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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

seit knapp einem Jahr entschuldige ich mich bei Vorträgen im außereuropäischen Ausland, wie wir Europäer mit der internationalen Flüchtlingskrise in und um Europa umgehen. Es ist einfach unglaublich, wie wir Legionen von Flüchtlingen im Mittelmeer ertrinken lasse und darüber zur Tagesordnung übergehen. Nun erreichen die Flüchtlingsmassen unsere Heimat. Ich erinnere mich, dass während der Kosovo-Krise 300.000 Flüchtlinge und eine Belastung des Bundeshaushalts von rund 3 Mrd DM jährlich im Verbund mit einer sich rapide verschlechternden inneren Sicherheit in Deutschland zu einem bis dahin beispiellosen Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr führten. Was bedeuten wohl die avisierten jährlichen Flüchtlingsmargen von bis zu einer Million Flüchtlinge und eine Belastung des Bundeshaushaltes um etliche Mrd. Euro für die künftigen Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr?

Nachdem wir nicht nur in der Interpretation von Francis Fukuyama das Ende der Geschichte erreicht zu haben glaubten, sind wir plötzlich wieder mitten drin. Die Geschichte lebt. Möglicherweise intensiver als nötig? Vielleicht, weil wir uns so wenig mit ihr beschäftigt haben? Das beginnt beim BREXIT – die Briten sind es tatsächlich leid, ständig uns Kontinentaleuropäer zu retten und können nicht verstehen, dass es auch eine andere Sicht der Dinge gibt. Es gibt auch problematischere Geheimdienste als die National Security Agency – ohne deren Hilfe wären weniger deutsche Geiseln befreit und zudem längst terroristisch motivierte Bomben in Deutschland explodiert. Asien wird sicherheitspolitisch wieder ein zunehmend problematischeres Region. Es ist höchste Zeit, sich den Herausforderungen einer multipolaren Welt beherzt zu stellen – ansonsten gerät sie noch mehr aus den Fugen.

Ralph Thiele, *Vorstandsvorsitzender*

In dieser Ausgabe

THEMEN

Germany, Europe and the Challenges of a multipolar World

We are living in an age of ever-faster change. Globalisation and the resulting rise of new powers and the simultaneous relative decline of the US, Europe and Japan is the megatrend of our time. Together with technological developments, the triumph of the West over the Soviet Union in the Cold War led to an enormous acceleration in globalisation and thus change.

The unipolar phase with only one remaining superpower – the US – only lasted around 20 years until the post-war order ended and the parameters of a new multipolar world became obvious. China's rapid economic and political rise has led some to talk already of a new bipolarity (G2), while others believe that an Asian century lies ahead with China and India (Chin-

India) at its heart. There's no doubt that the centre of gravity in the global economy and world politics is shifting from the North Atlantic area to Asia – from the West and North to the East and South. Alongside the world's two most densely populated countries – China and India – more than half of the second tier of rising economies, the Next Eleven, namely South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Viet Nam, are in Asia. However, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria – the most populous countries in Africa – are emerging as global players, as are Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, Saudi Arabia in the Middle East – thanks to its rich oil deposits – and Kazakhstan in Central Asia. Russia´s assertive policy on Ukraine which culminated in 2014 with its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its active support for East Ukrainian insurgents has probably also – at least temporally - increased its influence in global affairs. All of these countries have already evolved into regional powers and are thus part of the new multipolarism. However, globalisation has also led to the ascent of non-state actors. These – especially multinational companies and NGOs – are exercising ever more influence on the international agenda and are thus restricting the scope for action of nation states and international organisations.

The group of major rising economies known as the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – account for around 43 per cent of the world's population. Their share of global production has now reached 20 per cent – and this figure is steadily rising. The high overall economic dynamism of this group of states has now reached the second-tier countries, which have also become new centres in the global economy. Increasing economic power is usually accompanied by growing political influence. Although the shift of global power is not a tsunami, since it will last for many years to come, it's probably just as unstoppable. Despite its relative loss of power, the US will continue to be primus inter pares – the most powerful of the major powers – for some time.

However, it's by no means certain that America can maintain its current status in the coming two decades. Compared to the heyday of Pax Americana, American influence in the world has been steadily decreasing for some years. The withdrawal from Afghanistan and before that from Iraq has made this evident to everybody. The American age and with it the old order are thus coming to an end – an era marked by the two World Wars, the Depression and the Cold War. The rise of China and other new global players symbolises the start of a new order whose contours are only gradually becoming visible. China is expected to become the world's largest economy by the end of this decade and could even catch up with the US in terms of defence spending by 2025.

To date, the rise of new global players has by no means been uniform, nor will it be so in future. The rising economies are not only very different with regard to population and resources but also in terms of per-capita income, economic clout and dynamism as well as their political systems. China – a non-democratic, non-liberal state – is ascending in the global economic and political hierarchy and could become a political development model for other states in competition to the West. During the last 35 years, China has created a highly successful development and modernisation model which combines authoritarian political leadership with state-supervised capitalism. On the other hand, there are four democratic states among the up-and-coming ones – Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey – which have growing influence, and not only regionally. However, Western pluralism and free-market capitalism are regarded with a certain scepticism even in these countries, as are Western norms and values and the existing liberal world order.

