Center for Strategic & International Studies
– Europe Program –

U.S.–German Bilateral Dialogue
"BEYOND THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT"

In cooperation with the

Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft (pmg)

CONFERENCE REPORT

EDITED BY
CHRISTINA V. BALIS

Washington, D.C.
September 2002

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FOREWORD

On June 24, 2002 the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a one-day U.S.-German Bilateral Dialogue on "The NATO Prague Summit." The dialogue was organized in cooperation with the Berlin-based Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft (pmg), led by Colonel Ralph Thiele, commander of the Bundeswehr Office for Analyses and Studies.

Featuring key analysts from both Germany and the United States, the seminar sought to provide a balanced view of U.S. as well as European and German views on NATO's evolving role and the impact of the September 11, 2001 events on the transatlantic security relationship. This report is based on the adapted comments of eight of our lead discussants on four main themes: new members; new capabilities; new missions; and Russia's new status vis-à-vis NATO and its members. The quality of all sessions benefited greatly from the various contributions of all other participants, including Michael Haltzel and Vincent Morelli, respectively with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, as well as Charles Gati, now at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, and my CSIS colleagues John Hamre and Clark Murdock.

Even as the stakes and expectations with regard to the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled for November 20–21, 2002, remain high, much of what can be anticipated in the future will depend on events and developments following the decisions at Prague. The September 11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath point to several future scenarios for the transatlantic relationship—including a significant drift between the United States and the states of Europe. Neither complacency nor pessimism is an acceptable option, however. Our interest in holding such a dialogue in Washington reflected a genuine concern about the absence of a serious debate on the relevance and future direction of the transatlantic alliance. Our hope is that such consultations will be pursued more rigorously at the many different levels inside and outside the policy circles on both sides of the Atlantic.

I am grateful to Ralph Thiele for taking the initiative to help convene this conference, and to all my German and U.S. colleagues for helping to make this event as interesting and constructive as I found it to be. As always, we are also grateful for the generous support provided to the CSIS Europe Program by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Simon Serfaty
Director, CSIS Europe Program

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THINKING ABOUT AND BEYOND NATO

Simon Serfaty

Entering 2002, the two summits scheduled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) for the end of that year were expected to start the final phase of the Euro-Atlantic vision: two institutions with overlapping sets of members engaged in missions that might not always be pursued in common but would always remain compatible in their goals and complementary in their methods. Instead, as the year has unfolded, the Euro-Atlantic vision has become increasingly blurred. Now, there is a sense that the two sides of the Atlantic are drifting away from the lofty goals they set after World War II, and sought to reassert after the Cold War. The relationship is not only said to be lacking coherence, as America and Europe seem to be evolving in worlds of their own. It is also said to be losing its necessity, as Americans and Europeans no longer share values or even interests—and, even when they do, lose their commonalities in the increasing capabilities gap that separates and divides them.[1]

Rumors of an impending death of the transatlantic partnership are hardly new. For the past 50 years they have drowned the facts of mutually beneficial cooperation between America and its European allies, as well as among them. In the end, they never amounted to much. Yet the *déjà entendu* of past discord should not invite complacency. Rather, because this is not another transitory round of discord initiated by the style of a new U.S. administration or a passing moment in the security environment, there is cause for concern. Underlying the current rift are three conditions that have to do with the completion of "Europe," the neglect of NATO, and a "new normalcy" in interstate relations. Each of these conditions alone would have a significant impact on the transatlantic partnership; together, that impact is magnified beyond the traditional norms of past tensions.

A New Europe

To start with, there is the matter of the European Union: because of it, Europe, as we have known it since 1917, is dead and beyond resurrection. Some, admittedly, still deny it as they continue to predict the revival of the traditional nation-states whose sovereignty within impermeable boundaries was well worth a war or two (and more).[2] That prospect, however, is nil. It ended when the rise of institutions that were created to save the nation-states (from each other, as well as from themselves) progressively eroded their members' national content instead. "To understand," wrote Isaiah Berlin four decades ago, "is to perceive patterns."[3] Patterns are not shaped by theory but

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asserted by history. The pattern that has grown out of Europe's history over the past 50 years could not be more evident: with nation-states reinventing themselves as member states of the union they formed or which they hope to join, Europe is achieving a new *synthesis* that is making it whole at last. The single currency that was launched in January 2002, the enlargement that will be announced in December 2002, the constitutional convention that will be held in March 2003, and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that will take place in 2004 are the identifiable plays of an end game known as "finality:" deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both.

There is much in the transformation of Europe that should make Americans proud. The deconstructed Old World, which twice in two generations organized its own collective funeral, has now been rebuilt *à l'américaine*, to a large measure on the basis of inspired U.S. policies that showed, during 15 glorious weeks in the spring of 1947, how the peace could be won historically after the war had been won militarily. Indeed, the new Europe is more peaceful, safer, more affluent and more democratic—in short, more stable—than at any time before. Yet muting a legitimate satisfaction over this achievement, there is growing exasperation over what is still missing now and even some apprehensions over what might be about to emerge.

Europe, as we have known it since 1917, is dead and beyond resurrection.

For Americans who have at last ceased to view "Europe" as an institutional fake, causes for apprehension can take either one of two forms. First, an ever more united and progressively stronger Europe could conceivably rise as a "counterweight" to U.S. power—or, more bluntly, as a rival that would use its newly regained influence to challenge U.S. leadership at the possible cost of U.S. interests. This sort of Gaullist Europe would be built around an increasingly assertive, and even combative, Franco-German partnership that might ultimately be extended to Great Britain should Prime Minister Tony Blair seek across the Channel satisfactions denied to him by his overpowering partner across the Atlantic. Alternatively, or even simultaneously, U.S. apprehensions are motivated by concerns that Europe might wish to act before it is ready, thus leaving Americans once again to face the burden of finishing what Europeans would have started but could not complete. In other words, the new Europe would risk becoming a "counterfeit" of the superpower it claims to be, as it continues to lack military power and remains economically vulnerable and even as its age-old political ghosts are being sighted at either extreme of the fragile political center that has failed to define a credible third force.

