

Denkwürdigkeiten



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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

die Ereignisse in der Ukraine gewinnen rasant an Fahrt und viele Beteiligte und Unbeteiligte gießen unbekümmert Öl ins Feuer. Irgendwie scheint das kollektive Wissen um die Sensitivitäten im Ost-West-Verhältnis verloren gegangen zu sein. Auch unsere deutsche Medienberichterstattung glänzt überwiegend mit Programmmusik und hat sich auf Putin-Bashing eingestellt. Differenzierte Analysen werden gerne niedergeschrieben. Noch vor kurzem waren wir in Europa von Freunden umzingelt. Jetzt gibt es an den Rändern der Europäischen Union keine Region mehr, die nicht Sorgen bereitet. Der 100. Jahrestag zum Beginn des 1. Weltkrieges sollte eine Mahnung sein, dass man auch ungewollt in verheerende Auseinandersetzungen hineinschlittern kann. In seiner zu rasch verhaltenen Rede fordert Bundespräsident Gauck bei der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz mit Recht – wie Dr. Klaus Wittmann in seinem Beitrag betont – eine gestaltende, verantwortungsbewusste Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Die anhaltende Drohnendebatte passt durchaus in diese Entwicklung. Drohnen spielen insbesondere für Lageübersicht und Entscheidungsfindung in der Krisenbewältigung eine überragende Rolle - in Ost und West, in Nord und Süd. Das Joint Venture der diesbezüglichen Zusammenarbeit mit der Atlantischen Initiative e.V. war überaus lohnend - lesen Sie selbst in dieser Ausgabe.

Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender

IMPRESSUM

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Reflections on the Ukraine Crisis

Black Swan unveiled

The crisis surrounding the independence of the Ukraine has struck most observers completely unexpected. It has unveiled a Black Swan that nobody has noticed before – the possible return of a Cold War type rivalry between East and West. As the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated in a recent Spiegel-interview: „...the events of the last few months could lead to a break, to a crossroad for Europe. The events in the Ukraine have led to the worst crisis since the end of the Cold War. The gains Europe has achieved since the fall of the Berlin Wall in terms of peace, freedom and prosperity are now at risk. If the wrong decisions

*are made now, they could nullify decades of work furthering the freedom and security of Europe.*¹

Anti-government protests in the Ukraine have been followed by political upheaval and international crisis. When President Viktor Yanukovich fled in a panic from Kiev on 21 February 2014, this set off a dynamic whose consequences not only the Ukraine, but rather the world must now deal with. The Ukraine has called for fresh presidential elections on May 25. The move was countered by the Crimea administration that voted overwhelmingly to join Russia in a referendum.

With regard to the Ukraine the challenge is twofold:

- Save the Ukraine from the danger of a possible civil war.
- Save the Ukraine from the real threat of a humanitarian disaster.

Both threats would affect prosperity and security of Russia and the European Union as well.

Beyond the Ukraine the crisis is likely to have global ramifications. For a long time it appeared to political leaders throughout the world that the „rule of law“ had succeeded over the „rule of power“ particularly in the highly integrated European Union environment and its neighbourhood. Now, the increasingly violent developments in the Ukraine – including the “annexation” of the Crimea and Sevastopol – point in the opposite direction. Language, pictures and performance of involved actors that reflect on a possible 3rd World War, ask for tough sanctions and military moves or do not keep promises rather contribute to escalating the developing crisis. Vladimir Putin recently observed in his speech of 18 March 2014 to the deputies of the State Duma the “rule of power” as a key element of the emerging New World Order.

¹ Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, Interview, 'Russia is Playing a Dangerous Game' in: SPIEGEL Online, 28 April 2014, www.spiegel.de/international/europe/frank-walter-steinmeier-talks-about-the-ukraine-crisis-and-russia-a-966493.html (access 5 May 2014)

Developments in the Ukraine

Obviously, in the Ukraine the existing government model has failed. With its independence in 1991, the Ukraine inherited – with regions that have completely different histories, with a plethora of unresolved ethnic, religious, social and economic conflicts – a difficult legacy. Unfortunately the past decades have been a complete loss for the Ukraine. Half-hearted reforms, and a cooperative government structure that integrated private structures into justice, police, armed forces etc. also fed by corruption, crime etc. have led to a dysfunctional system. The Ukraine is the only post-Soviet nation that has not achieved the living standard of the Soviet period. It has turned into one of the poorest European countries.