Instead of opting for the market economy, many of the rising economies favour state-controlled capitalism. Their industrial policies are marked by the dominance of state-owned companies and national champions. Sovereign wealth funds, subsidies and capital controls as well as the manipulation of exchange rates are the key instruments in such a strategy. An economic policy of this kind has produced favourable results, not only in China but also in some other authoritarian countries. This has meant that there has been little pressure for democratisation or for citizens to have a greater say in how their society is run. Nor is it likely that any impetus for the renewal of the current liberal world order will come from these countries – on the contrary.

This is increasingly evident. For example, the response to the Arab Spring in early 2011 – which led to the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt – was restrained in many rising economies while the sweeping changes were welcomed and given wholehearted support in the West. Likewise in 2011, Brazil and Turkey – much to the displeasure of the US and Europe – made an unsuccessful attempt to undermine the West's policy on Iran. Thanks to their veto in the UN Security Council, Russia and China have greatly influenced the international community's policy on Syria on repeated occasions and prevented a possible humanitarian intervention against the Assad regime from the outset. And as Western countries decided on economic sanctions against Russia after its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 BRIC-partners of Russia and other developing countries did not only not join, but some even rushed to increase their business relations with Moscow.

Although most of the new global players share an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial attitude towards the West, many also regard each other with some wariness. These countries have little interest in tying themselves long-term to a powerful partner – for instance the US or China. It would thus be a mistake – despite their summit meetings and the recent establishment of a development bank – to see the BRICs as a coherent new bloc. For their interests are

too different. These interests have led in the past to armed conflicts between Russia and China as well as between China and India. In the course of their economic rise, nearly all new global players have increased their defence budgets and modernised their military apparatus. Particularly in Asia, rising military spending is likely due to continuing – and in some cases growing – regional rivalries as well as a reaction to the perceived US loss of influence and the doubts this has raised about the ability of the US to protect its alliance partners.

Many of the new global players are focused on narrow national and, at best, regional interests. In the sphere of global trade, for example, Brazil did not let its strategic partnership with China or the common partnership in the BRICs group prevent it – together with the US and the EU – from taking action at the WTO and accusing China of dumping. Despite growing global interdependence, institution-building and political integration are only taking place at regional level. In South America, Brazil is promoting a new integration project in the Union of South American Nations, while the ASEAN states are seeking to counterbalance their increasing economic dependency on China with greater cooperation amongst themselves as well as with the US, Japan and India.

Despite their rise, however, many of the new global players continue to have characteristics typical of developing countries. Some of them rely too much on raw materials and their processing (for instance Brazil, South Africa), while others have only developed a few globally competitive core industries so far (India, for example).

Although the rising economies have all contributed to the demise of the West-dominated post-war order, due to their conflicting interests they are unable, or unwilling, to cooperate constructively on building a new order. Together, however, we can assume that they are keen, and strong enough, to prevent a new hierarchical order. Therefore, the future will most likely see a multipolar world the stabilisation of which should be an objective of German and European foreign policy.

Early in the second decade of the 21st century, Germany – and with it the Federal Chancellor – are at the zenith of their international standing. Germany came top in a BBC poll in which those surveyed were asked which country they wanted to see take on a greater international role. Germany has achieved an unprecedented measure of prosperity, security and freedom. Hardly any other country has benefited more than Germany from globalisation and the liberal international order as well as from European integration. Conversely, that means that few other countries are as dependent as Germany on the continuation of the free world order based on cooperation (open markets and trading routes as well as direct access to raw materials) and from an intact European Union. It's therefore very much in Germany's interest that the crisis in the southern EU member states is overcome. Germany has close relations based on mutual trust with all its neighbours and hence the "German question" – which drew almost the whole of Europe into bloody wars on two occasions in the last century – has been resolved. In the long term, also Germany is unlikely to have any chance of maintaining its position in the global economy unless Europe remains competitive. Even in the best case scenario, namely the swift resolution of the crisis in Greece, in future Germany and Europe will lose economic and consequently political clout. Europe's share of global economic production is set to fall from 26 per cent in 2010 to 17 –18 per cent by 2030, as the major emerging economies in particular, but also the US, will grow considerably faster than Europe. Between 2002 and 2007, the emerging economies' share in global economic growth was greater than that in OECD countries for the first time. For the period from 2012 to 2017, the rising economies will produce 75 per cent of global economic growth. Accelerated by the crisis in the eurozone, Europe's share will fall to 5.7 per cent and not one European country – not even Germany – will be among the top ten engines of growth. Nevertheless, Europe is currently still the world's largest economic area and the relative fall does not necessarily mean that absolute prosperity has to decline in Europe.