On the way to the EU summit of December 2002—but also beyond, through the 2003 constitutional convention and past IGC 2004—Americans will have to be reassured that the new Europe will be a credible partner—the "counterpart" successive U.S. administrations have hoped for rather than the counterweight or counterfeit they might resent or from which they could even suffer to such an extent as to leave it or even derail it. To achieve that lofty goal, much will be needed from both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is high time to take their own commitment to integration seriously—in other words, to do what they say (which would make them predictable) even as they say what they do (which would keep them transparent). In addition, while thus crawling toward their institutional finality, Europeans should acknowledge the U.S. role in the development of their union. More specifically, an intrinsic part of Europe's finality debate is the U.S. role and rights as a non-member member state of the European Union. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who has a keen sense of history, should show more sensitivity to the U.S. condition by inviting a handful of American observers to the final phases of the constitutional debate over which he presides.

Only after that role has been acknowledged and defined will the United States be able to engage the EU more directly than has been the case to date, on the same grounds as the bilateral relations maintained by the United States with each EU member. Even though U.S.-EU relations should obviously not substitute for bilateral relations so long as the Europeans themselves do not complete their union, it is already possible to view the EU as the sixteenth member of the 15-member union—one which, through its Commission and its Parliament, exerts influence on its partners just as they, in turn, influence the union. The pre-summit invitation, extended by the Swedish EU presidency to the United States in Göteborg, Sweden, in June 2001, was a first step toward such a privileged U.S. status relative to, and even within, the EU. There should be more of such consultations, not only at such political levels but also at the levels of each of the various bodies that "represent" the EU. But, to repeat, the dynamics of U.S.-EU relations will remain conditioned not only by what the United States seeks from each member of the union but also by what these members themselves do with their union.

A Transformed NATO

While the transatlantic partnership is affected by the transformation of post–World Wars Europe, as Americans came to rediscover it after 1917, the post–Cold War North Atlantic Treaty Organization has also evolved. Most fundamentally, NATO, as we relied on it after 1949, is outdated and in urgent need of reform. This is not meant to declare it dead or even irrelevant, as was often done during the Cold War and has come back in fashion of late. Rather, it is to argue that NATO has now become so much larger, so much more unbalanced, and so narrowly confined to the European continent that it can no longer be understood as the same organization it was during the Cold War, or which it was expected to become after the end of the Cold War.

NATO, as we relied on it after 1949, is outdated and in urgent need of reform.

All too obviously, size matters. Like the EU, NATO has grown—from a not-so-modest membership of 12 in 1949, to 16 during the Cold War, to 19 by 1999, and later this year to 26—with a few more still standing on the sidelines. On the way to Prague, enlargement is no longer an issue: bigger may or may not be better, but bigger it is bound to be and remain anyway. Past enlargement, therefore, NATO needs to remain adaptive lest it become *de facto* what Lord Robertson called "an optional part." Decisions by consensus are no longer possible, and by implication security dependence on increasingly cacophonic "coalitions of the willing" is cumbersome, as was shown during the 1999 war in Kosovo. With a more united Europe whose common voice is likely to become louder (if not more audible) in future years, unilateral decisions by the United States on behalf of all its allies will become more and more difficult, and less and less desirable. Between these two extremes—one for all, or all for one—formulas of governance are vague. At two, between North America (including Canada) and the EU—but who will speak for Europe, and what will become of non-EU European NATO countries like Turkey? At more, as a responsible grouping of the capable—but, past the United States, by what standards will allies be deemed capable or not? At many, as ad hoc contact groups—but how would such groups be formed for regions of concern to all? Any of these worn-out ideas—two pillars, *directoire*, *géométrie variable*—would still be hampered by the elusive presence of Russia, itself a non-member member state of the organization that was designed to defeat that country's earlier incarnation. The answer lies in a mixture of all such ideas: closer bilateral relations between the United States and some of the most capable and willing European allies, but also closer bi-multilateral relations between the United States and the EU, as well as between the EU and NATO within or side by side the United Nations.

In addition, because most of the 10 new NATO members (including the seven countries expected to be welcome in Prague), are small and weak, the capabilities gap within Europe is growing no less dramatically than the capabilities gap between Europe and the United States—between Latvia and France, say, no less than between France and the United States. The gap is no longer defined by the availability and quality of military capabilities, but also by the will to use whatever available capabilities. Previously, it was America's will to use military force that was questioned. Now, it is Europe's will that is being questioned: weakness encourages appeasement, or at least a quest for "solutions" that avoid the use of force even at the cost of additional, occasionally unwanted, and often self-defeating compromises. To that extent, a buildup in European capabilities in the context of a common European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has become more necessary than before, from the vantage point of both sides of the Atlantic. Granted that the mission will define the coalition, the coalition still needs to be capable—and only those coalition members that make it so should be able to help define the mission. In Afghanistan, the NATO allies were admittedly underused, but that need not remain a pattern for the future, or the irreversible evidence of an alleged marginalization of NATO. What mattered there was that the NATO allies were offered a right of first refusal which they promptly assumed as they offered "complete solidarity."[4] But the fact that the leading NATO country did not find that solidarity necessary while the military campaign was still ongoing also matters. Now that "Europe" has a telephone number at last, the transatlantic calls it makes are answered with a busy signal—don't call us, we'll call you.

The gap is no longer defined by the availability and quality of military capabilities, but also by the will to use whatever available capabilities.

That will not do, and it is a gross and dangerous misjudgment to remove NATO from the common security structure that Americans and Europeans must build for the future. Even in the broadest framework of a "coalition of coalitions," the NATO allies are like-minded states that share common values and respond to common interests—which is hardly what can be said of non-NATO countries in Europe like Russia, or anti-terrorist coalition members in Asia. "The West" is really a coherent concept even if and when it does not maintain a single view on all international and domestic issues at all times.[5] For, in the end, Western countries all live within a reliable community of action that regains its unity when the values and interests we share are at risk. The goal is not merely to do something, let alone everything, together, but to make sure that together, everything, or even something, gets done.

In Afghanistan, the NATO allies were not underused by the United States: it is their uses—in part military but mainly non-military—that were understated on both sides of the Atlantic. What America can do is necessary—indeed "indispensable," as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once put it. But it is not, and is unlikely to become, sufficient: there is far too much unfinished business around the world to be managed by the United States alone—"blowbacks" inherited from earlier conflicts everywhere and over time.[6] The same is true of NATO. During the Cold War, one organization was enough to attend to the common defense of the West: one enemy, one alliance, one theater, and one hegemonic leader. This was U.S. unilateralism with a NATO *prix fixe.* Now, the security environment is more diffuse, the war more strange, and the enemy more elusive—everywhere and nowhere, about everything and for nothing. Whether at one (the United States), at 20 (with Russia), at 26 (after Prague), or at many more, NATO alone will not suffice: however necessary the alliance may be for military purposes, it is not, and never was, a full-service institution. It is Western multilateralism *à la carte*—a bit of this institution and a bit of that institution, simultaneously or consecutively, and designed to constrain or engage their leading members.

