, Chinese investment in Africa had reached \$26 billion. China has funded more than 900 infrastructure projects and dispatched some 16,000 medical personnel to the continent. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have visited more than 15 African countries since 2006. The Chinese have hosted several ministerial meetings attended by many African heads of state. Yet, China's move into Africa has been bumpy. Africans are beginning to complain to government officials about the operation of Chinese companies, including poor pay and low safety standards. What is motivating China's strategy in Africa?

China's Engagement with the African Continent: Brief Summary

Contemporary China-African diplomacy began in the late 1950s with the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and several African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan). Premier Zhou Enlai conducted a 10-country tour of Africa from December 1963 to January 1964. During the Cold War, especially in the 1960s, Mao Zedong's China extended scholarships to African students to study Marxism in Beijing, even though China was still a poor country. Back home, many of these African students became members of the elite class of their country and remembered their visits to an economically poor but ideologically committed China. In 1971, China entered – as Taiwan exited – the United Nations (UN), which helped China increase its presence in Af-

rica and secure allies for its global ambitions. In 1976, China completed building the famous Tan-Zam railway linking Tanzania and Zambia and continued to grant scholarships to thousands of African students to study at Chinese universities.

An interesting turning point of China-Africa relations was the Tiananmen Democracy movement of 1989 in which the government brutally suppressed demonstrators. The crackdown came under orders from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and was tacitly approved by former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping. The Party also persecuted former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and other top leaders who favored reconciliation with the demonstrators. The demotion and eventual house arrest of Zhao Ziyang, then the General Secretary of the CCP, and the Party's use of military power in the crackdown were strongly condemned by the United States and many other nations, especially in Europe. Many African states, on the contrary, refused to condemn the CCP's actions, adopting China's own phrase of "non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs." Thus, China found in Africa a region of compatible views as it struggled to protect its standing in the international community (Taylor 2006a, 2). In the 1990s, China's rapidly progressing economic reforms and growth required that Chinese economic planners find new markets for Chinese goods and new sources of raw materials and energy. The African continent, with its under-cultivated consumer markets and vast mineral and timber wealth, offered both.

In 2000, China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to promote long-term cooperation. The first FOCAC ministerial conference, held in Beijing in October 2000, was attended by President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Vice President Hu Jintao. Ministers from China and 44 other countries and representatives from 17 international and regional organizations attended the meeting. The second ministerial conference was

held in Addis Ababa in December 2003. At the third ministerial conference, held in Beijing in November 2006, President Hu Jintao announced China's grant of \$5 billion worth of concessionary loans to African countries. At the fourth ministerial meeting in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2009, even more loans were announced, along with construction projects sponsored by China. The fifth ministerial meeting is scheduled in Beijing in 2012.

As of 2009, China was reportedly hosting 120,000 students from Africa, with several thousand more studying without scholarships in a kind of on-the-job training. Chinese foreign ministers, premiers, and presidents continue to make tours of various African countries to demonstrate China's continuing interest in building solid political and economic relationships. When Western critics argue that China's recent interest in Africa is only to secure oil and raw materials, China reminds them of the early Chinese commitment to build the famous \$455 million TanZam railway and China's subsequent track record of hosting students and making state visits to the continent. However, the genuine question remains: On balance, what is China getting from Africa and what benefits does China bring to Africa? Put another way, when it comes to the China-Africa partnership, who is working for whom? (Gowan 2009, 1–8)

China's Economic Interest in Africa

China's national strategy is focused on its economy. Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao made the following pledge at the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007: *"We will quadruple the per capita GDP [Gross Domestic Product] of 2000 by the year 2020 by optimizing economic structure and improving economic returns while reducing consumption of resources and protecting the environment."* To provide a "well-off" society to all citizens, the Party leadership will push economic growth and social development. China's rate of economic growth during the past two decades

proves that the country is firmly set on a path to overcome poverty and underdevelopment. China is an economic giant and is expanding its reach worldwide, including into Africa. In terms of national GDP, the country surpassed second-ranked Japan in 2010.

Relentless economic and industrial development requires many resources. Africa, among other regions, has them, and China needs them. Oil best exemplifies this relationship. Since 2007, China has been the world's second largest consumer of oil behind the United States. China has been a net importer of oil since 1993. Oil use for transportation in 2010 was 3.4 million barrels per day (showing an annual increase of about 7% since 2004). As of 2010, China was consuming about 8 million barrels of oil a day. Three major state-owned enterprises (China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, and China Offshore Oil Corporation) are working to secure ever more oil resources. It is projected that China will need 12 million barrels per day by the year 2020. (Zhang 2010, 1–3)

The Chinese seem willing to go anywhere to procure resources, without worrying about the “three Ds”, a Western expression for a working environment that is “dirty, dangerous, and difficult.” Chinese corporations, most of them still owned by the state, have few scruples about dealing with shady governments. Thus, China's “oil safari” has traveled to such corruptly led countries as Angola, Sudan, and Gabon (Taylor 2006b, 944–945). In the Chinese political dictionary, “There are no rogue states” (Taylor 2006b, 946). Moral judgment and political values are not critical factors when it comes to Chinese business interests.

The length to which China is willing to go to secure trade opportunities is extraordinary. For example, China immediately offered Angola \$3 billion dollars in oil-backed credits to rebuild the country's infrastructure after its long and brutal civil war. Angola is the second largest oil producer (after Nigeria) in sub-Saharan Africa,

and 30% of Angolan oil is now being shipped to China. Similarly, China has invested heavily in Sudan, and the China National Petroleum Corporation has a 40% stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Company that dominates Sudan's oilfields. In 2009, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports. (Jiang 2006, 6–7)

In the eyes of the economic and political elite class of many African countries, China is a desirable partner. China's “non-interference in other countries' domestic politics” (one of the five principles of external relations stipulated by the Chinese constitution) is very convenient for African political leaders who want a free hand to rule their countries. China tries to impress African countries with the idea that both China and Africa have suffered at the hands of Western imperialists and that China is not imperialistic. Chinese workers and businessmen are willing to work and settle in Africa to make the kind of profits and seek the kind of potential profits that cannot be made in developed countries. China offers loans on favorable terms to cash-poor African countries for long-term procurement projects. China's top leaders have been supportive of African states by making frequent state visits, giving the impression to Africans that rather than living in a two-dimensional Africa-West world, they live in a triangular China-Africa-West world.

China has poured billions of dollars into railways, bridges, roads, dams, and hospitals in Africa. China's health-care units, regularly dispatched to Africa, especially since the early 2000s, have impressed African leaders. As early as 1963, a Chinese medical team was dispatched to Algeria and soon word spread about good Chinese medical care. According to the Chinese Ministry of Health, nearly 20,000 Chinese medical personnel have worked in 47 African countries since 1963, treating 200 million patients. (Shinn 2006, 14–16) Chinese traditional medicine is also widely popular in Africa today because many African tribal communities have relied on traditional healers and herbal

medicine. All in all, many Africans admire China.