Each change of the regime was accompanied by major purges that reached down to the level of hospitals and middle schools. In one case it led to the point that a complete village rose up against its corrupt police that also had been violating human rights on a permanent scale. The Ukraine governments – to include the present – have been abusing their power position to draw money out of the country for personal advantage. The legitimacy of the present government is additionally challenged as it represents only 4 out of 25 regions of the Ukraine and monopolises decision-making. This puts a premium on early elections. But, what credibility are elections on 25 May likely to have?

20 years of transformation in the Ukraine have led to a polarization of respective positions instead of achieving compromises and comprehensive approaches. Several social-cultural divides have developed

- Russian-Ukraine
- industrial-economical
- centre versus periphery
- young people versus older population

These different groups obviously have different interpretations of the terminus “freedom”.

Until February 2014 these developments were citizen driven. Af-

terwards particularly militant forces took charge. This eased involvement from outside, i.e. Russia, USA and the EU. Eastern Ukrainian separatism has no mass character. Small armed entities shape developments there. The Ukraine is likely to collapse politically, economically and socially unless there isn't a rapid turn around. If the elections fail, we may see a civil war soon!

To this end the Ukraine needs to form rapidly a round table that includes all relevant stakeholders in the Ukraine and to create a standing national assembly of all stakeholders to identify what action and improvements need to be taken and to provide the nation with a new constitution as result of a consensus. At the beginning of this process important questions need to be resolved that stand in the way of any reasonable compromise

- Who has been shooting at the Maidan?
- Where do the weapons come from?
- Has Yanukovich been arrested?

Russian perceptions

For the past two decades Russia has seen strategic risks coming predominantly from the South and not from the West. The Ukrainian crisis has altered this perception. Strategic threat from the West has become possible again. Russia considers the Crimea crucial to its national security. In Putin's perception the Ukraine crisis represents a showdown that he could win. Putin has been using the upheaval in Ukraine to pay back the West for what he sees as a quarter century of disrespect, humiliation and diplomatic bullying.

Obviously, the Russian perspectives of the emergence of the Ukrainian crisis as well as possible solutions have been shaped by three decisive experiences in the recent past

- NATO membership of East European Countries
- Developments in the Greater Middle East – the engagement of the West ended repeatedly in bloody civil wars

- Decision to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence in Eastern Europe

Now – from a Russian perspective – the regime change in the Ukraine has been massively supported by the West and has destroyed a fragile balance within the state with massive negative consequences.

The Putin speech in the Kremlin on 18 March 2014 is a viable source to analyse Russian behaviour in the Ukraine as he outlined his principle approach to security²:

- Russia does no longer recognize the West as a credible Partner as the West pursues a Cold War-like containment policy against Russia.
- Russia no longer considers itself as part of European civilization. Russia is a democracy but of particular shape.
- As international law has been reduced to a menu of options from which powerful nations choose options that suit their interests international law has lost its character as a system of rules setting reference points.
- The Westphalian principle upholding state sovereignty and territorial integrity has lost its validity for weaker states. It's not the rule of law, but rather the rule of the stronger (Plato) that determines processes in the developing new world order. Security becomes a playing field for stronger states that have the capability to protect their borders with their own armed forces to include the military support of partner nations.
- The role of international organizations such as the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe has diminished. Their rules and frameworks have been ignored, if they negatively affect the national interests of powerful nations. This has become apparent with view to several military operations in the past 2 decades.