Whether at one (the United States), at 20 (with Russia), at 26 (after Prague), or at many more, NATO alone will not suffice ... it is not, and never was, a full-service institution.

Admittedly, other NATO countries must spend more on defense—and past the French and German elections there are indications that they will, at least to an extent. The shared goal is not only to remain "interoperable," but also to maintain appropriate levels of "cooperability" without which the alliance would be too unbalanced to gain the global scope it now needs. But the criteria of cooperability are not only met with levels of defense spending. They are also met by what NATO allies in Europe can do in relief of their senior partner during the latter innings of a particular contest. Working through the EU, the European allies have the economic capabilities to reward and sanction; they have the political tools to stabilize and punish; and they have the know-how to negotiate and isolate.[7] Like sheer military power, these capabilities, these tools, and these skills are hardly sufficient to initiate action—but they are undoubtedly necessary to end it.

Defining the "New Normalcy"

The limits of NATO as the security institution of choice but, nonetheless, as one institution among a few others have been reinforced by the events of September 11, 2001, and the "new normalcy" of "post-modern conflicts" it threatened to inaugurate. Central to the uncertainties that surround NATO and its purpose is a fundamental difference between the allies over the meaning and implications of these events.[8]

The semantic contest that began almost at once between America and its European allies reflected a clash of historic experiences that became increasingly open in subsequent months.[9] For Europeans, notwithstanding the spontaneous emotions generated by the extraordinary sight of their bleeding, crippled, and even frightened senior partner, these events were, in a sense, predictable—history as usual. Hegemonic powers cannot live their moment of greatness without pain. Indeed, judged by standards set by history, the pain endured by America on September 11 was relatively minor—a few minutes worth of casualties on a bad day in 1916 or 1941. Understood as an act of terror, that pain was somewhat sharper, but it also pointed to a fact of life that European countries have faced and defeated many times—although, admittedly, the standards of September 11 were all the more disconcerting as, in French president Jacques Chirac's words, "next time it might be us." Still, having properly demonstrated their sympathy, Europeans could invoke the *déjà vu* of history to reassert the *déjà dit* of the need for consultation with the allies and for patience in defeating the enemy.

For Americans, however, such logic of historic inevitability cannot be convincing. Pain may well be the way of history, but it was not intended to be the American way. Wars were expected to be waged "over there" where the forward deployment and use of superior American power would keep them by containing foes and even, on occasion, friends too. "Over here" might be acts of terror initiated by misguided high school teens or grown misfits. But these acts would be home-bred, not exportable to the nation by evil forces abroad. On the whole, so it had been since the War of 1812, and for 189 years subsequent attempts to violate America's territorial invulnerability had been stopped and countered forcefully, whether far away in the Pacific (after Pearl Harbor) or closer in the Caribbean (after the Cuban missile crisis). Under such conditions, the war that erupted in Afghanistan, where the culprits hid, was more than America's "first war of the twenty-first century" (as President George W. Bush dubbed it)—it was indeed the first war in at least half a century which America could truly call its own. The U.S. goal was not to protect or avenge others but to avenge and protect America's citizens and its institutions. It would therefore be fought the American way: admittedly brutally, until unconditional surrender or unmitigated annihilation, and somewhat unilaterally, with coalition members used on the basis of need rather than because of stated availability.[10]

For Europeans ...the [September 11] events were, in a sense, predictable—history as usual .... For Americans, however, such logic of historic inevitability was not convincing.

But this transatlantic clash of history is not limited to the experiences enjoyed by the New World relative to, or occasionally at the expense of, the Old World. It is also rooted in the differing interpretations that were and continue to be made of the most effective way to contain the unwanted new normalcy inaugurated by the attacks on New York and Washington. As Eric Hobsbawm noted on the eve of the twenty-first century, there are inevitably "single, specific events which are unpredictable," but even *post facto* the real task for historians and analysts "is to understand how important they are or could be." That certainly is true of the events of September 11: however unpredictable they may have been, it would be wrong to shy away from seeing the predictability of their consequences.[11]

Europe's assessment of the "new normalcy" does not fit that of many in the United States. For many in Europe, the perpetrators of this act of violence, already helped by their enemy's blunders and also by chance, aim at the United States exclusively. Accordingly, with such violence unlikely to be repeated, it is important to influence U.S. responses whose motivation might be legitimate but whose consequences would be to create new instabilities in and beyond Islamic countries, including in European countries where large Muslim populations raise the risks of a cultural spillover of new instabilities in the Middle East. Thus, the Euro-Atlantic community of interests perceived in the immediate aftermath of September 11 have come under threat since President Bush began to emphasize the other dimensions of an "axis of evil" that included, but was hardly limited to, Iran (and North Korea) as well as Iraq.

... with America's traditional margin of security now bridged, there is less room for ambiguity and indecision. ...The madness will have to be denied before the hatred can be cured ...

However, with America's traditional margin of security now bridged, there is less room for ambiguity and indecision, of its own let alone from the allies. The threats posed by weapons of mass destruction that have been, or are, acquired by intrinsically hostile groups or evil states are real, lethal, and unacceptable. "The depth of the hatred," said President Bush in his State of the Union address of January 29, 2002, "is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design." The proposition is too daunting to be checked for accuracy after the fact. The madness will have to be denied before the hatred can be cured, thereby making it necessary to "be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty," as the president put it more cogently in his address in June 2002 at West Point.[12]

One year after September 11, 2001, this is the defining question that was raised when four hijacked planes and 19 criminals ended America's sense of territorial invulnerability. The risk had been perceived by America and its allies—it was one of these "other risks of a wider nature" first envisioned in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept, and reasserted next in its 1999 Strategic Concept. It is an existential risk written with the invisible ink of an unpredictable future. It carries with it the related risk of an undeclared cultural war that would prove irreversible for the many after it might have been precipitated by the suicidal acts of the few.