Africans Express Concerns about Chinese Companies

China has argued that its engagement in Africa is mutually beneficial for China and the continent because it provides two-way commercial trade, infrastructure investment, and aid grants. At least in the short term, it would certainly appear that China's trade and investment in Africa are good for the continent. China's investment in African infrastructure would seem especially welcome in a continent where so much of the infrastructure is substandard.

However, the long-term effects of China's engagement in Africa are worrisome to some Africans. At least three concerns have been voiced (Taylor 2006b, 951–954). First, they are wary of becoming heavily dependent on Chinese economic development, especially in the oil and commodities industries. Second, they are concerned about China's ambivalence regarding norms for human rights and democracy. Third, they see a lack of environmental concern in Chinese-funded development projects.

For example, in April 2006 a car bomb exploded outside an oil refinery in Nigeria, a week after Chinese President Hu Jintao signed oil deals with the Nigerian government. A group calling itself the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta claimed responsibility for the blast, which it said was a warning to foreign companies working in Nigeria, specifically, Chinese companies: “*We wish to warn the Chinese government and its oil companies to steer well clear of the Niger Delta.*” The group claims that the Nigerian government is not spending its billions in oil revenues for the benefit of its people. (CNN World 2006)

In Gabon, environmental activists have pressed corrupt local officials to stop allowing the exploitation of Gabon's park areas by the Chinese company Sinopec. When a Gabonese national government delegation visited one of the parks, it determined that Sinopec

was guilty of environmental exploitation for prospecting for oil, dynamiting, and carving roads in the park without first receiving approval from the environmental impact statement that it submitted to the government (Taylor 2007).

In Zambia, 13 Zambian miners at the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine were injured in October 2010 when they were shot by two Chinese supervisors during a wage protest. Zambian prosecutors charged the supervisors with attempted murder but later dropped the case for undetermined reasons. The mine had been temporarily shut down the previous year for unsafe working conditions, and a Zambian provincial minister charged that the mine workers were being employed under disadvantageous circumstances since they were classified as part-time laborers even though some of them had been with the company for up to nine years. (Chen 2010)

A Washington-based economist with personal experience in Africa has shared the following observation on China's image in Africa: "Only corrupt nations will accept China with open arms. In more successful African economies – for example, Ghana members of the social and economic elite have demonstrated deep concern toward Chinese business practice and ethics."

Concluding Remarks: Is China a Soft Power in Africa?

China has wielded its power more dramatically since President Hu Jintao mentioned at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 that it needed to increase its soft power. The expression's creator, Joe Nye, recently defined this concept to a group of Beijing University students as "the ability to use attraction and persuasion to get what you want without force or payment." However, calling China a soft power in Africa, misses important nuances. Not all Africans are impressed with China. African Countries are beginning to complain about Chinese companies' poor pay and low safety standards. The exercise of soft power is not always easy, as Americans

well know. If Americans want to keep Africa open to Western influence, they need to pay closer attention to China's role in the continent.

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THEMEN

New Chinese Leadership in Saddle

Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction

Succession smog in China's top leadership hierarchy has since thinned out. A close look on the outcomes of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (*Zhonggong Shibā-dà*) speaks aloud a queer story of 'fixed match' with a difference where factions (*Tuánpài*), gangs (*Bāng*) and cliques (*Fèngxi*) have had their share of the present and future political booty in a quite nuanced way. This was while 2270 Deputies of the Communist Party of China (*Zhongguo Gongchandang*) formally took part in a televised election process to elect the ruling elite for the next five years.²⁵ They represented 40 different electoral units.²⁶ Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have made up for the much expected two top notches in the ultimate go. There is little repeat of either Lin Biao or Hua Guofeng events.²⁷

²⁵ The 1st National Congress of the CPC, held from July 23–31, 1921 had just 12 Deputies, representing 50 Party members. The number of Deputies didn't reach even 100 mark until the 6th National Congress. The total membership was just 40,000. The number of Deputies and the total membership swelled to 547 full and 208 alternate members with total membership crossing 1.21 million in the 7th National Congress held in 1945.

²⁶ 40 electoral units included 31 Provinces, Autonomous regions and Municipalities. There are six other constituencies which comprise of the PLA, the Central Party Organization, the Central Govt. Ministries and Commissions, the State Owned Enterprises, the People's Bank of China and other Financial Institutions and hypothetically the Republic of Taiwan. Hong Kong and Macao delegates are counted as part of Guangdong electoral unit. The rest other electoral units are made up of Deputies representing People's Armed Police, Social Management Groups, the Public Service Sector workers in private enterprises, and workers in foreign and joint enterprises. They make over 3.89 million grassroots units of the CPC, the total membership of which has since grown to 82.0 million. In a country with a total population of 1.347 billion, the choice of 82 million people, even if represented thoroughly and perfectly, is a minuscule representation of the people in a democratic setting.

²⁷ Lin Biao symbolizes too aggressive or self aggrandizing while Hua Guofeng happened to be ineffective. Both of them were choice of Mao Zedong. Once suspected of threatening the ruling base of paramount leader Mao Zedong, he ended up in a plane crash. Hua Guofeng formally succeeded Mao Zedong in 1976. He

For a perceptive China watcher, behind the cloak of orderly change of guard, there is a long story of inter and intra-faction bargains characteristic to an autocratic system bereft of democratic practices. In over all perspective, it has rather been an old wine in new bottle where system dynamics stemmed and flourished as a function his/ her relationship (*guanxi*) with the power in saddle' and hence, Princlings (*Taizé*) constantly stood a better chance over all and sundry (*läobǎixing*) in the run up for socio-economic and political climbing.²⁸ A field day for factions (*Tuánpài*), gangs (*Bāng*) and cliques (*Fèngxi*) in the Chinese political arena is thus, a rule rather than an exception. Notwithstanding, again for historical reasons, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have had constantly played a critical role in leadership change.²⁹

The paper, in its perspective, explores the individual and group legitimacy of the line up as heir apparent and beyond. The analytics, accordingly, peeps into the relative strength of *guanxi* of individuals and the group as *Taizé* with and/ or without their personal aura while in public services. The assumptions look beyond the general refrain to treat Chinese political system a rather frozen entity. While much awaits down the line, the Chinese citizens now enjoy relative freedom of choice on such matters as where they can live, where they can travel, what they can wear, what they can read, where they can work, and where they can be educated.

was literally ousted once proved ineffective in the eyes of power in saddle.

²⁸ Relationship is rather a loose translation of the word '*guanxi*'. In China's basic socio-cultural context, *Guanxi* is a system of '*renqing*' (favours), in which obligation and indebtedness are manufactured, and in which there is no time limit for repayment. By cultural instincts, the Chinese would always return '*renqing*'. One can thus, look at '*renqing*' as the exchange currency to cultivate '*guanxi*'. As a thumb rule, the more '*renqing*' one accumulated, the person was better poised get in return in career progressions.