Putin relies his vision to the entire territory of the former Soviet Union reflecting on "Russia's historical heritage". Obviously Russia will take action, if any of the former Soviet republics will attempt to join NATO or the European Union. As Putin sees the world becoming much more volatile place with increasing risks of more military conflicts, he has been focusing on the development of a fundamentally new balance of power in the world that sees the declining Western economical and military power in the world, while Asia, South America and Africa are gaining influence. He feels supported by the major non-Western Members of the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Aleksandr Dynkin, Director of the Moscow Institute for global economy and international relations observed recently that the decade from 1989 until 1999 has been a "golden period" that ended with the bombardment of the Kosovo, where the Russian government experienced a situation of complete helplessness when it simply had to accept international behaviour without being able to bring own considerations to bear. The subsequent years have been a period of a correct relationship. Now he considers Russia and the West at the edge of a new Cold War.

Core of the problem is in his view is the Russian perception that it has no adequate place in the new emerging global order particularly not in Europe. The West has been obsessed with the idea that a new empire is growing and attempted to disconnect the Russian Commonwealth states from Russia. But a security order without Russia means always a security against Russia. Consequently after the Cold War the attempts to build a new world order have failed. But, while in the first Cold War everybody understood that the prize of failure is too high today we have lost this sensitivity. It needs to be regained.

German approaches to crisis management

In looking back on the recent developments in the Ukraine, on the

German side there is a remarkable degree of self-criticism. It has become apparent what difficult partners Germany has chosen on the Ukrainian side. It has also become apparent that there is more effort needed to better understand all stakeholders concerned to include Russia.

Germany's position can be described by

- Preference for cooperative peace solutions
- Stick to the rule of law
- Strive to avoid conflict in the Ukraine particular through close involvement of the OSCE and the United Nations
- Involve and organize participation of smaller powers
- Restrain the German power position as a political lesson learned by German politics
- Cultivate power via integration

The key motivation of German politics has become de-escalation even though the prospects of successful de-escalation have been diminishing in the past weeks. To this end it is of high importance to keep all available communication channels open. A process of reconciliation needs to get started. Consensus, cooperation and participation needs to be organized in the Ukraine. The OSCE could have a key role in crisis management.

To this end, Matthias Platzeck, former Prime Minister Brandenburg and President German-Russian-Forum has come up with a couple of recommendations:

1. Round table in the Ukraine to include all relevant parties
2. Decentralisation of governance
3. Disarmament of groups
4. Analysis of the Maidan-shootings and what really happened in February in Kiev
5. Stabilization of economy

The German public has been supporting this approach. It understands the German interest in partnership and the political, economic, and cultural exchanges in European-Russian relations. Building on dialogue in the European neighbourhood appears to them as the only valid way. Yet,

² Ryzhkov, Vladimir, „The new Putin Doctrine“, The Moscow Times, 3 April 2014

as pro-Russia militants seize more public buildings in Ukraine's turbulent east and violence escalates, President Barack Obama and Germany's Angela Merkel agreed in Washington that further sanctions need to be taken if Russia continued to destabilize its neighbour ahead of elections on May 25.

Rebuilding trust and adjusting capabilities

In solving the Ukrainian crisis, the EU and Russia are natural geopolitical partners. Only together they have the capacity to stabilize the situation in the Ukraine. Unfortunately, the loss of trust between the stakeholders is a key problem of the present situation. Trust is foundation of cooperation. This very foundation has been damaged. Rebuilding trust is at the core of future developments. Russia's attempts to develop a solution commonly with EU and USA in order to force the solution upon the Ukraine is met sceptically, particularly as Russia is seen as an involved party.

A further complicating factor is the new Putin doctrine that is highlighting the "rule of power" as a key element of the emerging New World Order. It may well inspire EU and NATO to adjust European and transatlantic foreign, defence, trade and economic policies and capabilities. The Ukrainian crisis shows that forcibly discharged military conflicts in the neighbourhood of NATO and the EU have become possible again. As particularly NATO has begun seeking to maintain its relevance in the post Afghanistan era, the Ukraine crisis may be directing NATO's and the EU's political military narrative from "deployed" to "prepared".