The response of Western powers to that risk should not be to go it alone but to go it together. As Richard Perle put it, "Europe must understand we are ready and able to act without them to fight this new war."[13] While this is true, the United States is probably neither ready nor able to end this war, even as it continues to win every military engagement it faces or launches. The "West" remains a community of action that is shaped by values that are compatible and by interests that are common even when they are not always equally shared. What it needs, and must seek in and beyond the Prague summit, is more, not less, integration. Among themselves as a mutually shared right of first refusal, but also with new associates and partners, the NATO countries should be able to agree on some immediate priorities and certain key principles on how to define and counter these new threats. As Sam Huntington recently stated, "the idea of integration" is "the successor idea to containment." More specifically, integration is "about locking [the allies] into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more."[14] There are two summits scheduled for late 2002, and these might well decide whether the ideas of European and transatlantic integration, which were launched along two parallel paths after World War II, and were refined—deepened and enlarged—throughout and since the Cold War, can now be completed by and between the United States and the states of Europe in the context of the new normalcy envisioned after the Cold War for the twenty-first century.

The NATO countries should be able to agree on some immediate priorities and certain key ideas as to how the world is threatened and how it should operate.

Notes

[1] "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world," writes Robert Kagan. ("Power and Weaknness," *Policy Review*, No. 113 [June–July 2002]: 1.) What is significant is neither the argument itself nor the observer who eloquently articulates it. Rather, what is significant is the enthusiastic hearing the argument and its author have received.

[2] Nothing lastingly new in Europe, seems to insist John Mearsheimer who still lives the future in the past tense when he writes, ominously: "Almost every European state, including the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated albeit muted fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively." (*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* [New York: W.W. Norton, 2001], 2.)

[3] Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 52.

[4] The most unequivocal statement came from German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who, on October 4, 2001, pledged "unlimited cooperation. And by unlimited, I mean unlimited."

[5] Among many others, Francis Fukuyama thinks otherwise. "Has History Started Again?" *Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 2002): 3–7.

[6] See Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), 33.

[7] Christopher Hill, "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 6 (2001): 329.

[8] The reference to a "new normalcy" was first made by Vice President Richard Cheney. Quoted by Bob Woodward, "CIA Told To Do Whatever Necessary To Kill Bin Laden," *The Washington Post*, October 11, 2001, sec. A, p. 22. Also, Lawrence Freedman, "Post-Modern Conflict," *Financial Times*, September 12, 2001.

[9] Eliot A. Cohen, "A Strange War," *The National Interest*, No. 65-8 (Thanksgiving 2001): 3. "We do not face a war," immediately stated Germany's Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping. For a lengthier discussion of some of these concluding themes, see my own "The Wars of 911," *The International Spectator*, Vol. 36 (October-December 2001): 5–11.

[10] "Leadership demands a Pagan ethos," pleas Robert D. Kaplan, as he acknowledges, or boasts of, "the imperial reality" that "already dominates our foreign policy" and which demands that "power politics [be

placed] in the service of patriotic values." (*Warrior Politics* [New York: Random House, 2001], 145, 154.) Even for a moderate observer like Dimitri Simes, America should be "altering the whole terrain [in Afghanistan] if that is what is required." Quoted in "After September 11, A Conversation," *The National Interest*, No. 65-8 (Thanksgiving 2001): 90.

[11] Eric Hobsbawm, in conversation with Antonio Polito, *The New Century* (London: Abacus Books, 1999), 1

[12] Henry A. Kissinger, "Our Intervention in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, August 12, 2002, sec. A, p. 15.

[13] Quoted by Vago Muradian, "NATO Remains Key, But U.S. Ready To Fight Antiterror War Without Europe," *Defense Daily International*, February 8, 2002, p. 2.

[14] Quoted by Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *The New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, p. 46.

PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT: NEW MEMBERS, NEW MISSIONS

Michael Inacker

The road to NATO's Prague summit is still paved with good intentions, despite some outdated expectations about how to reform the alliance. In Prague, NATO wants to invite several Central and East European countries to join the club. Yet, although NATO diplomats continue to operate more or less according to the old parameters, viewing enlargement as a kind of a new Western *Ostpolitik*, we need to evaluate the rationale for enlargement from the perspective of the watershed of September 11.

Defining NATO's Enlargement and Enlarged Mission

Enlargement can only contribute to the stabilization of NATO and Europe if all members of the club share a common ground of strategic interests. Prior to September 11, this common ground was given—in the alliance's rhetoric. Insiders, however, knew better: the talk about common ground was mere window dressing. Since last fall, it has become obvious that American and European perspectives are diverging. Robert Kagan is correct when he writes in the June-July issue of *Policy Review* that "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world."

This development has not been reflected adequately by traditional "NATO-nians," but it is imperative in order to keep NATO vital and to fit enlargement within a strategic framework that seeks to close the power gap between the North American and European allies. Thus, the alliance should use its upcoming November summit to adapt to current security challenges. Just as the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans forced the alliance to redefine its purpose, so the September 11 events and the ongoing conflict require NATO leaders to think boldly and creatively about how to keep the alliance relevant.

There are two different approaches to defining the alliance's enlargement and enlarged mission:

NATO as the global pacifier. Some argue that NATO should act as "Globocop," a kind of global pacifier. In the American perspective, this approach could save money and increase the moral and international legitimacy of U.S. military actions. In Europe, "Globocop" supporters argue that a global NATO mission would help keep the Americans in the club and give the club a military-strategic rationale beyond the European horizon. Yet one thing is clear: the role of global pacifier would

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overstretch NATO's military and financial capabilities and also lead Western publics to reconsider their traditional acceptance of the alliance.

NATO as an international force provider. Better suited than all the overstretching roles and missions is the rationale for an alliance that looks like a regional UN but with credible military capabilities and an already demonstrated willingness to use force. As an international force provider, NATO would guarantee military interoperability among the allies, enabling them to cooperate militarily even when NATO itself is not involved—as they did during the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War and during operations in and around Afghanistan. This approach is highly valuable for Western cohesion, as well as being more effective because it corresponds to current U.S. perceptions of NATO's role: nice to have, but if the going gets rough we need to do it alone. Of course, really doing it alone will not work in the long run, but an effective role of the alliance as force provider is a convincing argument to keep NATO relevant for the United States.

As an international force provider, NATO would guarantee military interoperability among the allies, enabling them to cooperate militarily even when NATO itself is not involved.

Scenarios for Enlargement

The enlargement question is essentially a threefold one: How many new members will enhance NATO's capabilities as a force provider? How much enlargement is manageable within the given structures? And how should NATO enlarge? The main criterion for accession should be the ability of every new member to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area—be it in the framework of collective defense or with regard to the new crisis management tasks. Taking in new members must not endanger the efficiency and viability of NATO itself. Yet everybody knows that the value of this perception is relative: NATO has always rejected the idea of a real checklist for candidates in order to preserve maximum political leeway. Hence, choosing new members will always be a highly political decision.