²⁹ In 1930's, Mao Zedong succeeded in taking over the rein due to his control over Red Army. Deng Xiaoping did as well work out the PLA backings: First, in getting over *siren bang* (Gang of Four) in leadership strife and then for crushing the Democracy Movement of 1989. The PLA had played no smaller role in installing Jiang Zemin either.

There is since change in the age and educational characteristics of the leaders in the line up. As a result, not until they meet the fate of host heir apparent of yesteryears, the line is broadly expected to rise to the occasion. It is quite another thing that their propensities to respond to the challenges of different sorts in regional and global contexts would remain open to turn of events, as they come and evolve. Approach of the study is rather 'interpretive in nature and character' and draws on wide range of secondary sources. The audiences in view include decision makers in perspective besides the general readership.

Factional War and the End Winners

Placement of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang at the helms to succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively happened to be a post script of in-house power play and compromises of various *Tuánpài*, *Bāng* and *Fèngxi* in China's recurrent political life. Among the individual players, Jiang Zemin is the winner with five protégé ultimately making over in the seven member top decision making body of Politburo Standing Committee.

Xi Jinping, China's real power in saddle with a control over the party, the armed forces and the executive happens to be one of the paramount *Taizé* (Princlings).³⁰ While being a protégé of former PRC President Jiang Zemin, former PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong and other prominent figures of the Shanghai Clique, he draws on his strong PLA heritage and backing.³¹ As Vice President, he

³⁰ Xi Jinping has since succeeded Hu Jintao as the General Secretary of the CPC at the 18th National Party Congress. He will take over the rein of the President in March 2013 and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2014. For graphic personal details, see Liang Jian 梁剑 *New Biography of Xi Jinping* (近平新传 New York: Mirror Books, 2012); and Wu Ming 吴鸣 *Biography of Xi Jinping* (近平传 Hong Kong: 文化艺术出版社 2008).

³¹ Son of Xi Zhongxun, founder of a Chinese guerilla army base in the Northwest of China during the period leading up to the CPC's capture of power in 1949, and husband of Maj. Gen. Peng Liyuan, a famous Chinese folk singer, and having served PLA in various capacities including personal assistant to the then Chinese Defence Minister Geng Biao, Xi

has had earned impressions of a consensus builder in the party hierarchy, and votary of relative openness in China's political and economic life. His major challenge remains to acquit reasonably well as a 'decisive man'.

Li Keqiang, the second man in calling, is linked with Hu Jintao and his Youth League (*Tuánpài*).³² In normal condition, he is supposed to replace Wen Jiabao at the 12th National People's Congress slated for March 2013. However, for an array of reasons including his non-Princeling backdrop, it was possible that takes over the Chairmanship of National People's Congress (*Quánguó Rénmín Dàibiǎo*), and the Premier of the State Council passes on to a joint protégé of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, possibly Wang Qishan, one of the five other selected members of Politburo Standing Committee.³³ Li Keqiang has otherwise backing of at least 86 of the 371 member Central Committee.

Li Keqiang has a penchant for populist economic policies such as employment generation, basic health care, balancing regional development, and clean energy. Notwithstanding, he is believed to be the brain behind the *World Bank China 2030* report that recommended to put a limit on the 'power of State Owned Companies. In the eyes of Bo Zhiyue, an academic with the National University, Singapore, Li Keqiang is more focused a leader than Wen Jiabao. However, in the assessment others, both Chinese

Jinping carried strong inter-group backing in his appointment to the top post. Nevertheless, With market friendly approach, he draws support from Chinese big business houses, too. As for political insights, he is considered least liberal and hence, a chip of the old Marxist block.

³² *Tuanpai* (团派) in China have come to be referred as being 'Populist' faction as against 'Elitist', who come from relatively humble background and have come to rule the roost through the power structure from the grass-roots. They prevail upon by dint of their educational probity and the acumen to sail along.

³³ In Chinese vernacular press, Li Keqiang (李强) has come to be contrasted against the charisma factor of Wen Jiabao and toughness of Zhu Rongji in the face of multitude of issues faced in day-to-day handling of China's political and economic life, in particular those posed by vested corporate interests groups.

and others, to quote pertinently Washington Post columnist Keith B. Richburg, the modest birth of Li Keqiang was veritable hurdle in the implementation of his lofty ideals.³⁴ In the words of Victor Gao, one time English interpreter of Deng Xiaoping, as quoted in News Stream, CNN, for success, Li Keqiang has to learn to be an “effective second fiddle” to Xi Jinping.³⁵

As for Wang Qishan, in the contrast, he can veritably count upon his heritage.³⁶ Son of an academic of Qinghua University, and son-in-law of Yao Yilin, a former Politburo Standing Committee Member and Vice Premier, he has deep root in Zhongnanhai’s politics. His close comrade-in-arms relationship with Jiang Zemin’s son Jiang Mianheng is an added advantage. Most critiques on Wang’s preferences and priorities speak of him as an ardent advocate of find state monopoly. It remains to be seen how he strikes balance with those who seek to promote private sector. Scholarly studies in the field find him a likely ‘drummer for liberalization of China’s financial system, and tax-revenue reforms’. In the eyes of Johnny Lau Yui-siu, a veteran China-watcher, the reputation of Wang Qishan as a ‘troubleshooter’ can perhaps stands him stead in his upward movements.³⁷ His positioning as discipline watchdog, as Bo Zhiyue, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asia Institute would like to see, was a ‘huge waste’ of his strength. Most analysts including Bo Zhiyue otherwise holds him good in his ‘banker’s job’.³⁸

³⁴ <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/11/li-keqiang-liberalbackgroundlimited-leeway/> (accessed on Dec 1, 2012)

³⁵ <http://newstream.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/15/li-keqiang-china-effective-second-fiddle/> (accessed on Dec 1, 2012)

³⁶ For biological details of Wang Qishan, see Guo Qing 郭晴 *From Yao Yilin to Wang Qishan (从姚依林到王岐山)* (Hong Kong: 明报出版社, 2009).

³⁷ Austin Ramzy, Time, Nov. 15, 2012, “Meet the Men Who Will Rule China”, <http://www.world.time.com/2012/11/15/chinas-new-leader-meet-who-will-rule/slide/wang-qishan/> (accessed on Dec 1, 2012)

³⁸ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-14/xi-li-named-to-communist-party-panel-clearing-way-to-top-posts.html> (accessed on Dec 1, 2012)

Tuánpài proximity with Hu Jintao has been a factor in the meteoric political career of Liu Yunshan who otherwise has a rather lack-luster heritage in comparison and contrast with most of the Chinese political heavy weights of the day.³⁹ In the opinion of most journalists, in particular Cheng Yizhong, the former Chief Editor of the *Southern Metropolis Daily*, with Liu Yunshan at the helms, “the control on ideology will only get tougher”.⁴⁰ There is then sobering thought from some, to name in particular Chen Zeming, a Beijing based political commentator. In his opinion, Liu Yunshan was a “bureaucrat”, and he “wouldn’t have any direct hand in the control of ideology.”