In terms of per capita income and productivity, Europe is still far ahead of China, the top performer among the new global players. Europe's Achilles' heel is its slow economic growth. The European Union has not achieved the goal set out in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, namely to become "the world's most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economic area" by 2010. Today, the EU is experiencing its most serious crisis, marked by demographic problems (especially in Germany), high national debts, weak and uneven growth, falling productivity, structural unemployment (especially high youth unemployment) and political crises in key member states. While the EU was always lacking in hard power, it's now also lost soft power as a result of the crisis. It's perceived to a lesser degree than ever before in the rising economies as a role model or strong partner. Instead, it is regarded as an ageing and declining continent which is preoccupied with itself. This is also having an impact on traditional partners in Africa, Latin America or Central Asia which are increasingly looking to China and other rising economies.

The international, liberal post-war order, to which Germany owes its rise to prosperity in freedom, is under considerable pressure. However, there's no new order as yet. At best, only its vague contours are discernible. While the old order proved to be relatively stable, the transition to a new order is likely to bring major uncertainties and the risk of instability. Whether and when a stable new order will emerge, and what form it will take, is still in the stars. What is certain is that the United Nations, NATO and the EU – which Germany and Europe regard as key components of a global order – are undergoing change and that even the US, the

guarantor of the old liberal order, is increasingly losing influence.

Europe has to quickly restore its effectiveness in the face of the rise of new global players. In order to achieve that, the EU must overcome the sovereign debt crisis and ensure the competitiveness of its enterprises or – where it has been lost – restore it. Otherwise, there is a danger that Europe will be left behind and pushed to the margins of the global economic order and, consequently, the margins of international politics. Only by strengthening its economic foundations and furthering political integration, including the rectification of its democratic deficit, can the European Union bring its weight fully to bear and help shape a future new order in keeping with our interests and to play a key role in it. Due to its own loss of influence, in future Germany will have to rely more than ever on a strong EU in order to push through its own ideas on the new global order. The aim of Germany's policy on Europe must therefore be to strengthen the community, thus ensuring that the Union is effective even in the shadow of an emerging new global order. The stabilisation and further development of the euro area and the EU as a whole remain a priority in Germany's policy on Europe. Monetary union must be complemented by economic and fiscal union. Large-scale investments are needed not only in physical infrastructure but also in education and research if Germany and Europe are to remain competitive. The world of the 21st century is marked by large populous and at the same time dynamic states such as the US, China, India as well as Brazil. In order to compete with them as a market, it's essential that we complete the European single market. Europe could become more attractive to qualified immigrants and thus slow down the looming demographic crisis by, among other others, creating a single European labour market. Europe and Germany have to adopt a coordinated approach if they are to master the challenges of global change. "Right now, the EU still has seven per cent of the global population. If it is to continue playing a role in shaping the world, Europe needs a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This would involve strengthening the European External Action Service as well as the position of the High Representative, Federica Mogherini. The neighbourhood policy should be to the fore and in fact it is. The EU is taking on its natural role as regional heavyweight in its eastern and southern neighbourhood. Germany and Europe have a fundamental interest in sustainable stability and democracy in Eastern Europe, the Maghreb and Mashreq countries as well as in anchoring Turkey to Europe on a permanent basis. And German and European Foreign Policy is acting accordingly. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia and its military support for separatist insurgents in Eastern Ukraine are representing the most serious threat to European peace since the end of the Cold war and the wars following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Germany together with France took the initiative which led to the agreements of Minsk in order to stabilize Ukraine and open a political process to settle the massive conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Germany together with its two European P5 partners – Great Britain and France – and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs worked over many years together with the US, China and Russia on the Iran nuclear issue which resulted on July 14 in the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed with the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. There is hope that this agreement will also contribute to the stabilization of the whole Near and Middle East with the self-declared Islamic State as the biggest destabilizing factor which is already spreading its brutal ideology to Northern Africa and threatening European countries.

The promotion of democracy, pluralism, good governance and the rule of law as well as respect for human rights are and remain at the top of the EU's agenda in its relations around the world and, in particular, in Europe's neighbourhood – even in times like the current one when tensions and conflicts there are on the rise. It's essential that member states and the EU speak with one, stronger voice, also in international institutions – the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group – in order to keep in check the impending loss of influence there due to the growing demands of the new global players for greater representation.

Although the global shift of power towards the new global players cannot be averted, Germany and Europe can play a role in shaping the new multipolar order, only the contours of which are evident to date. The strategic aim of German and European foreign policy is to ensure that the transition is peaceful and that the new order is as liberal and rules-based as possible and geared to cooperation. German and European foreign policy must be aimed at gaining partners and with their help securing and, if possible, further expanding the normative network which has been developed in the West in the last few decades.

Germany and the EU must therefore try to strengthen relations with the like-minded. These include traditional partners in Europe, including Turkey, the non-European NATO partners the US and Canada as well as Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Mexico and Chile and also Israel.