Ralph Thiele

Ralph Thiele is Chairman of the pmg. Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

THEMEN

Defining Global Norms on Drone Policy

Introduction

Atlantic Community members agree that an overall ban on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) technology is not a realistic or beneficial solution, thus significant concerns that exist warrant specific policy reforms. UAVs are becoming more and more common and it is the simple fact that UAVs are here to stay (Nedzarek) that should be the basis on which global norms are formulated. A regulated drone policy could instead lead to greater citizens' respect for and understanding of the technology, which could in turn expose civilians and soldiers alike to less risk in combat zones.

UAVs have the potential to positively contribute to the civilian component of modern day life but it is the use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) by non-transparent intelligence agencies that has disorientated the public as to their benefits (Schmid). The current use of drones by the US has raised issues regarding international law and morality. The proliferation of drone technology has lead experts to fear that some countries may use the current US policy of targeted killings as a means to justify attacks on rebellious minority groups within, or neighboring, their borders. Pre-emptive strikes may solve an immediate issue but in the long run they may compromise the integrity of the international system that the West has helped to create (Williams). The awareness of the importance of political legitimacy in the long run may help to encourage drone policy reform (Schmid). Atlantic Community members consider it in the transatlantic partners' long-term interest to implement these reforms in favour of adopting global norms on drone policy.

Policy Recommendations

1. Set a clear policy framework for combat drones.

1.1 Establish clear restrictions for armed drone operations.

Because of inherent limitations of oversight, armed drones should be restricted to countries' respective militaries as opposed to intelligence agencies (Nedzarek). Their use outside of armed conflict zones should be halted unless international law is updated to include guidelines for fighting transnational terrorism (Ferslev).

1.2 Formulate precise rules of engagement for UCAV crews in combat.

One of the most common yet unfounded concerns of civil society is that UAVs will, in the future, be able to conduct operations beyond human control. While such a scenario is not yet possible, it should be ensured that UCAV weapon systems remain under all circumstances within the hands of a fully responsible human operator (Bartsch).

The interoperability of NATO countries could provide the perfect platform to introduce norms for the appropriate use or non-use of UCAVs through adapting operation plans, tactical regulations and training manuals (Bartsch). NATO could create an internal committee that has the authority to demand accountability from its members on the legality and ethics of its drone use (Ivanov).

2. Strengthen norms on a domestic level.

2.1 Increase parliamentary oversight.

The use of drones should allow for increased democratic oversight by parliamentary committees (Nedzarek). This would increase transparency and assure citizens of their respective countries that their rights and values were being shown greater respect. Catering for future developments, domestic legislation could easily introduce effective curbs on fully autonomous drone systems (Nedzarek). As the United States is the main user of drones, the US Congress, specifically the Select Committee on Intelligence, should advocate

for a greater role in shaping UAV policy, with such a role involving an increased awareness of US UAV use, while also providing for the possibility of ensuring greater operational limitations. The US Congress should continue to engage with officials and non-governmental experts on the short- and long-term effects of the use of drones on US foreign policy.

2.2 Increase domestic debate on drones: Appeal to reason, not to emotion.

A responsible, balanced and sober discussion on the technical possibilities and ethics of remote warfare should be further stimulated. The European public needs to engage with that debate on drones instead of just criticizing US actions. A unified European position is necessary to augment the global UAV discourse and to force European governments to take a position on the use of UAVs (Sirseldoudi & Ferslev).

2.3 Make a firm commitment to increase transparency.

The US and European administrations should, when possible, offer increased disclosure and information about drone strikes to the public. Sensitive information that authorities deem eligible for release could be placed under "Freedom of Information" frameworks, i.e. the delayed release of information of a sensitive nature to the public (Nedzarek), which would ensure responsibility and transparency, while ensuring strategic interests are protected (Schendzielorz). Transparent policy would allow the public insight into the level of careful planning and safeguards that are currently in place for US drone operations and would lead to confidence and trust in the future use of the technology.

3. Implementing norms on an international level.

3.1 Utilize existing mechanisms to negotiate norms.

Due to the integration of most Western forces into NATO, regulation of the use of UAVs for military use has to begin on an international level right away (Bartsch). As an organization that has em-

phasized it is a coalition of democracies that has respect for human rights and the rule of law, NATO could use its power as an organization that the United States respects to influence the US to adopt internationally agreed operational procedures for the use of drones (Laird).