Zhang Dejiang is a Princeling, born to Maj. Gen Zhang Zhiji and a protégé of Jiang Zemin. He belonged to Shanghai *Fèngxi*. In the estimation of some of the critiques such as Dong Liwen, a professor at Central Police University, Taiwan, “Zhang Dejiang is a key figure in Jiang’s power-succession strategy for the 18th party congress”.⁴¹ “Opportunism is one of the common political characteristics of the Shanghai gang,” Dong said. “To maximize their political interests, their ideology is always swaying between that of the leftists and the rightists, combining hard and soft tactics.” In the eyes of Prof. Yang Kaihuang of Ming Chuan University, Taiwan, Zhang Dejiang’s iron-fisted problem solving skills, displayed over and over again, the latest being his eight months long post-Bo Xilai tenure in Chongqing, perhaps stood him stead for the nomination.⁴²

³⁹ Early career of Liu Yunshan (刘云山) included the job of a school teacher in Inner Mongolia and manual labour in the countryside during the *Wenhua Da Geming* (the Great Cultural Revolution) days. Marriage of his son Liu Lefei with the daughter of *Tuánpài* heavy weight Jia Chunwang is considered a shot in his arms.

⁴⁰ Thanks to strong propaganda regime, China ranked 174th in Reporters without Borders’ press freedom index in 2011-2012, ahead of only Iran, Syria, Turkmenistan, North Korea and Eritrea.

⁴¹ South China Morning Post, Nov 26, 2012 <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1030269/zhang-dejiang-rise-iron-fisted-enforcer> (accessed on Dec 1, 2012)

⁴² Ibid

But for comparative disadvantage of age, as most analysts see, Yu Zhengsheng was worth watch future leader of China for a variety of reasons.⁴³ He is first, a Princeling with a difference.⁴⁴ In China’s political dynamics, one can’t lose sight of the fact that he enjoyed confidence of Deng Xiaoping as well as Jiang Zemin. Nevertheless, his writ run high in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by default of his wife Zhang Zhikai being the daughter of Maj. General Zhang Zhenhuan. Diminutives in his career graph, if any and whatsoever, included his much talked links with Liu Zhimin, who was dismissed on corruption charges. The blowing up of “shared mistress” in the yesteryears of his career does as well stand a blemish.⁴⁵ Considering all factors, some of the Chinese and foreign analysts consider Yu Zhengsheng to hold strong chance to end up as Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Yu Zhengsheng’s hot-button policy issues may possibly include the promotion of the private sector, urban development, legal development, and social reform to promote confidence-building and mutual trust in society.

Zhang Gaoli, the seventh star in the line up of future Chinese decision makers, is a protégé of

⁴³ For detailed account of his family and other connections, see Gao Yuanpeng 高源鹏 *Yu Zhengsheng and His Family (俞正声和他的家族)* (New York: Mirror Books, 2009); Wang Yaohua 王耀华 *Competition among Provincial Chiefs (诸侯争锋)* (New York: Mirror Books, 2009), pp. 133–196; and Gao Xin 高新 *The New Leaders Who Run China (领导中国的新人物)* (New York: Mirror Books, 2003), Vol. 2, pp. 624–658.

⁴⁴ Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声) has incomparable ancestry at his back. Besides the fact that his own uncle Yu Dawei once served as Defence Minister of China under Chiang Kai-shek and legendry Madam Jiang Qing, the third wife of Mao Zedong who later led the Gang of Four happened to be none but his step mother. Before defecting to the United States of America in late 1980s, his elder brother Yu Qiangsheng served as China’s Defence Minister.

⁴⁵ See Jiang Weiping 姜维平, “What Does Liu Zhijin’s Downfall Mean?” (刘志军落马说明了什么?), *China in perspective (纵览中国)*, February 13, 2011, <http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=10125>; and Luo Changping, “Public nepotism” (公共裙带), *Caijing* magazine, No. 4, February 14, 2011

Jiang Zemin as well as Zeng Qinghong. While Party Chief of Shenzhen, he showcased Jiang Zemin's famous adage of theory of three represents (*Sāngè Dàibiào*).⁴⁶ Jiang has thus, paid back the favour by supporting his candidature. In the studied opinion of some analysts, Zhang Gaoli has had privilege of Zeng Qinghong's pleasure even earlier say first, in getting the post of Governor of Shandong, and one year later, Party Secretary of Shandong. By training, he is a reputed statistician. For strategic reasons, Zhang Gaoli maintains a low profile.⁴⁷ It is thus, difficult to gauze his moves.

In the factional fights, Shanghai *Fèngxi* led by Jiang Zemin has thus, clearly scored over Hu Jintao's faction, and the *Tuánpài*. Zeng Qinghong has quite obviously joined hands with Jiang Zemin for the nomination of his protégé. At the end of the day, Jiang Zemin's Shanghai *Fèngxi* pocketed five out of seven minds say Xi Jinping, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli. But for Zhang Gaoli, all others are Princelings. Hu Jintao's *Tuánpài* could manage to have two non-Princelings-Li Kejiang and Liu Yunshan. This is perhaps under a deal. Hu Jintao's *Tuánpài* has perhaps conceded against a future gains. This is apparent when one looks at the factional composition of 25-member Politburo, a *de facto* layer below the Standing Committee, and, a rung of power below that, among the 376 members of the Central Committee.⁴⁸ In the battle of wits in months long haggling and bargaining, thanks to startling disclosures of his family making good of his position in amassing wealth, Wen Jiabao, himself rather a progeny of Jiang Zemin led

Shanghai *Fèngxi*, had visible little say.

Maneuvers and Machinations of Chinese Characteristics

In the internecine war of political power, Jiang Zemin's Shanghai *Fèngxi* succeeded in outpacing the stride of its 'rival apparent', the Hu Jintao led *Tuánpài* in making good five of the seven positions in the Politburo Standing Committee. Relative strength of Shanghai *Fèngxi* is even more pronounced in the exclusion of Liu Yuandong, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang. It is but a reassertion of China's political culture where connections (*guanxi*) out-weigh all other factors in vertical rise in political career.

Thanks to the Bo Xilai factor, it was not a fight to finish. The two sides rather ended up in a compromise. This is *inter alia* demonstrated from the fact that Hu Jintao's *Tuánpài* is since basking glory with nine protégé in the 25 member Politburo, a *de facto* layer below the Standing Committee.⁴⁹ Similarly, a rung below it, the 376 member Central Committee, Hu Jintao's *Tuánpài* has better representation. Hu Jintao's protégés are also well represented on the Party's Central Military Commission (*Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng Zhōngyāng Jūnshì Wěiyuánhui*).⁵⁰ As one could see, provided the Chinese political

system doesn't undergo much expected metamorphosis, Hu Jintao's protégés stand a better chance even in the subsequent 19th National Congress.