However, Germany and Europe must also aim to broaden and deepen relations with the new global players, in particular those with values and norms closest to our own. There is no doubt that these include Latin American states led by Brazil as well as India. With these countries, as well as with China, the European Union has entered into strategic partnerships which either have to be filled with substance or deepened. However, relations with the Next Eleven should also be further expanded: among others with

Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria, Indonesia and Viet Nam as well as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan, which have all become regional players. In expanding relations with these countries, we must support their appropriate representation in international organisations if we are to retain or arouse their interest in these institutions. Otherwise there is a great danger that these organisations will lose influence to regional institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated in 2014 by China and headquartered in Beijing. The aim of German and European foreign policy must be to persuade the new global players – in keeping with their increased power – to shoulder greater responsibility for the international order. This includes dealing with those countries which are causing problems, for example North Korea, and helping to prevent the failure of states and the consequences, for instance in Somalia, which has become a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorists and pirates.

Since reunification and the increasingly successful efforts to overcome the consequences of division in Germany and Europe, Germany has come to take on a leading role in Europe and Europe's neighbourhood. On the one hand, Germany is being urged to step up to the plate and take on this new role – for example by Radek Sikorski, Poland's Foreign Minister until September 2014 – while, on the other, the idea of German leadership has stirred up unease – especially in Greece and other southern member countries of the Eurozone, partly as a result of the sovereign debt crisis there. The ECONOMIST is right when it concludes an article on Germany´s role in Europe in its August 8, 2015 edition by stating "In short, there is no crisis in Europe that can be solved without Germany."

Germany must accept this leading role but, at the same time, show considerable prudence, patience and a readiness to reconcile interests. Given their relative loss of power and the re-focusing of the US on its own core interests and priority regions – to which Europe and its neighbourhood belong less and less – Germany and Europe must do more to ensure that no vacuum of power and thus instability – for example in North Africa – emerges in its neighbourhood. Never before has there been such a great opportunity – as well as an absolute necessity – to ensure a true partnership between Germany, Europe and the US within the global West. Ultimately, our task is to maintain a liberal international order, or create a new one under the new conditions in world politics, to which we owe our prosperity, security and freedom – and to secure it for the future.

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Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

THEMEN

Brexit – the View from Berlin

There is a sense in Berlin that David Cameron does not comprehend the paradigmatic and thus geostrategic shift represented by the Euro currency project (and the support for that project in Washington – see last week's note for the US view of the referendum). Cameron must conduct his negotiations in this context: future integration of the Eurozone cannot be halted or slowed down. Similarly, change in the EU treaties is not viable in the short term. Berlin would certainly prefer for the UK to stay in rather than leave the EU. But it is a British misconception (not to say wishful thinking) that Germany would be terrified at the prospect being 'left alone' in the EU with France.

There is a sense of frustration and exasperation in Berlin with a view to Cameron's European agenda. 'We think we understand what Cameron wants for Britain. However, we are not certain we understand his European narrative,' is a sentiment often heard in Berlin. There is a consensus that Cameron's perception of the European agenda is substantially out of sync with that of Hollande and Merkel.

At this point one misconception has to be resolutely put to rest: that Germany would be terrified at the prospect of Britain leaving – and thus leaving it alone with France – and will therefore do all it can, within reason, to convince other EU members to support Britain's agenda. This is wishful thinking in certain London circles and defies the reality of the current European dynamics! For one, there is very little left to balance between Berlin and Paris! For another, if balancing were needed it would be with a view to the Eurozone; and here London is of no importance.

To put it in a nutshell: London is important for the outer European layer but not for the core of the European agenda which, in essence, is the Eurozone. The narrative of the inner core is essentially written in Berlin and Paris. When 'London' is mentioned in this context it is actually the City, not Whitehall or Westminster that is being referred to. There is a perception that Warsaw will eventually gravitate towards the Eurozone; this would leave only London and Stockholm outside.

It has been noted in Berlin that the British press circulates the impression of a privileged political relationship between Merkel and Cameron. One looks in vain for similar reporting in the German press! From a Berlin perspective the relationship between Merkel and Cameron is 'diplomatically correct in a wider European context' for London does not contribute to the pressing agenda of managing the Eurozone and keeping open a channel of communication with Putin. And both agendas have the full support and indeed encouragement of Washington. It has been suggested in closed sessions that any meeting with Cameron takes time away from Merkel to address the two key issues of the Eurozone and the Russian agenda.

There is a sense in Berlin that Cameron does not comprehend the paradigmatic and thus geostrategic shift of the Euro currency project and the subsequent support for the project in Washington. The Berlin narrative is thus: The Euro currency is irreversible the regardless of Greek membership. The reason for this lies in the realization that Paris has 'war-gamed' the fundamentals of French membership in the Eurozone and concluded that a withdrawal would be detrimental to the national interest. Apparently, one of the arguments has been that Paris cannot afford to let Berlin run a 'rump Eurozone' on German terms while unveiling French economic and currency weakness. Whilst it remains a part of the Berlin-Paris tandem, the argument goes; France can at least pretend equality.

The Eurozone narrative should not be misconstrued as politically naive. To be sure, the continued development will be costly and thus continue to be politically controversial. There will be Greek debt relief however politically cloaked! Rightly or wrongly, there is a sense in Berlin that the point of no return for the Euro currency has already been passed. As a result, a 'two-speed Europe' will gain momentum after the 2017 elections in France and Germany. The question remains, however, whether this is too late.