Furthermore, the use of leverage in bargaining situations is an effective way of establishing international norms. Through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership talks, the EU can begin to leverage the US into adopting drone norms which respect the human rights framework set out in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (Ciocia).

3.2 Seeking concrete government statements.

Clear statements are needed from many governments, especially within the EU, to make it clear that current US policy is not supported by their allies and many other countries around the world. Without a clear position emerging, US practices might become standard procedure, and thus a customary law would be established (von Roeder). A clear policy formulated in Europe will act as a counterbalance to the use of drones by the US. A collective consensus within the EU will legitimize the use of drones by European states and will allow for state policy to feed into regional and continental policy, over time making way for a global norm to emerge (Williams).

3.3 Update international law and set up a new international watchdog.

The policy of targeted killings using drones has tested the limits of international law with contestations over interpretation. It is necessary therefore to see where more oversight and pressure for restraint could be applied, and if adjustments can be made to already existing frameworks to ensure the strengthening of international law.

An organization such as an international watchdog could be effective in creating debate and moving the process of establishing global norms forward (Dubow). Such an

organization has the potential to increase public awareness of the use and purpose of UAVs in a variety of roles. The transparent nature of the watchdog, in conjunction with the increased transparency of national governments' drone usage, would convince the public of the greater good of UAV technology.

*Golo M. Bartsch, Lee Ciocia,
Gregg Dubow, Nils Ferslev,
Georgi Ivanov, Ciaran Laird, Rafal
Nedzarek, Konstantin Schen-
dzielorz, Johann Schmid, Matera
Sirseldoudi, Olaf von Roeder*

This paper was first published at the ATLANTIC MEMO #46; www.atlantic-community.org/-/atlantic-memo-on-drones-presented-in-public-panel

THEMEN

Globale Normen zum Einsatz von Drohnen

Kooperationsveranstaltung der Atlantische Initiative e.V. und die Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft (pmg) am 26. März 2014

Die Atlantische Initiative e.V., in Kooperation mit der Politisch-Militärischen Gesellschaft (pmg) e.V., freute sich am Abend des 26.03.2014 zahlreiche Gäste in den Räumlichkeiten des Auswärtigen Amtes zu begrüßen, um *Globale Normen zum Einsatz von Drohnen* zu diskutieren.

Anlass der Veranstaltung war ein im Herbst 2013 gemeinsam mit der pmg durchgeführter Politikworkshop auf dem Online Think Tank atlantic-community.org (AC): Hier entwarfen junge außen- und sicherheitspolitische Nachwuchskräfte von beiden Seiten des Atlantiks ein Memorandum an Politikempfehlungen für den internationalen Einsatz von Drohnen.

In Berlin nun stellten die beiden AC-Mitglieder Golo Bartsch (Berlin) und Nils Ferslev (Kopenhagen) das Papier der Öffentlichkeit vor und diskutierten dieses und die Thematik darüber hinaus mit den Panellisten Bischof Dr. Ste-

phan Ackermann (Bistum Trier, Vorsitzender der deutschen Kommission Justitia et Pax), Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska (Wissenschaftlicher Direktor des Instituts für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Universität Hamburg) sowie Stephan Lösch (Airbus Defence & Space). Moderiert wurde die Veranstaltung von Ralph Thiele, Vorsitzender der pmg.

Trotz der verschiedenen Hintergründe der Teilnehmer war bald klar, dass Einigkeit auf dem Panel insoweit bestand, dass Drohnen als technisches Instrument im Einsatz sind und bleiben werden – die Frage war also nicht mehr ob, sondern *wie* damit nun umzugehen sei.