Strikingly, away from the public gaze, the PLA played its innings quiet potently. Until long, it exhibited its prowess direct and crudely. This time, it has notably been indirect and in sophisticated manner. The reasons are not hard to find. All through 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and part of 1970s, when Mao Zedong reigned supreme, or thereafter when Deng Xiaoping came to roost, the PLA went whole hog and hand-in-hand, of course as an instrument of the Party. In the bargain, when seen in its perspective, the PLA have had its pound of flesh, both in pomp and power. This is besides concerted efforts first, by Deng Xiaoping and then subsequent leadership to limit political role of PLA. Change in the operational control has been the prime vehicle. While military policy originated at the ends of the Political Bureau and/ or the CMC, it got to attain and acquire operational form and shape at the level of General Staff Department (GSD), and subsequently flowed down to main force units through military regions.

In turn, the PLA often chooses to take wind out of the sails of its political masters in a concerted way. In public space, the PLA personnel, both acting and retired, would often take up issues of general concern. It included much needed reforms of the political system, corruptions in public life and the objective necessity for strong political leadership to meet the challenges of time. Of scores of stories making rounds, there is much talked about example of Lt. Liu Yazhou, who predicted Soviet Union style collapse unless the PRC went ahead with whole hog reforms of the political system.⁵¹ In similar vein, on the state of

⁴⁶ The idea of *Sāngè Dàibiào* (three represents), initiated by Jiang Zemin in 2000, was an ideological justification for the priority given to the private sector in China's economic development and for allowing entrepreneurs to be members of the communist party.

⁴⁷ For detailed discussions on the issue why Zhang Gaoli sports a low profile, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *How China's Leaders Think* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), pp. 229–231.

⁴⁸ The 376 members Central Committee of the CPC is made up of 205 regular and 171 alternate members.

⁴⁹ There is no fixed norm about the size and composition of either the Politburo or its Standing Committee which rule the roost in political governance of China. It has been largest ever during the spell of Hu Jintao. In the 16th (2002) and 17th (2007) Central Committee, the Standing Committee was composed of as many as nine members. The size of the Politburo then ran to 25 members. In the recent past, the 13th Central Committee is characterized for smallest size. The Standing Committee was then composed of just five members. The Politburo then had 17 full and one alternate member. The size of the Standing Committee increased to seven in the 14th (1992) and 15th (1997) Central Committee under the reign of Jiang Zemin.

⁵⁰ Hu Jintao has relinquished the Chairmanship of Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) while retaining the Chairmanship of the CMC of the People's Republic of China (PRC). As both commissions are identical in membership, it is hard to distinguish their prowess. CMC of the PRC is normally referred as State CMC, and the Chairman is elected by the National People's Congress (NPC). Xi Jinping has thus, to wait for his election by NPC which is due in March 2013. In China, the Chairman of the State CMC is both *de facto* and *de jure* Commander of the Armed Forces.

⁵¹ John Garnaut, "Rotting from Within", *Foreign Policy*, April 16, 2012 http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within?wp_login_redirect=0 (accessed on Dec.4, 2012); as also see China Leadership Watch, April 12, 2012 which refers his interview with Phoenix TV, Hong Kong, on the issue. (accessed on Dec.4, 2012)

corruptions, among others, Lt Gen. Liu Yuan went public in predicting defeat and destructions of otherwise invincible Chinese armed forces due to corruptions.⁵² Incidentally, the outpour of the PLA General had come just when Lt Gen Gu Junshan, the then Deputy Chief of the PLA's General Logistics Department had come under fire on the charges of corruptions and the investigations were half way through.⁵³ These public statements of the PLA brass were characteristically public bargains to nudge policy instruments. "Combating corruption and promoting political integrity" must not otherwise have been the main theme of the "state-of-the-nation" address of Hu Jintao.⁵⁴

Meantime, as one could see in the past couple of years, while keeping the political leadership out of loop, the PLA has been carrying out some sort of strategic moves to show its prowess and preponderance in decision making. It was often intended to a score a point, be it foreign policy and/ or domestic policy. In the recent past, as and where the PLA personnel did not find the top political leadership on the same page, they have gone on venting their disgust openly. Trend study bears out interesting features. It could sometimes happen in stray write up in the news papers. In certain cases, the PLA brass made best of it in a public forum.⁵⁵ On the opposite, in this leadership transition, thanks its bargain weights, once the PLA struck

treasure trove in getting as many as two slots first, Xi Jinping, the epitome of China's political and military powers, then Zhang Dejiang, another PLA cohort of go getter fame in China's political world.

Even as there is much yet to come out in public, there is quite a lot for perceptive China watchers to gauge impact of PLA factor much less hands in leadership transition. For much of historical past, in particular when Jiang Zemin and earlier Deng Xiaoping held the Chairmanship of the CMC of the CPC, it didn't change hand with effect. Hu Jintao abdicating Chairmanship of CMC of the CPC in favour of Xi Jinping thus speaks of PLA pressure. An oblique testification of the hypothesis comes from this unprecedented event, and the PLA losing no time to pledge its unfettered obedience to Xi Jinping.⁵⁶ Perceptive China watcher can't perhaps lose sight of the unstated glee in the wordings of the spokesman of the PLA., borne of its pull and pressure strategy to get two slots in the seven men top decision making body of Politburo Standing Committee.⁵⁷ Beginning 1979, Xi Jinping have had a long active service with PLA in various concurrent capacities, in particular in Fujian and Zhejiang Military Districts under Nanjing Military Region before ascending to the high pedestal of the CMC, first as

Vice Chairman in 2010 and then now as Chairman.⁵⁸

In innocuous perspective, it could first, entail better deal in resource allocation, fueled by quite a few ambitious defence development programmes. This can be over and above committing double digit growth in tandem to its continued spree of growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Last year, China unveiled its Chengdu J-20 Stealth Fighter Jet programme, which could quite possibly into service in 2017-19. It has since set up a land based anti-ship missile system. Over and above the fleet of 50 and odd diesel submarines, it has gone for five nuclear powered Jin Class (Type o94) ballistic missile submarines. This is besides developing an array of advanced precision guided munitions, anti-satellite and cyber warfare capabilities. The hypothesis is substantiated, if not testified by stated views of quite a few think-tank including Zhao Chu, who hailed positioning of Xi Jinping at the helms for obvious reasons as harbinger of "better coordination between the party and the military". The ground realities of the time alone would tell the hard truth.