According to Karl-Heinz Kamp, a senior analyst at the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, three scenarios for enlargement are possible:

1. The "big bang" option: this would mean inviting all nine current candidates at the same time. Were it to take such an approach, however, NATO would be biting off far more than it could swallow, while endangering its own vitality. In addition, the "Big Bang" option would make concepts like the Membership Action Plan (MAP) completely useless as a means of preparing candidate states to meet alliance standards: Why should some states try harder, if everyone is admitted in the end?

2. The "regatta approach:" this option would mean inviting all applicant countries to start negotiations on membership and admitting them one by one provided they had made the necessary progress. This approach would enable NATO to circumvent the painful decision about whom to admit in Prague, as well as giving it more time to further elaborate and evaluate the pros and cons of

certain countries' membership in the alliance. But this scenario has one really big disadvantage: an enlargement strategy of "yes, but not today" could be used by NATO as a way to postpone the admission of new members indefinitely. Furthermore, the "Regatta Approach" only works in conjunction with some kind of clearly defined criteria, thus stripping NATO of the freedom to make political decisions about new member states.

3. The "limited invitation:" Inviting a limited number of applicant countries has the advantage of signaling that the door remains open without overstretching NATO's capacity to adapt and integrate. Meanwhile, the trend is to admit five to seven new member states—including the three Baltic republics—plus Bulgaria, and possibly Slovakia and Romania. The new relationship between Russia and the West that stems in part from the common war on terrorism should help ensure that NATO enlargement, even to the Baltic states, does not undermine relations with Russia.

At the end of the day, the question as to what kind of enlargement scenario is preferable depends largely on the question of what kind of NATO we envision. If we wish to keep NATO relevant within the new, post–September 11 framework, then the third scenario seems to be the most reasonable one, because it keeps NATO vital and provides better cohesion for capabilities and missions than the "big bang" option. Moreover, the "limited invitation" solution accords much better with the overall new strategic landscape since September 11.

A more limited and more cautious enlargement increases the alliance's relevance and survivability: NATO will be strengthened (or, at least, will not be weakened) by acting as an international force provider and force facilitator for new threats, such as the emergence of international terrorism. Still, NATO allies can and should do more: share information about nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs; develop civil defense and crisis-management planning; develop theater missile defenses; and better coordinate the various member states' special forces, which will play a critical role in the ongoing anti-terrorism campaign. As Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution has proposed, the alliance should also consider the creation of a new "Force Projection Command" tasked with planning out-of-area operations. This project needs the timely help of both old and new NATO members.

The question as to what kind of enlargement scenario is preferable depends largely on the question of what kind of NATO we envision.

Even in the context of current security preoccupations, NATO ought not to lose the incentive to provide a political-military portfolio that goes well beyond the war against terrorism. Of course, it can be argued that NATO has ceased to be significant since September 11, but only if it is assumed that fighting terrorism will be the only imaginable security challenge in the years ahead. This assumption is obviously wrong. Just imagine if during the Afghanistan campaign things had turned sour in, say, Macedonia. Once again, it would have been NATO that would have had to clean up the situation and no one today would be questioning NATO's relevance. That is why the alliance must continue to operate as the prime institution for the management of transatlantic security relations. While NATO will probably not return to being the central defense organization it was during the Cold War, it will continue to provide the United States and its key allies with an essential tool for coordinating their militaries, promoting the unification of Europe, maintaining peace in the Balkans, and, quite possibly, conducting major military operations anywhere in the world.

BUILDING MORE EUROPEAN CAPACITY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Michael E. O'Hanlon

This essay attempts to lay out what is good, and what is still lacking, in the physical capacity of NATO for efficient military burdensharing. It also lays out a brief set of recommendations for how to improve the power projection capabilities of the European pillar of the alliance.

The Impressive Allied Response Since 9/11

In recent months, European countries' support for their U.S. ally has been extraordinary. The 19 NATO members unanimously invoked Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty for the first time, stating that an attack on one was an attack on all and promising to come to America's aid. NATO sent five of the alliance's AWACS aircraft and their crews from Europe to the United States after September 11 to help patrol American airspace. European countries offered up forces for operations in Afghanistan at about the same time.

Starting in December, the European presence on the ground in Afghanistan has been rather considerable. Special forces from Britain, France, and other European countries, as well as possibly Australia and Canada, may have been part of Operation Enduring Freedom even sooner. Many of those details remain secret, but once the majority of the country fell to the U.S.-aided Afghan opposition, allied forces arrived quickly. During the winter of 2001–2002, allied troops in Operation Enduring Freedom, most of them European, numbered about 15,000 personnel in all. U.S. forces involved with the operation numbered 60,000, but half of those were in the Persian Gulf, so the disparity between American and allied efforts in the Afghan theater of operations was not so great.

This European effort did not amount simply to "doing the dishes," or mopping up in post-hostility operations, after the United States did the glamorous work of militarily winning the war. Activities since December have been dangerous, and important in military terms. Operation Anaconda last March, and other efforts to attack residual Al Qaeda and Taliban units, have been risky—and have certainly amounted to real combat. Allied soldiers from Germany, Canada, and other countries have lost their lives as a result. Today, European troops in Afghanistan are comparable in number to those of the United States. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has numbered nearly 5,000 troops, most of them European, and has been led first by the United Kingdom

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and then by Turkey. European and other allied troops also continue to contribute substantially to Operation Enduring Freedom under U.S. command. As of this writing halfway through 2002, American and European troops in Afghanistan each number about 7,000 to 8,000 forces.

This allied effort has been impressive—and appreciated. When the United States needed allied help, it turned to NATO and Australia—not Korea, not Japan, not Latin America, not Middle Eastern allies. Clearly, Pakistan and several Central Asian states have been critical allies in the region; countries like Japan have done more than might have been initially expected. Yet it is Europeans, Canadians, and Australians who shared a sufficiently common sense of security and strategic culture, and who possessed sufficient military capacity as well as the will to employ it, to put troops on the ground and in harm's way.