There is a geo-economic angle to the Euro currency in the context of the rise of China. The Euro is a strategic partner to the US$ in terms of 'hedging' the renminbi as a global reserve currency and in the debate over the role of the Chinese currency in the context of the IMF.

Coming back to the issue of a possible BREXIT, it would seem from a Berlin perspective that Cameron needs to formulate and embed a UK agenda in a positive and constructive European narrative in order to be heard across the Channel. Can there be tactical alliances on issues like stopping the abuse of national welfare systems? Yes! Yet, at the same time the issue of free movement within Europe is non-negotiable. Will a British push for less Brussels bureaucracy find acceptance in Berlin? Yes! At the same time EU treaty change in the short term is seen as unrealistic in both Berlin and Paris.

There is little Berlin can do to influence the UK 'Brexit' debate. Concessions 'within the existing EU structures' are possible. There are red lines, however, and short term EU treaty change is not on the agenda. In addition, Cameron must apprehend that future integration of the Eurozone cannot be halted or slowed down. He has to price this into UK initiatives to secure the position of the City within the Eurozone discourse.

Finally, one is frequently reminded in Berlin that Washington can be expected to put pressure on London if BREXIT looks like a realistic scenario. This might apply especially if a Republican Administration is elected, for the elephant in the room is China. This brings us back to the geostrategic dimension of the Euro currency. American pressure on Britain to stay in Europe would bring a new and innovative meaning to the term 'special relationship'.

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Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.
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THEMEN

Die Rolle der Geheimdienste – Mehr oder weniger Intelligence?

Beim CIA, dem Auslandsgeheimdienst der USA, ist Intelligence Teil des Namens. Doch was der Begriff wirklich bedeutet, wissen nur wenige.

Der Begriff Intelligence deckt ein weites Feld ab und lässt sich nur schwer exakt definieren. In diesem Beitrag sollen unter Intelligence Informationen verstanden werden, die nicht öffentlich bekannt sind oder Analysen, die auf solchen Informationen beruhen und für Entscheidungsträger in der Politik erstellt werden. Solche Informationen werden durch Observation, Ermittlung, Internet Recherchen und Analyse gewonnen und geben Aufschluss über die Fähigkeiten, Intentionen oder Aktivitäten von Regierungen, Personen oder Organisationen, eines Verhandlungspartners oder eines Gegners. Sie dienen letztlich dem Staat bei der Entscheidungsfindung, erhöhen die Qualität einer Entscheidung durch Ausschöpfen möglichst vieler Erkenntnisquellen und verringern das Risiko einer Fehlentscheidung.

In der Geschichte hat der Einsatz von Intelligence oft eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt. Ein gutes Beispiel hierfür ist die sog. Zimmermann-Depesche, die der gleichnamige deutsche Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes im Januar 1917 über die deutsche Botschaft in Washington an den deutschen Gesandten in Mexiko sandte. Er schlug darin ein Bündnis zwischen Deutschland und Mexiko vor für den Fall, dass die USA ihre Neutralität im 1. Weltkrieg aufgeben sollten. Der Regierung von Mexiko sollte für diesen Fall Unterstützung für die Rückgewinnung des 1848 an die USA verloren gegangenen Territoriums in Aussicht gestellt werden. Dieses Telegramm wurde vom britischen Marinegeheimdienst abgefangen und entschlüsselt. Sein brisanter Inhalt wurde der US-Regierung zugespielt und veröffentlicht. Dies trug entscheidend dazu bei, die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit und Präsident Woodrow Wilson auf den Kriegseintritt der USA einzustimmen, der am 6. April 1917 erfolgte. Der Rest ist Geschichte.

Im Kampf gegen Terrorismus jeder Art ist Intelligence von hoher Bedeutung. Ohne den Einsatz von Intelligence ist es kaum vorstellbar, dass ein Anschlag durch die Sauerland-Gruppe verhindert worden wäre. Im Oktober 2006 leitete die amerikanische National Security Agency (NSA) über die

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Erkenntnisse über intensiven Mailverkehr zwischen Pakistan und Deutschland an den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) weiter. Dieser schaltete den Verfassungsschutz ein. In der sog. Operation Alberich überwachten 500 Beamte die Verdächtigen, hörten Telefone ab, verwanzten Wohnungen und Autos. Dabei arbeiteten die deutschen Behörden eng mit den Kollegen der CIA zusammen. Schließlich wurden im Juli 2007 die für den Bombenbau beschaffte Wasserperoxyd-Mischung durch eine harmlose Flüssigkeit ausgetauscht und die potentiellen Attentäter verhaftet. Geplant hatten sie Anschläge auf amerikanische Einrichtungen in Deutschland, die möglicherweise viele Opfer gefordert hätten. Auch wären die Beziehungen zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland im Fall eines erfolgreichen Anschlages schwer belastet gewesen – durch den Einsatz von Intelligence wurden die Pläne vereitelt.