Scott Kennedy speaks of growing influence of 'business lobbying' in China.⁵⁹ Steven M. Davidoff testifies it in almost same vein.⁶⁰ According to him, political connections in China had since become 'quickest path to riches'. In this backdrop, the scope of *quid pro quo* in China's political and business lives was a rule rather than exception. The *modus operandi* in vogue included use of network of patrons to get lion's share of business opportunity by 400 and odd chambers of commerce at national level and scores of them at local levels. This is true for all sets of the Chinese business enterprises, irrespective of being domestically or foreign funded.

⁵² Quoted Ray Wong, "No Country Can Defeat China, says PLA General", Forbes, April 17, 2012

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/raykwong/2012/4/17/no-country-can-defeat-china-says-pla-general/> (accessed on Dec. 4, 2012)

⁵³ <http://www.wantchinatime.com/ews-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120202000101&cid=1101>

⁵⁴ <http://www.ecns.cn/2012/11-08/34362.shtml> (accessed on Dec. 4, 2012)

⁵⁵ Of scores of incidents, the latest one related to Lt. Zhang Qinsheng 章庆 Deputy Chief of General Staff lashed out Hu Jintao in public in the course of Lunar New Year party. This was against backhanded policy to keep him out of the Central Military Commission. In another instance, Lt. Gen Li Jinai 李耐 then a member of the Central Military Commission and the Director of the PLA General Political Department, wrote a front page editorial in PLA Daily to criticize the Party for its stated wrong notions.

⁵⁶ Hu Jintao relinquished the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission of the Party and handed it over to Xi Jinping the very day the latter assumed the Chairmanship of the Party. This is against all precedence, the most immediate being that of Jiang Zemin who had retained it for over two years. In an editorial, the People's Liberation Army said, "At any time and under any circumstances, the PLA will take orders from the party centre, the military commission, and commission Chairman Xi Jinping." Hu Jintao could have otherwise retained the position of Chairman of Central Military Commission until 2014.

⁵⁷ Close connections of Xi Jinping (习近平, son of Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) with the PLA ensues from two different sources: first, his close ties with Jiang Zemin (江泽民, former chairman of the CMC and president of China; and second, the support of Jiang's loyalists in the PLA, in particular Guo Boxiong (郭雄, Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Jia Ting'an (贾廷安) Xi is, besides, close to a number of Princeling Generals in the PLA, including Liu Yuan (刘源, Liu Yazhou (刘洲) and Zhang Haiyang (张海洋)

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http://www.chinavivae.com/biography/Xi_Jinping%7C303

⁵⁹ Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China, Harvard University Press, 2005

⁶⁰ Quoted William Alden

<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/wealth-and-politics-converge-in-china/>

While there is yet little in public domain, the scrutiny of some of the Chinese Blogs over the period tends to lend veritable proof of backdoor pestering by quite a few business bigwigs, some of whom figure in *Hurun Rich List* of 271 billionaires.⁶¹ Notwithstanding, if one believes in the stories in quite a few Chinese Blogs, for their known economic prowess, and political clouts, those who should have had cast influence in the election process of this 371 members Central Committee in general and the 25 members Politburo, leave aside the all powerful seven member Politburo Standing Committee included an array of business units that figure in the '2012 Fortune 500 Companies'. Interestingly, the criterions, in all such cases were just 'pliability' and 'proximity of interests'.

Hopes and Despair Galore

While in saddle, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang duo now stand face to face to steer clear myriad of swamp bequeathed unwittingly and/ or otherwise by the outgoing leadership before they could testify their mark. In the eyes of Qian Gang, an expert in the field of textual analysis, to the worst chagrin of the incumbents, the outgoing Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao combine have since bound their hands and feet on the issue of 'reform and opening up' (*Gǎigé Kāifàng*).⁶² The crux of the 64-page document, laid down on the table of the 18th National Congress that constituted the mainstay of Hu Jintao's 100 minute keynote address on the occasion, captioned, "*Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of Moderately Prosperous Society in*

⁶¹ The *Hurun Rich List* (胡潤榜) released on Sep 24, 2012 saw 20 of 271 Chinese with more than US\$1 billion net worth in 2011 list suffering slide down US\$ 1 billion as a result of the economic slow down. Of the top 1000 of the *Hurun Rich List*, as many 469 saw their wealth shrink, of which 37 suffered shrinkage by over 50%. However, there were 291 who saw their wealth grow.
<http://www.hurun.net/usen/NewsShow.aspx?id=349>

⁶² Quoted *The New York Times*
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/hu-jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

all Respects" stand a clear testimony.⁶³

Most formidable challenge to China's political monolith political system, as Hu Jintao acknowledged in his said address, stemmed from rather "pandemic corruptions" (*quán guó liú xíng de tān wū*). A candid acceptance of this hard fact had earlier come in the address of Wen Jiabao to the State Council in late March 2012.⁶⁴

The exasperations of these two top functionaries of the Chinese political system as such didn't come out of blue. Way back in 2003, when the 10th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was in session, Xie Yong, a newly elected member had gone on record to say that corruption had then 'spoiled the image of the party and government' and could 'harm the reform and construction of the country'.⁶⁵ All this had then come about in the wake of unsavoury revelations in a joint study of the Chinese National Conditions Research Centre (NDRC) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Tsinghua University under the caption, "Characteristics and Development Trend Research on Chinese senior Officials".⁶⁶ Minxin Pei held the maze 1200 and odd 'spotty and ineffective' anti-corruptions Chinese laws responsible for the situation where the direct cost of corruptions then ran to over US\$86 billion while indirect costs in terms of inefficiency, waste, and damages to environment, public health, education, credibility and morale were incalculable.⁶⁷

⁶³ http://en.ce.cn/subject/18cpc/18cpcf/201211/18/t20121118_23857689.html

⁶⁴ Tong Hao and Zhao Yinan, *China Daily*, March 27, 2012

http://www.china-daily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/27/content_14818830.htm (accessed on Dec. 10, 2012)

⁶⁵ <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/2003/Mar/57418.htm> (accessed on Dec 12, 2012)

⁶⁶ <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/2003/Jun/66715.htm> (accessed on Dec 12, 2012)

⁶⁷ Minxin Pei, *Corruption Threatens China's Future* Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief No.55, October 2007

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/10/0>

Going by the account of Col. Liu Mingfu, the author of the book, "Why the Liberation Army Can Win", leave apart the civilian organizations, even the PLA is in deep throes of corruptions. This is despite Herculean efforts in the past couple of years to stamp out the sickening malaise. If only some one takes the authenticity of a report of the Chinese Central Commission of Discipline Inspection (CCDI), it got into investigation of 643,759 cases in a spell of past 5 years between Nov. 2007 and June 2012. There should have been several multiples of cases.⁶⁸ No wonder, in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the PRC shares the cudgels with countries such as Serbia, Trinidad and Tobago etc. 80th slot out of 176 countries. While little conclusive but reports in public domain tend raise fingers on the probity of some of top new leaders both outgoing and in saddle.⁶⁹ There is thus, a real life litmus test for the new leadership to come out fair and square much less effective in combating corruptions.