Some European officials modestly seek to deflect credit for their contributions, stating that NATO's Article V necessitated such a response. They further argue that if NATO has any meaning, an attack on American territory killing 3,000 persons—some of them from allied nations—surely required such a strong response from the allies. This argument is accurate and convincing. Yet, it should not obscure the fact that, when Americans were attacked and needed help—not just in the areas of intelligence and law-enforcement, but in military terms as well—our NATO and Australian allies were there, even though the response was carried out very far from NATO's formal area of responsibility. Just because certain actions may be expected does not mean they are insignificant, unappreciated, or unimpressive. Political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic might make greater note of these facts. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has occasionally gone out of his way to thank the allies, but most other U.S. officials have not done enough publicly.

With many other things to worry about, it was far from surprising that American war planners last fall did not make a priority of using U.S. assets to deploy allied forces into Afghanistan.

Moreover, European nations sometimes seem more inclined to criticize the United States for not having taken up their offers of help sooner last fall, rather than accept American gratitude for the remarkable services that have in fact been provided. Yet one might ask, when could the Europeans really have helped in the early phases of the war? In October and November, 2001, the United States was groping for a strategy that might work in Afghanistan. We needed operational flexibility and secrecy, not protracted debates in Brussels or complex efforts to coordinate multinational efforts on the ground.

In early and mid-December, during the key phases of the bombing of Tora Bora, it would have been very beneficial to have western ground troops sealing off possible escape routes for Al Qaeda leaders and troops who were believed to have been in that area. The United States made a major mistake in my judgment, and Osama bin Laden as well as other top Al Qaeda leaders may have escaped as a result.[1] American aversion to risking troop casualties, even in a war of such importance to core U.S. security, may have contributed to this wrongheaded policy of relying on airpower and Afghan allies to go after the Al Qaeda forces at Tora Bora. Europeans may not have been so casualty-averse, and may have been willing, in principle, to deploy ground troops in and around Tora Bora. Yet how were the European forces to get to Tora Bora? U.S. Marines did not enter Afghanistan until late November, and they did so successfully only because of a long tradition of projecting power and operating in austere environments. Any European forces arriving in Afghanistan in late November and early December would have depended on the United States for transport and logistics. With many other things to worry about, it was far from surprising that American war planners during this time period did not make a priority of using U.S. assets to deploy allied forces into Afghanistan.

Yet again, the testy rhetoric that has sometimes characterized transatlantic relations in recent months, exacerbated in many ways by the presence of a conservative Republican administration in the United States, should not obscure what has been achieved since September 11. Nor should Americans forget that their allies have been providing about three-fourths of all forces in the stability operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or that British troops have contributed not only to the no-fly-zone operations over Iraq but to the successes of recent peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone.

The Shortcomings of Allied Capabilities

It must also be observed, however, that, for all their admirable contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF, not to mention IFOR and KFOR in the Balkans and recent peacekeeping missions in places such as Sierra Leone, European countries' accomplishments fall short. Like other U.S. allies more generally, they do not have the degree of military capability that they should, particularly for the important post–Cold War missions of projecting power beyond national borders.

This conclusion is not meant simply to repeat the fact that the United States greatly outspends virtually all its allies on defense—not just in absolute terms, but also as a percent of GDP. Although, of course, desirable, European countries are unlikely to spend more on defense, despite the exhortations to do so from the United States and their own pro-defense communities. Even if they do not spend more on their militaries, however, European countries should be able to develop and deploy more power projection capability. By continuing their recent movement toward smaller, more professional militaries, and by buying the requisite transport and logistics assets, they can do so even at current spending levels.

Even if they do not spend more on their militaries, European countries should be able to develop and deploy more power projection capability.

First, it is important to dramatize how much still needs to be done. In recent times, European countries have spent more than half as much as the United States on defense. Yet, as this author and other have argued in the past, aggregate European capacity for power projection is estimated at only about 10 percent that of the United States.[2] Spending levels, or inputs, have been 50 to 60 percent of the U.S. total in Europe. Yet the output—that is, the capacity to deploy and operate forces far from home territory—is only about one-tenth what the U.S. armed forces can muster.

Second, Great Britain, accounting for only about a quarter of NATO Europe's defense spending, possesses the majority of the continent's deployable forces. That was apparent in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, where Britain deployed 35,000 forces and the rest of Europe together somewhat less. It was apparent in Kosovo in spring 1999, where preliminary talk of a NATO ground invasion assumed 100,000 American troops, 50,000 British soldiers, and perhaps 25,000 other Europeans in total. It is also apparent from more technical calculations of strategic lift and dedicated projection forces—that is, units with their own organic logistics and command and control capabilities. By these calculations as well, the Kosovo estimates appear broadly correct.

To be sure, there are sound historical reasons to explain this fact. This does not mean, however, that it should be viewed as an acceptable state of affairs by the rest of Europe's nations or their armed forces. Britain should become the model for most large countries in NATO; for smaller countries, roughly proportionate capabilities should be the target.

As a final means of underscoring Europe's current military limitations, consider how the continent's militaries match up against the U.S. Marine Corps, with an annual budget of only about $10 billion and a total active-duty end strength of about 170,000. Despite these limitations, it has never considered itself incapable of developing substantial power-projection capabilities—or incapable of profiting from the so-called revolution in military affairs. Granted, the U.S. Marine Corps has its ships and aircraft provided via the general Navy budget, not its own dedicated funds, and it benefits from the general command and control capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. Even after adjusting for the ships and airplanes the Navy purchases for it, however, the equivalent Marine Corps budget is no more than $15 billion. That is less than the defense budget of Italy, considerably less than that of Germany, only half that of Britain or France, and only about twice that of many smaller European nations.

Despite an annual budget of only about $10 billion and a total active-duty end strength of about 170,000, the U.S. Marine Corps has never considered itself incapable of developing substantial power-projection capabilities.

Indeed, to dramatize the point further, consider the following war game: the U.S. Marine Corps is pitted against NATO Europe as a whole in an armored warfare scenario on a third continent, say Africa or Australia. The rules of the game are that war is assumed to begin three to twelve months after the starting gun is fired. During those months, both "sides" are allowed to prepare and deploy their forces. The goal of the tactical engagement on land is to seize some specified territory and hold it. In this game, by my estimates, the U.S. Marine Corps could deploy about 75,000 forces within several months, together with the logistic support needed to sustain them (and keep that support flowing at the required pace thereafter). NATO Europe as a whole might be able to field 60,000 to 70,000 troops—roughly the aggregate totals of the EU "Headline Goals." Manpower and force structure would not be the constraints; rather, dedicated strategic lift and deployable logistics support would limit the European capabilities. European efforts to rent commercial shipping and aircraft, and develop mobile capabilities for equipment repair, ammunition replenishment, military construction and engineering, and so on would require the better part of a year to generate large forces, if not longer. In other words, the tiny Marine Corps might well win the war game, defeating all of NATO Europe in aggregate.