Die sog. Operation Overt im Sommer 2006 in Großbritannien folgte einem ähnlichen Muster. Der britische Inlandsgeheimdienst MI5 wurde auf einen jungen Islamisten aufmerksam, der in regelmäßigen Abständen von Großbritannien nach Afghanistan und Pakistan reiste. Nach einer solchen Reise wurden am Flughafen sein Gepäck untersucht und verdächtige Artikel gefunden. MI5 erhielt die Erlaubnis, Gespräche des Islamisten abzuhören, dabei wurden Hinweise auf einen bevorstehenden Anschlag gefunden, so dass die Observationen verstärkt wurden. Es wurde schnell deutlich, dass gleichzeitige Anschläge auf bis zu sieben Flugzeuge geplant waren, womöglich im amerikanischen Luftraum. Der Islamist und seine Komplicen wurden verhaftet und zu hohen Haftstrafen verurteilt. Behörden schätzen, dass der geplante islamistische Anschlag mehr Opfer gefordert hätte, als die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001 in New York. Ferner hätte ein solcher Anschlag auch zu größeren Problemen in den Beziehungen zwischen Großbritannien und den USA geführt. Der vereitelte Anschlag hatte nachhaltige Folgen für den Flugverkehr – das Verbot, Flüssigkeiten an Bord von Flugzeugen mit sich zu führen, gilt seither, bis heute.

Deutsche Regierungschefs scheinen dagegen, anders als US-amerikanische und britische, ein Problem mit ihren eigenen Geheimdiensten zu haben. Helmut Schmidt ließ sich nach eigenen Aussagen als Bundeskanzler nie einen Bericht des BND vorlegen. Er meinte, die Ergebnisse solcher Berichte beruhten oftmals auf Eindrücken, die stark durch die politischen Präferenzen des Berichterstatters gefärbt seien. Durch seine engen Kontakte zu den damaligen Größen der Politik in Ost und West verfügte er wohl über ausreichend Informationen. Auch Helmut Kohl war kein dankbarer Klient der deutschen Dienste. Auf einem Empfang anlässlich des 60. Geburtstages von Klaus Kinkel 1996 in Bonn kam er in seiner Laudatio auf die BND-Tage des Jubilars zu sprechen, die ein blinder Fleck in dessen Biographie seien. Im Übrigen wüsste er, Kohl, nicht, was und ob dort überhaupt etwas gearbeitet würde. Dass diese Einschätzung bei den Sicherheitsbehörden nicht sonderlich gut ankam, erscheint verständlich. Schließlich war es derselbe Helmut Kohl, der 1991 den damaligen Generalsekretär Gorbatschow gegen die Moskowiter Putschisten unterstützte. Das schien zu jenem Zeitpunkt eine mutige Entscheidung, schließlich standen noch 400.000 russische Soldaten auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR. Allerdings wusste Kohl aus BND-Berichten, dass die Putschisten keine breite Unterstützung im Militär hatten. Mit dieser Information konnte er seinem Freund Gorbatschow ohne großes Risiko für Deutschland zur Seite stehen. Das hat Gorbatschow auch nie vergessen.

Auch Bundeskanzlerin Merkel scheint dem Nutzen von geheimdienstlichen Informationen eher ablehnend gegenüber zu stehen. Im ARD-Sommerinterview 2015 wurde sie auf die Aktivitäten der NSA angesprochen und meinte, dabei stünden Aufwand und Ertrag nicht im Verhältnis. Auch richte das Ausspionieren von Freunden mehr Schaden an als es Nutzen bringe. Sie verhandle lieber, ohne zu wissen, was ihre Gesprächspartner dächten.

Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass es die deutsche Politik bislang nicht recht verstanden hat, welchen Wert Intelligence besitzen kann. Sie steuert die Beschaffung von Intelligence nicht nach Prioritäten in enger Anbindung an die vorhandenen nachrichtendienstlichen Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten. Eine solche Vorgehensweise zwänge die Dienste, Rechenschaft über ihre Arbeit abzulegen, und sie zwänge die Politik, sich darüber schlüssig zu werden, welche Intelligence sie tatsächlich benötigt. Die Politik verwechselt auch zu oft öffentlich zugängliche Informationen mit Intelligence. Öffentlich zugängliche Informationen können Politiker der Presse und sonstigen Veröffentlichungen entnehmen, Intelligence hingegen wird von den Diensten geliefert.

Die klassische Intelligence basiert auf dem Sammeln von Informationen aus diversen Quellen. Diese reichen von menschlichen Quellen und Informanten (HUMINT) über abgefangene Gespräche und Kommunikation (COMINT) sowie elektronische Informationen (ELINT). In letzter Zeit sind weitere Informationsquellen wie Satellitenbilder (IMINT), Standortbestimmungen (LOCINT) und geografische Informationen (GEOINT) hinzugekommen. Auch sind öffentlich verfügbare Informationen (OSINT) immer wichtiger geworden. Das Internet erlaubt den Diensten Zugang zu einer Vielzahl von Informationen über Zielpersonen, Länder und Wirtschaft. Gleichzeitig nutzen Zielpersonen und -gruppen das Internet, um miteinander zu kommunizieren und ihre Botschaften in die Welt zu tragen. Die Dienste bedienen sich nicht nur aus dem Internet, sie müssen auch genau verfolgen, wer im Internet was kommuniziert.