There are nonetheless challenges to go full drive on scores of issues. It included reorienting the economic growth model which once brought China on the world scene and now spelled doom.⁷⁰ Besides

[9/corruption-threatens-china-s-future/g4](http://corruption-threatens-china-s-future/g4) (accessed on Dec 17, 2012)

⁶⁸ John Chan, "China's Leadership Announces New Anti-corruption Campaign", World Socialist Website, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI)

<http://wsws.org/en/articles/2012/11/china27/html> (accessed on Dec. 17, 2012)

⁶⁹ Outgoing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has been under fire ever since an article in *New York Times* spoke of net worth of his family since touching US\$ 2.7, and alleging big connections as the source of all that riches. In the same vein, unconfirmed reports in public domain suggested Xi Jinping family to have made fortune worth hundreds of millions, primarily business connections in the fields of minerals, particularly rare earth, real estate and mobile phones. Bloomberg reports stand very specific about his family ownership of hillside villa worth US\$31.5 million and six other Hong Kong properties. Among gainers of his position in China's public life included his 63 year's old elder sister Qi Qiaoqiao and her 61 years old husband Deng Jiagui besides 33 years old daughter Zhang Yannan.

⁷⁰ In Dec. 2012, China's GDP in nominal terms stood at US\$7298.097 billion (US\$7.29 trillion). In 1980, before the PRC got to usher its present policy actions, China's GDP had crawled to paltry US\$202.46 billion. The growth has been startling for a variety of rea-

calling a day to exchange rate manipulations, it will have to get to 'domestic consumption and innovation' driven mode to physical 'infrastructure and export' driven growth and development model with particular thrust to 'knowledge economy and service industries'. Meanwhile, China will have to bid a good bye to state monopoly over several sectors while empowering civil society with free flow of information to augur a worthwhile innovation oriented market economy. Nonetheless, it will have to institutionalize 'rule of law' lest the long standing rein of 'systematic abuse of privileges and power' should frustrate all well meaning measures. Addressing social discontents and promoting political pluralism were the much needed resort. Stuck with what scholarship in the field call 'path dependency', it is hard to imagine that the Chinese leadership could make a dent in foreseeable time.

The hangover of Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao epoch in the realm of foreign policy is equally daunting. Overstepping to the limits of 'assertive nationalism', subscribed since 1980s stands quite potently at the back of the trouble.⁷¹ In the studied opinion of Jennie Welch, the phenomenon has its root in domestic pressure first, as a by-product of political influence of the PLA, in particular PLA AF and last but not the least, rising nationalism.⁷² Worst still, as Zhao Suisheng holds, and quite a few China watchers attest in their own way, the Chinese assertiveness, as such, stemmed from rather a stratagem to "leverage its growing capabilities" to "shift global power

sons including exchange rate manipulations. In 2000, for example, China's GDP ran to US\$1453.828 billion (US\$1.45 trillion). There is thus, five fold increases in a decade. In comparative perspective, China's GDP value now represented 11.77 percent of the world's total.
⁷¹ Allen S. Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy" *Asian Survey*, Vol.23, No.8, (Aug 1983), pp. 913-933
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2644264?uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21101469983153>
⁷² Jennie Welch, "China's Domestic Pressure shape Assertive Foreign Policy", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Nov. 16th, 2012 <http://cogitasia.com/chinas-domestic-pressures-shape-assertive-foreign-policy/>

balance in its favour".⁷³ In a way, it is a commentary on the real intent and purpose of China's much pronounced policy thrust of 1990s of "peaceful rise" (*héping juéqǐ*).

It laid claims and shown belligerence against each and every land and maritime neighbours. While the rationale differed, from time to time and case to case, the objectives in all such instances have instinctively been 'self aggrandizement' with a difference. As Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, Zheng Wang, Minxin Pei and many others in the field tend to attribute in their own ways and words, it is rather a reflection in reaction to China's national psyche of *Wuwang Guochi* (Never Forget National Humiliation), suffered grievously for nearly a century while under the yoke of western powers.⁷⁴ Ostensibly outraged at India giving refuge to the 14th Dalai Lama Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso who did not submit to its whims and fancies, the PRC launched "Teach India" war of aggression in October 1962. As Ivan Lidarev and a host of other scholars in the field contended, China took advantage of the US-Soviet nuclear stand off in Cuba and flexed its muscles in perfect simulation to Mao Zedong's

⁷³ Zhao Suisheng, "Understanding China's Assertive Foreign Policy Behaviour during the Global Financial Meltdown", *The World Financial Review*
<http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=409>;
 Louisa Lim and Frank Langfitt, "China's Assertive Behaviour Makes Neighbours Wary", NPR, Nov.2, 2012
<http://www.npr.org/2012/11/02/163659224/china-assertive-behavior-makes-neighbors-wary>; Thomas J. Christensen, "The advantage of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy", Brookings, March/April 2011
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/03/china-christensen> (accessed on Dec 19, 2012)

⁷⁴ Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Strategy and National Psychology in China", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 370, National Character in Perspective of the Social Sciences (Mar. 1967)
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1038060?uid=3738256&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=21101471677203>;
 Zheng Wang, "Never Forget National Humiliation", IIAS, 32/ The Focus: Post Colonial Dialogue
http://www.ias.nl/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL5_9_3233.pdf; Minxin Pei, "China's Fragile Mindset", *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 9, 2001

dictum that political power grew out of the barrel of a gun (*Qiangganzi limian Chu zhengquan*).⁷⁵

In the same vein, much in conformity with over 2500 years old Chinese 'stratagem', attributed *inter alia* to Sun Zi of 'Spring and Autumn' period of its history, China under Deng Xiaoping invaded Vietnam on February 17, 1979.⁷⁶ Against all evidence to the opposite, China called it 'defensive counter attack against Vietnam' (*duì yuè zìwèi fǎnjī zhàn*). As K.C Chen and a lot many other scholars hold, China's invasion of Vietnam stood apart in the annals as an "unusual development in the communist world" where a "socialist fraternal country launched war" against the other.⁷⁷ While it was a threat to Vietnam's sovereignty, for China, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, it amounted to be just a "spank" to ones unheeding "young friend".⁷⁸ In Zhang Xiaoming's opinion, China's decision to invade Vietnam stemmed from a variety of considerations, which included a wish to "improve strategic position" in the world around besides showing off to the then Soviet Union for its new found alliance with its foe.⁷⁹

The PRC is then locked in maritime territory (*lǐnghǎi*) disputes with one and all countries in, along and around the East China Sea, South China Sea and Yellow Sea.