Improving NATO Europe's Power Projection Capacity

What is a realistic goal for NATO Europe, or alternatively the European Union, in future military planning? Clearly the two groups of states are different, but they include most of the same key members, so force-planning targets should be similar for both.

NATO Europe fields almost twice as many active-duty troops as the United States, or about 2.5 million men. More to the point, it spends about half as much as the United States. Actually, it will spend somewhat less than half in 2003, when the U.S. national security budget will be about $400 billion and NATO Europe's equivalent funding about $150 billion. Viewed over a longer-term perspective, however, it is roughly accurate to think in terms of NATO Europe having half the defense resource base of the United States. In addition, in the post–Cold War era, it shares with the United States the luxury of having national territories that are generally free from the danger of traditional military attack—even if the territories are still at risk due to terrorist attack.

This suggests that NATO Europe as a whole should have approximately half the war-fighting capability of the United States.[3] Put differently, NATO Europe should collectively be able to deploy and sustain forces adequate for one major regional war as defined in recent times in U.S. defense planning. That translates into a total of about 500,000 troops, including the equivalent of about half a dozen ground-combat divisions, 15 fighter wings (1,000 combat aircraft), including naval and air force assets, naval vessels, and associated transport, logistics, and support assets.

NATO Europe spends most of its military resources on its main combat forces, and will continue to do so in the future. So the issue of how to allocate resources for these forces will remain central.

NATO Europe need not have a rotation base large enough to keep 500,000 forces fielded indefinitely. The 500,000-figure is a maximum war-fighting capability for intensive combat operations, not a force to be sustained in a foreign theater for years on end. As such, it would require roughly a doubling or a tripling of the EU Headline Goals (whether done under EU or NATO auspices, or both). Those goals call for a force of 60,000 troops to be deployable indefinitely, necessitating a rotation base of about 200,000.

This calculation is not meant to imply that, in the future, NATO Europe or the EU must envision fighting a major regional war on its own, without U.S. help. The point is not to suggest a weakening of security collaboration between the United States and its alliance partners, or a future scenario in which they would fight without each other. The above argument and quantitative estimates are simply designed to help with force planning, not force utilization, decisions.

After watching the results of Operation Enduring Freedom, some might be tempted to think that NATO Europe should focus on special forces, precision-strike aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than combat forces. The above capabilities are indeed important—a lesson learned also in Kosovo, particularly for the case of precision air strikes. But NATO Europe spends most of its military resources on its main combat forces, and will continue to do so in the future. So the issue of how to allocate resources for these forces will remain central. In addition, the United States may not always need a great deal more help with special operations than what it received in Afghanistan, at least for operations it leads. Finally, few future military missions are likely to resemble Afghanistan. For example, an all-out war against Iraq followed by a military occupation would likely require large numbers of ground forces.

Right now, European countries tend not to share the U.S. interest in overthrowing Saddam. That could well change, however, if Saddam acts provocatively, or if he clearly thwarts weapons inspectors in the future. Under such circumstances, it would be desirable that European countries have the forces to help with both a war to overthrow Saddam and an occupation to stabilize the country thereafter, should they choose to participate in either or both. Even if one does not like this scenario, others involving significant numbers of ground troops can clearly be imagined.

What does this boil down to in terms of resources? Rather than collectively field 2.5 million troops, with no more than 50,000 to 100,000 quickly deployable at great distance, European nations might move toward a total combat force structure made up of about 2 million troops. Assuming constant spending levels, relative to today, resources made available by the force cuts could be devoted to buying equipment for the smaller remaining forces. Some of that equipment would be advanced weaponry such as precision munitions, advanced communications systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other elements of the so-called revolution in military affairs. Other resources, however, would be for more mundane, yet perhaps even more important purposes. These would include not only airlift and refueling planes but also dedicated military sealift, mobile equipment maintenance facilities, mobile hospitals, tactical transport assets for ammunition and for fuel and water, and engineering and construction crews capable of operating autonomously far away from national infrastructures.

Rather than collectively field 2.5 million troops, with no more than 50,000 to 100,000 quickly deployable at great distance, European nations might move toward a total combat force structure made up of about 2 million troops.

Based on a Congressional Budget Office study from the mid-1990s and other sources, the remaining cost of this type of agenda is estimated at about $50 billion in one-time investment costs.[4] Spread over half a decade, that implies $10 billion a year for all of NATO Europe (plus Canada), or about 7 percent of current defense spending. That amount could easily be made available by additional force-structure cuts of 20 percent. Certainly, these general, aggregate estimates could vary from one country to another when actually put into effect, but the broad numbers are approximately correct.

Conclusion

Since September 11, 2001, NATO has proven itself a remarkably strong alliance. Doubts about its continued relevance have been largely dispelled. When the United States needed active military partners in the struggle against terrorism, it turned primarily to NATO, and America's NATO allies obliged, in a moving and important show of solidarity with the United States.

The role of Germany deserves special note, given that it has suffered several casualties in Afghanistan and has contributed well over 1,000 troops on the ground to the two missions there. Its contributions have been nearly as impressive as those of France and Britain. Indeed, seen in historical perspective, Germany's recent military contributions to western security have been at least as impressive as any European country's. Over the last decade, it has contributed combat troops to the stabilization missions in Bosnia, dropped bombs on a past victim of Nazi aggression (Serbia) as part of a NATO operation designed to save lives in Kosovo, contributed combat troops to operations in Kosovo and, most recently, participated in another stabilization effort as well as a warfighting campaign in Afghanistan.

Germany and the rest of NATO Europe can do more ... By emulating the U.S. Marine Corps, or perhaps Great Britain, they can together become the second genuine military pillar of the Atlantic alliance

Yet Germany as well as the rest of NATO Europe can do more. These countries do not necessarily need to increase defense spending—as welcome as that would be, particularly in Germany—to make a major improvement in their capacity for deploying forces abroad and then sustaining them during difficult missions. By emulating the U.S. Marine Corps, or perhaps Great Britain, they can together become the second genuine military pillar of the Atlantic alliance. That seems a worthy goal as NATO approaches the Prague summit and as European nations seek to achieve and then move beyond the EU Headline Goals.