Das Internet bietet eine Fülle von Informationen, die für die Behörden von Nutzen sein können. Diese persönlichen Daten (PROTINT) reichen von Reisedaten und Telefonverbindungen über Einkäufe, Kreditwürdigkeit, biometrische Daten bis hin zu Registern verschie-

dener Art. Die Analyse solcher Daten ist in der Bekämpfung von Kriminalität und Strafverfolgung von großem Nutzen und wird von den Behörden auch zur Verfolgung von terroristischen Organisationen genutzt.

Diese gesammelten Informationen aus den beschriebenen Quellen sind keine Intelligence. Erst durch Bearbeitung dieser Informationen in Fachkreisen, Prüfung, Analyse und Bewertung der Ergebnisse zusammen mit dem Auftraggeber, werden Informationen zu Intelligence. Man spricht hierbei von einem „Intelligence Cycle". Dieser Begriff ist aber eher als interaktives Netzwerk, bestehend aus Auftraggeber und den zuarbeitenden Behörden, zu sehen. In diesem Prozess gewinnt die Intelligence an Bedeutung, je öfter sie von allen Beteiligten hinterfragt wird.

Die Bereitstellung von Intelligence bedarf eines Auftrags der Politik, sie ist kein Zufallsprodukt der laufenden Arbeit. Die Rolle der Politik in der Nutzung von Intelligence beschränkt sich aber nicht nur auf den Abruf von Intelligence. Die Politik sollte eng eingebunden werden und Feedback innerhalb des Intelligence-Zyklus liefern. Ein solcher Prozess führt dazu, die Fragen klarer zu formulieren, die Methoden der Informationsgewinnung zu schärfen und die Qualität von Intelligence zu steigern. In Großbritannien erfolgt dieser Prozess durch das Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), das direkt an den Premierminister berichtet. Mitglieder dieses Committees sind neben den drei Geheimdiensten auch Kabinettsmitglieder und Entscheidungsträger verschiedener Ministerien. Das Ergebnis ist die professionelle Zusammenfassung einer Lage durch die britische Intelligence Community – nicht nur der Dienste sondern auch von Experten aus allen betroffenen Bereichen.

Das Thema Öffentliche Sicherheit nimmt an Bedeutung zu. Eines der Merkmale einer guten Regierung ist, wie sie öffentliche Sicherheit gewährleistet, denn darauf basiert die Idee des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols. Nichtsdestotrotz erwartet die Bevölkerung, dass die Aktivitäten des Staates das Recht nicht beugen und die grundrechtlichen Freiheiten unangetastet bleiben. In anderen Worten: Die Regierung muss zum Schutz von Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft ein professionelles Risikomanagement betreiben. Um Sicherheit zu garantieren, ist die Regierung gefordert, nicht nur die gegenwärtige Lage zu erkennen und Gegenmaßnahmen zu entwickeln, sie muss auch künftige Risiken erkennen, analysieren und ihnen im Vorfeld begegnen. Dies schafft Vertrauen in den Staat und ermöglicht eine kontinuierliche Entwicklung von Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft. Ein Schlüssel für Stabilität in der Zukunft ist die Bereitstellung von Intelligence, um die Entscheidungsträger in ihren wichtigen sicherheitspolitischen Entscheidungen zu unterstützen.

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Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

EDITOR'S CHOICE

Could History Repeat Itself and See Another Great Power War Occurring in Asia?

Review: Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia, edited by Andreas Herberg-Rothe

If an historical analogy is a useful tool in understanding the contemporary realities, it is worth reading this edited volume full with analogies between the pre-World War I Europe and the 21st-century Asia, fraught with power transition, alliance politics, rising nationalism, and territorial disputes, among others.

The contributors to *Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia*, edited by Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Fulda, Germany) and published by ibidem Press in 2015, agree more or less with the notion that there are striking similarities between the pre-World War I European power constellations and the current security arrangements in Asia.

No one denies that China's future relations with the United States, Japan, Russia, and India will be crucial for Asia's shifting regional order. In particular, China's territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets and international confrontations over maritime jurisdiction in East China Sea and South China Sea have been identified as the potential powder keg that could potentially lead the regional powers to war. Therefore, the question converges on whether history would repeat itself, as the one-hundredth anniversary of World War I had just passed in 2014.

In fact, today's situation is much more complicated than 100 years ago because it is not just about a new rising power, China, challenging the established power, the United States. In a more complex manner, the two declining (US, Russia) and two rising (China, India) powers formed cross-cutting interests across potential Indian/US and Russian/Chinese alliance constellations, as some contributors to this volume have argued.

If Thucydides had rightly argued, a war is unlikely to be started by China striving for power and status, but the United States, a relatively declining power gripped by the fear of losing its status and influences. However, if we put India and Russia in the picture, the game will become more complex than imagined thus far.