Den Auftakt machte Bischof Dr. Ackermann: Er betonte die Chance auf Gewaltvermeidung durch den Einsatz von Drohnen, mahnte aber zu einem verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit der Technologie. Denn als Gefahr sehe er insbesondere die Vor- und Fehlverurteilung, welche einem Einsatz von Kampfdrohnen zugrunde liegen können, insbesondere, wenn dieser lediglich auf dem Material von Überwachungsdrohnen basiere. Zu bedenken gab er darüber hinaus die ethisch bedenkliche Parallele zur Todesstrafe und äußerte außerdem die Sorge, wonach ein vermehrter Gebrauch von Drohnen Ausdruck neuen Wettrüstens sei. Um die ethisch und völkerrechtlich unklaren Grenzen herauszuarbeiten, wünscht Bischof Dr. Ackermann einen breiten öffentlichen Diskurs und schlägt die Einrichtung einer Enquete-Kommission des Bundestages zur deutschen Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vor, um die Richtung der deutschen Position durch den Bundestag herauszuarbeiten.

Aus akademischer Perspektive war es Professor Brzoska besonders wichtig hervorzuheben, dass es völkerrechtlich immer schwieriger zu definieren sei, ob Drohnen noch innerhalb oder auch außerhalb von Kampfzonen eingesetzt würden und betonte die zivilisatorische Errungenschaft, auch in rechtlicher Kategorie zwischen Krieg und Frieden zu unterschei-

den. Dies mache den Einsatz von Drohnen zu einer zunehmend politischen Frage. Des Weiteren wies Professor Brzoska auf die Problematik der Automatisierung hin, insofern diese die Frage der Verantwortlichkeit erschwere, sollte ein Einsatz nicht wie geplant verlaufen. Er sehe die größte Gefahr darin, dass die Bedienung einer Drohne in Zukunft von jedem Teil der Welt möglich sein könnte, verneinte den deutschen Bedarf an Kampfdrohnen und empfahl ein beispielgebendes Verzichtsmoratorium seitens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Aus technologischer Perspektive mahnte Stephan Lösch, nicht den Anschluss verlieren zu dürfen an weltweite Entwicklungen und insbesondere die führenden Nationen USA und Israel. Er plädierte dafür, den Blick von der Stigmatisierung der bewaffneten Drohne zu lösen und weitere Chancen der zivilen Nutzung in Betracht zu ziehen. Gerade was die Lagebeurteilung angehe, sei eine Drohne viel flexibler einsetzbar als ein im vergleich schwerfälliger Satellit. Diese kurzfristigen Eingriffsmöglichkeiten bei der Steuerung von Drohnen seien auch bei Kampfoperationen ein entscheidender Vorteil gegenüber anderen Waffensystemen.

Als einer der Autoren des Memorandums der Atlantic Community betonte Golo Bartsch das Bestreben der Nachwuchswissenschaftler, der Debatte um den Einsatz von Drohnen die Emotionalität zu nehmen – die Diskussion müsse vielmehr sachlich geführt werden. Und dazu gehöre es anzuerkennen, dass entgegen aller Automatismuskritik immer noch ein Mensch die Maschine bediene und über ihre Aktion entscheide. Damit laufe die Drohnentechnologie eben wie jedes andere Waffensystem auch die Gefahr, missbraucht zu werden. Völkerrechtlich müsse daher erst einmal der Status des Instruments Drohne international definiert werden, so Co-Autor Nils Ferslev, denn Fehlverhalten und illegale Einsätze können erst als solche verurteilt werden, wenn Grenzen festgelegt wurden. Hier sei es entscheidend, wer international federführend bei

der Setzung von Normen agiere und eine Vorbildfunktion einnehme – gerade Deutschland könne einen entscheidenden Beitrag leisten. Was Exportregelungen und Proliferation betrifft, so seien diese laut Autoren des Memorandums sehr schwer zu fassende Herausforderungen: Vor dem Hintergrund der heutigen globalen Verflechtung von Wissen sei die Drohnentechnologie kein Hexenwerk mehr.

Damit läuft es auch in der Debatte um Drohnen letztendlich auf eine Grundsatzdiskussion hinaus: von Krieg und Frieden einerseits, wenn es um Kampfdrohnen geht, andererseits vom Schutz der Privatsphäre, wenn man Überwachungsdrohnen betrachtet. Klar ist, da nun einmal entwickelt, wird die Technologie der Unbemannten Luftfahrzeuge bleiben – die Frage bleibt also weiterhin das *Wie*. Wie wir damit umgehen, wie wir sie einsetzen wollen. Wir hoffen, mit dieser Veranstaltung einen Beitrag zur Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Fragen angestoßen und zur Meinungsbildung beigetragen zu haben.