⁷⁵ Ivan Lidarev, "History's Hostage: China, India and the War of 1962", *Pacific Sentinel*, Aug. 21, 2012

<http://pacificsentinel.blogspot.in/2012/08/editorial-history-hostage-china-india.html>

⁷⁶ In China's perspective, stratagem ostensibly stood for tactics (*zhànshù*) and war planning (*zhàn dòu jì huà xi tóng*) deployed by the two contending sides in a military campaign. See the *Chinese People's Liberation Army Officers Handbook*, Qingdao Publishing House, 1971, p197

⁷⁷ K.C. Chen, "China's War against Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis, *the Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. III No. 1, Spring/ Summer 1983 pp 233-261

⁷⁸ A month and half before China invaded Vietnam, in the course of his US visit, Deng Xiaoping reportedly quipped: Unheeding young friend called for being spanked" (*小朋友不听话 该打屁股了*)

⁷⁹ Zhang Xiaoming, "Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to go to War with Vietnam", MIT Press Journals, *Journal Cold War Studies*, Summer 2010, Vol.12, No.3, pp 3-29
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/JCWS_a_00001

Nevertheless, big powerful entities such as Russian Federation and small entities like Bhutan and/ or South Korea have since been embroiled in unending territorial disputes. While each feud carried almost equal probability to unleash tension and cost heavily to the life system of the people in the region, the fast brewing Sino-Japanese stand-off over Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands could possibly spell disaster sooner rather than later. Quite importantly, as a trend analysis, carried out by several scholars including M.T Fravel put the chances of maritime spat turning critical twice more than any land boundary issue for 'military and economic reasons'.⁸⁰ This is since Islands in disputes are substantially vital to sea-lane security of the countries in question besides holding vast reserves of hydrocarbons and sea food. China has of late succeeded in nudging the Philippines while Vietnam remained a potent source of flare up. China's latest move to deploy marine surveillance plane besides putting in place Anti-access/Area Denial (A 2/AD) system have literally been stoking fire.

China's maritime disputes over Paracel Islands, Sparty Islands, and Scarborough Shoals in South China Sea remain as much potent source of trouble. To buttress its cause, the PRC has been using what Ronald O' Rourke says "*map of nine dashed lines, covering roughly 80% of the South China Sea*" region.⁸¹ While a burden of history as China Daily called in an article and little to do with the new Chinese leadership, especially Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang duo now at the helms, it calls for a measure of understanding and sagacity lest the age old mistrust and suspicion should thwart the dawn of better tomorrow.⁸² Content analysis of

dispatches in the Chinese media over the period, notwithstanding suggests war of words short of real engagement of the armed forces to continue. As Li Xiushi and a lot many Chinese scholars continue to reflect on the issue, especially the ongoing Sino-Japanese row, China's old wound added to the new found glory of World power in making has been at the back its assertive stance at large.⁸³

While a way different in nature and character, the PRC has grouse and disputes with European Union (EU). Arms embargo following the Tiananmen incident of 1989 has been prime factor. For various reasons including US pressure and Japan lobby, the EU was not expected to lift the ban in near future. Retaliatory Chinese action to ban export of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum has put premium on positive turn of events in the strained relationship. There is then trade dispute including carbon emission issue. Retaliatory actions by the two sides tend to spoil the relationship still further.

China-EU relations could possibly face rough weather on another count. It can trade and business competitions, most pertinently in Africa and Latin America. Sino-African trade volume had touched US\$ 166 billion in 2011. In the first months, it reached US\$163 billion. It was barely US\$1 billion in 1980s. Over 800 Chinese entities are engaged in the pursuit. Infrastructure, energy and banking sectors happen to be the thrust areas. In the similar vein, from rather a scratch, China-Latin America trade had reached US\$ 241 billion in 2011. The flip side of the development has raised rancor in the hearts and minds of EU member countries, which have had over a century old relations and stake in the regions. The story of China's business invasion into Africa and Latin America is now a household talk in EU.

Even as limiting factors as such abound, there is hope first, as the seven members Standing Committee draw on diverse professional and political backdrop and last but not the least, have commitments for institutionalization of the political system. There is yet a caveat. Not until they rise above biases, and build consensus on larger issues, bequeathed to them by their predecessors, they must not ever think of cutting the Georgian knot. There is reason for despair. Despite all big talks, political reforms, in particular intra-Party democracy has since remained a distant dream.

Future Course of Events

As the discussion in the foregoing sections bear out, the generational leadership change in China as this carries shadow of the third and fourth generation of the Chinese leadership. The fifth generation under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang duo shall have to wait for a magic to set firm feet on ground.

Of some of the intractable challenges to the new Chinese leadership, 'corruption in public life' tops the list. This is while it counted second to 'environmental pollution' in order of precedence in the keynote address of Hu Jintao on Nov. 8, 2012. Growing 'rich-poor gap' figured next to it at the third notch.⁸⁴ In the words of Hu Jintao's held the potentials of "killing the party and ruining the country". Just four days back, Wang Qishan, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the CPC had called for 'intensified action' to deal with the malaise as he feared adverse aftermath of it both to the CPC and the Chinese nation. In his address, Xi Jinping coupled corruption with alienation of the people as threat to the CPC and the nation. Inter-regional developmental dichotomy figures next to it. For known enormity of the problem, it is easy said than done.

The upper and lower limits of the change in the scenario is

⁸⁰ M.T Fravel, "The Dangerous Math of Chinese Island Disputes", *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 28, 2012

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100001424052970203922804578082371509569896.html>

⁸¹ Ronald O'Rourke, "Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Dec 10, 2012

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>

⁸² http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/chia/2012Diaoyu/2012-09/28/content_15790474.htm

⁸³ Li Xiushi, "Japan is Playing a Dangerous Game", *China Daily*, Oct 8, 2012
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-10/08/content_15799481.htm

⁸⁴ <http://chinadaily.com.cn/2012/11/09/hu-jintao-starts-the-xviii-congress-of-the-communist-party-of-china/>

theoretically contingent to the propensities of new Chinese leadership to remain tied up and/or cross over the set limits of reforms and opening up to the promises of 'no stop in reform' in the course of Guangdong Inspection tour of Xi Jinping.⁸⁵ Xi Jinping termed 'reforms and opening up' as 'win or lose' option in the realization of China's much talked about goals by 2021 and 2049. It is pertinently hard to realize until the new leadership went for rather hard to implement bold political reform. Xi Jinping looks rational in suggesting 'neither too fast nor too slow' pace.⁸⁶ The issue is whether it was within the competence of the new Chinese leadership to hold back the expectations of already alienated populace.

In the domain of foreign relations, the challenges are equally demanding. China has land and maritime border disputes with one all neighbouring powers. There is trade and business related quarrels with European Union. Nonetheless, it is embroiled multidimensional strife with the USA. It has made well calculated best foot forward in Africa and Latin America. It can't yet be oblivious of trouble spots. While a nascent world power, the PRC has to move out from the shadow of rather archaic past.

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⁸⁵ Global Times, Dec. 12, 2012
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/749620/Xi-Jinping-pledges-no-sto-in-reform.aspx>

⁸⁶ <http://www.theepochtime.com/n2/china-news/xi-jinping-plans-on-introducing-reforms-source-says-304122.html>

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