Nevertheless, most contributors are not sanguine about the possibility of another international war in Asia in spite of the striking parallels between the two periods, even though it is impossible to rule out the probability of Asia degenerating into a zone of power politics between the two poles, the United States and China. In particular, Christopher Coker stresses that the warring parties are not rational actors, but gripped rather by unfounded passions, sentiments and illusions.

Therefore, the contributors from different backgrounds and nationalities, including Christopher Coker (LSE), Harald Muller and Carsten Rauch (Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt and Goethe University Frankfurt), Namrata Goswami (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi), Pang Zhongying (Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou), Antulio Echevarria II (US Army War College), and Artyom Lukin and Andrey Gubin (Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok), propose a variety of ideas and strategies to promote mutual understanding and create international security mechanisms.

The editor of this volume, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, is a leading Clausewitz scholar and Hegelian who stresses the importance of recognition not just between the United States and China, but among major Asian powers. In particular, he argues that the future war in Asia, if any, is not a war of conflicting interests, but "a cultural war for mutual recognition."

Then, what lesson can we draw from this analogy? In fact, one of Hegel's most striking arguments in the master-slave dialectic is that the elimination of the enemy or enslaving the others is tantamount to self-destruction, because these acts result in eliminating the peers who can recognize the master properly. In the absence of self-conscious peers recognizing the victor, any victory in war could mean nothing but self-indulgence.

As a way to alleviate the current tension in Asia and build an international system of security and prosperity, three contributors called for the establishment of the "21st Century Concert of Powers" in Asia, reminiscent of one in the nineteenth century Europe. Since this idea is related to international or supranational institution building engineered mainly by great powers, it is questionable whether this form of great power arrangements could be applicable to the political situation of the twenty-first century Asia, where the international norms of sovereignty and equality have been deeply embedded and the spirit for a community of peers is strong, as witnessed in the process of region building through such international mechanisms as the ASEAN Plus Three. But, as Harald Muller and Carsten Rauch from the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt emphasize, although a concert cannot automatically ascertain peace and if the participants decide to abandon concert diplomacy – as the European great powers had chosen to do by 1914 – the functionality of the concert would break down as well. But if the great powers would stick together, a concert could at least maximize the chances for peace. They are maintaining that while the conflict between Russia and the West is the more immediate issue, the rise of China is probably more crucial for international relations. They are arguing that soothing the relations between the declining hegemon and the rising challenger, while at the same time keeping all major powers in contact and communication, would be the concert's most vital task.

Although Antulio Echevarria (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle) is asserting that an arms race does not automatically lead to a war between the great powers, he nevertheless emphasizes the dangers of such an arms race in Asia. The potential for "unhealthy competition, rivalry, or conflict" is in his view already present, even if the intention is not. Settling the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas would pose challenges to the "balance between cooperation and competition," particularly as the demand for oil and other resources increases with the growth of Pacific Rim economies. Consequently, both sides may on occasion feel pressure to reassert their claims, pressure that some experts have already applied. Such reassertions, should they involve military forces, would amount to a de facto arms race.

Artyom Lukin and Andrey Gubin highlight the problem of the power dynamics in the decades to come. While a great-power war would hardly be probable now and in the near future, it can be made more likely if Eurasia slides into hostile alliance politics and splits into U.S.-centered and China-dominated camps, with Moscow becoming an ally of Beijing. In their view, when the U.S. enjoyed its "unipolar moment" in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, Washington could easily pursue a dual containment of Russia and China. Since that time, the balance of power has changed significantly. As even some prominent strategists in the U.S. acknowledge, America is now hardly in a position to confront two great powers in Eurasia simultaneously. However, the pincer move continues, literally pushing Russia and China together and tempting them into a fateful alliance.



Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia (An Interdisciplinary Series of the Centre for Intercultural and European Studies - CINTEUS)

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Namrata Goswami's contribution centers on the question of which path of international policy India should pursue and therefore on the identity of India. She indirectly reflects the fundamental problem of India becoming a major power in Asia, which leads to the question of whether India should consider itself as just a member of a U.S.-led coalition to balance the Asian hegemon, China, or whether it conceives itself more as a part of the emerging Asian century. Also, Pang Zhongying addresses the

problem of identity and self-understanding with respect to China's foreign policy. China is a hegemon in Asia "by nature." The questions for China, then, will be whether it will be a benevolent hegemon and whether it will be willing to integrate itself into a security system in Asia. The choice for the U.S. and China seems to be the same: Both could rely on pure power-politics and by doing so intensify the risk of a great power conflict, including their ally-systems, or they could acknowledge that in a globalized world, sharing power is a way of accumulating power, as the editor, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, maintains.

The analyses in *Lessons from World War I*, based on rigorous qualitative research, are powerful as they provide a convincing linkage between the possibility of international war and human and state-level efforts to prevent or avoid it.

All in all, this edited volume does not show a single road to peace, but illustrates there are many different paths. Even though it is questionable whether the major powers in Asia could form a concert of powers in Asia, or start the process of recognizing each other's status and identities, as advocated by the editor, the sheer lack of working security mechanisms in Asia makes any serious suggestions and developments in tension reduction and confidence building look advisable.

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Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

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