Svea Burmester

Svea Burmester, Atlantische Initiative e.V.

THEMEN

Aktive statt reaktive Politik

Was Gaucks Forderung nach verantwortungsbewusster Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet

Die vor einiger Zeit an dieser Stelle ausgedrückte Erwartung, er möge dem sicherheitspolitischen Diskurs neue Impulse geben, hat Bundespräsident Gauck eindrucksvoll erfüllt: Am 3. Oktober beschwor er Deutschlands internationale Verantwortung („Unser Land ist keine Insel“), und auf der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz forderte er eine Wende in der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Sie müsse mehr Initiative zeigen, denn Deutschland profitiere vom „Geflecht aus Normen, Freunden und Allianzen“ und

sei besonders anfällig für Störungen. Zurückhaltung könne „Selbstprivilegierung“ sein. Verantwortung sei Mitverantwortung. Alleingänge, auch im Abseitsstehen, hätten ihren Preis.

Sicherheitspolitischer Dialog müsse nicht nur unter Experten, sondern in der breiten Öffentlichkeit stattfinden, da Sicherheit als Existenzfrage alle angehe. Reflexhaft der Kommentar eines Politikers, es sei keine „Zurückhaltung“, mehr auf diplomatische als auf militärische Mittel zu setzen. Er verriet das verbreitete dichotomische Denken – als gäbe es hier nur Entweder-Oder. Doch größere Verantwortungsbereitschaft zielt nicht auf Bundeswehreinätze bei jeder sich bietenden Gelegenheit oder gar auf eine „Militarisierung“ der Außenpolitik. Sie überwindet die Jahre, da in Krisen oft als erstes verkündet wurde, was deutscherseits „ausgeschlossen“ sei. Und zur „Kultur militärischer Zurückhaltung“, die durch ständige Berufung darauf entwertet und in den Augen Verbündeter zur Ausflucht geworden war, gilt Minister Steinmeiers Feststellung, so richtig sie sei, dürfe sie doch nicht als „Kultur des Heraushaltens“ missverstanden werden.

Konkret bedeutet eine solche Umorientierung vor allem: Erklären sicherheitspolitischer Erfordernisse, auch bei geringem Bedrohungsgefühl, des Paradigmenwechsels von Verteidigung zu komplexer Sicherheitsvorsorge und der instrumentalen Rolle des Militärs; Bedrohungsanalyse in enger Konsultation mit Verbündeten und aktive statt reaktive Politik bei krisenhaften Entwicklungen; die Erkenntnis, dass nach den Untaten des „Dritten Reichs“ Friedensverantwortung nicht totalen Pazifismus bedeutet, und dass auch Nichthandeln schuldig machen kann; ein kohärentes Konzept zu Zielen deutscher Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, zu Interessen, regionaler Gewichtung und Kriterien für Mitwirkung; ressortübergreifende Sicherheitspolitik, aktives Anbieten deutscher Beiträge, und umfassende (nicht rein militärische) Einsatzmandate; das Ziehen von Lehren aus Auslandseinsätzen für Deutschland, Nato,

EU und VN in systematischer Evaluierung und Auswertung; periodische sicherheitspolitische Leitliniendokumente nicht allein des BMVg (das letzte Weißbuch stammt von 2006!) und – über routinemäßige Mandatsbeschlüsse hinaus – regelmäßige Bundestagsdebatten zur Sicherheitspolitik; deutsche Impulse (im Einklang v.a. mit Frankreich und Polen) zur Ausgestaltung und Anwendung der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU; Konzentration auf die wirklichen Bedrohungen im Cyber-Raum; und aktive Mitwirkung an der Weiterentwicklung der Responsibility to Protect (Schutzverantwortung) unter Betonung der Konfliktprävention.

„Früher, entschiedener und substantieller“ solle Deutschland sich einbringen, forderte Gauck. Das betrifft alle Elemente der Sicherheitspolitik; militärische Gewalt ist ultima ratio, äußerstes Mittel. Aber militärische Optionen müssen vorhanden sein – je glaubwürdiger, umso geringer die Notwendigkeit, sich ihrer zu bedienen. Nun wird erwartet, dass Deutschland „liefert“, Initiative ergreift, politischen Willen zeigt und mobilisieren hilft.

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THEMEN

China's Mediterranean Presence is an opportunity for NATO

At its Wales summit in September, NATO will focus on its future. But while the Ukraine crisis has refocused the alliance on collective defense and its immediate neighborhood, its international partnerships and cooperative security with rising powers will also become more relevant in an age of globalization, emerging non-traditional security challenges, and declining Western defense budgets. This is especially important

given China's rise as a global actor and its growing presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after the Arab Spring.

It was at the EU-U.S. Summit in November 2011 that the transatlantic partners initially discussed the idea of a joint pivot to Asia and agreed to increase their dialogue and coordination on Asia-Pacific issues. However, in view of declining defense budgets, many European countries saw Asia as a region too far, preferring a division of labor to focus on territorial defense and Europe's own backyard. The countries of southern Europe, especially, feared destabilizing spillovers from developments in North Africa, such as mass migration and terrorism, as well as energy and maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece.

This division of labor is gradually emerging, with the MENA region becoming a greater European concern, and responsibility for Asia falling primarily to the United States. But this raises practical questions over whether Europe can secure its neighborhood without U.S. support. In the Libyan campaign, European allies relied on U.S. capabilities such as aerial refueling and ran quickly through their munitions. Moreover, such a division risks weakening the transatlantic bond over time. As such, China's growing footprint in the Mediterranean presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States and Europe to constructively engage China, and together form a common strategy for post-Arab Spring reconstruction.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen would like the alliance to engage China because NATO operates with United Nations mandates, and China is the only permanent UN Security Council member with which it has no formal mechanism for engagement and consultation. NATO's new strategic narrative would need to account for China's entry into NATO's neighborhood, and focus on ways to engage China for cooperative security and

crisis management so as to stabilize the MENA region.

For Beijing, the MENA region is primarily important as a source for energy resources to feed China's growing economy. It is also an export hub for Europe and Africa and a forward front for protecting China's "One China Policy" and combating terrorism and East Turkistan separatist forces. After losing over \$20 billion in investments and evacuating 36,000 Chinese nationals from Libya, Beijing is concerned about another scenario of that nature. China also fears that the new Islamist regimes in the Arab Mediterranean countries will be more supportive of Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang and deny Beijing's access to their energy supplies. Thus Beijing will increasingly exercise its diplomatic and military power to protect these far-flung interests, and already China is developing its long-range naval logistic capability.

To this end, China's recent entry into Mediterranean security requires a readjustment of sensitive regional balances as well as the need for defense planners in the U.S. European, Central, and African Commands to incorporate China into their strategic calculus. China's increasing economic and maritime footprint, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, could benefit cooperation on non-traditional security challenges such as counterterrorism, anti-piracy, crisis management, and arresting weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Maritime security is another issue for cooperation given China's interest in Israeli and Cypriot gas, as well as counterterrorism against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which attacked Chinese interests in Algeria in 2009. In Syria, China has concerns about Uyghur jihadists linked with al Qaeda.

With almost 1 million citizens in Middle East and Africa facing threats of piracy and kidnappings, China also has an interest in crisis management and emergency response. Moreover, NATO engaging China would help keep the United States firmly anchored in the Mediterranean region despite

the Asia pivot, and reassure allies and NATO partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative that the United States is not leaving the region.

China's expanding overseas economic interests, with commensurate maritime power projection capabilities across the Indian Ocean littoral and the Mediterranean, present a timely opportunity for Beijing to help burden-sharing in providing global public goods, especially in the maritime commons. If the transatlantic community can succeed in working with China in MENA on emerging security challenges, the United States and its allies can export important lessons to the Western Pacific in the hope of also nurturing cooperative security in China's own neighborhood. This article was originally published as part of the German Marshall Funds Transatlantic Take series.

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