Notes

[1] For a more extensive argument, see the author's "A Flawed Masterpiece," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May–June 2002): 47–63.

[2] See, for example, the author's "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1997): 5–15.

[3] Of course, there are bound to be inefficiencies in European defense planning, given the number of countries involved, but Europe also spends much less on military research and development, on overseas operations, and on certain other activities, so the overall conclusion seems about right.

[4] "Transforming NATO," op. cit.

PREPARING FOR ACTION:
COMMITMENT, TRANSFORMATION, CAPABILITIES

Ralph Thiele

When the heads of state and government of the NATO member countries meet in November 2002 for the NATO summit in Prague, new capabilities, new members, and new relations will be the key discussion items. The summit's objectives will be the modernization and transformation of the alliance and the redefinition of its mission and structures in order to enable it to react adequately to future challenges, including terrorism. Closely linked to this agenda is the challenge to clarify NATO's future core function: the continued stabilization of Europe or the essentially global expansion of its role as a contributor to international order.

Decision opportunities of that caliber do not arise every fortnight. At the Prague summit in particular, the European countries will have a unique opportunity to advance NATO with respect to the issues of the twenty-first century and to reinforce their own standing within the alliance. A unique opportunity will arise to get the Euro-Atlantic military cooperation on track in order to build an effective Euro-Atlantic military alliance for the new security era.

The Road to Prague and Beyond

The challenge for the alliance ahead is to extend stability and security, democracy and the market economy in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, as well as to meet dangerous threats that put the safety and security of both North America and Europe at serious risk. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the uncertain border between the two nuclear powers of India and Pakistan, the imploding impact of disease and tribal warfare on sub-Saharan Africa, international crime and drug-smuggling, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and global terrorism constitute an explosive mix of challenges to Euro-Atlantic security.

The alliance must be able to protect its citizens effectively—both against threats of an asymmetrical kind and against threats by nongovernmental actors. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the fight against global terrorism and other asymmetric threats has moved to the center of NATO's discussions as one of the key future challenges. NATO will have to meet these challenges by

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adapting to and assuming new roles. NATO's role clearly needs to go beyond that of an "interoperability facilitator" that provides for ad hoc coalition building.

In future, both national and collective capabilities will have to be improved in order to protect both populations and territories, as well as cities and the deployed armed forces of NATO's member states, civilian infrastructures and computer networks, and to further develop NATO's ability to rapidly react to asymmetric threats. This implies that the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) needs a successor, that national defense plans need to be reconsidered, and that armaments cooperation needs to be deepened in order to improve existing capabilities as well as to develop new capabilities with the potential to meet future security challenges and thus establish a sound basis for effective cooperation.

With regard to terrorism, obviously the military options constitute only one element in the political portfolio alongside economic, diplomatic, and other measures. Any employment of armed forces in the fight against terrorism will provide complementary support to other political action in the sense of comprehensive prevention. Such prevention must focus on disentangling the political causes which result in international terrorism, cutting off all the financial and logistic support possibilities, isolating those states that actively support terrorist activities, reintegrating states that are willing to turn away from their support of terrorism, and, of course, preventing proliferation.

With regard to the military capabilities for fighting terrorism, four essential task areas can be identified:

- ☐ *Prevention* by intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, "crisis-oriented" international dialogue, military cooperation, and national exchange of information.
- ☐ *Homeland protection* by surveying the airspace/maritime area.
- ☐ *Active fighting* by systematic reconnaissance, as well as the active prosecution and destruction/elimination of terrorist structures, installations, and training camps.
- ☐ *Stabilization* of a "political endstate," particularly by setting up a "secure environment" as well as through inter-ministerial assistance for reconstructing social order and infrastructure by supporting civilian organizations, including nongovernmental organizations.

The September 2001 terrorist strikes on the United States killed more people than the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Future attacks seem likely. Yet these threats seem small in comparison to the greater damage that weapons and means of mass destruction could inflict. In this context, the effective prevention of the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high-explosive (CBRNE) weapons and carrier systems constitutes a particular challenge. Disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation are fundamental for security inside and outside NATO. But the alliance will also need new military and civilian capabilities for protection and defense against WMD attacks and their means of delivery—especially in the "bio-defense" field.

As these new threats stem from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the alliance must be prepared to respond to them by acting outside that area as well.

In sum, the opportunity is there to reform NATO so that it can better provide for peace and stability and defend against old and new threats and defeat them. As these threats stem from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the alliance must be prepared to respond to them by acting outside that area as well. There is a more global role for NATO. When this is accepted in Europe, it will in turn shape the future development of NATO as well as the nature of the evolving transatlantic relationship.

Asserting the Commitment

NATO has survived many crises. The question of "Why NATO" has been asked since its foundation. Common values and common interests have been the foundation of mutual commitment. Yet the present lack of key capabilities on the part of the European allies and the resulting insufficient "cooperability" risk affecting the very core of any military alliance. Obviously, only a capable military alliance can be of much use in the long run, particularly when it comes to expeditionary warfare. Both sides—the United States and Europe—need to invest in the relevance of their relationship.

The U.S.-European cooperability gap, first revealed in Kosovo, has widened considerably since then, as revealed most recently during the military campaign in Afghanistan. The ability of U.S. and allied forces to cooperate in high-intensity, violent contingencies without compromising effectiveness is alarmingly low. Although the allies offered unreservedly to join the military response to the terrorist strikes, U.S. forces carried out that response predominantly unilaterally due to the lack of European capabilities for such intense expeditionary warfare and also because of U.S. reluctance to complicate an urgent and difficult operation. Obviously, the absence of cooperability may preclude coalition expeditionary warfare even when the United States and its European allies have the same strategic objectives. In Afghanistan, both sides came to realize this fact.

Even though "cooperability" does not guarantee Euro-Atlantic strategic consensus, its absence leads to insufficient interoperability in a military crisis.

The need to reform NATO's political and military apparatus goes well beyond cooperability. Unless cooperability is restored, however, other reforms will clearly suffer. Although this has not yet proved decisive in Afghanistan, it may well do so, should Iraq become an issue of imminent significance. Having "uncooperable" forces accelerates divergences in U.S. and allied strategic thinking. Even though cooperability does not guarantee Euro-Atlantic strategic consensus, its absence leads to insufficient interoperability in a military crisis. If this is not overcome, it will have harmful implications for the respective roles, burdens and risks of America and Europe in preserving international peace. A commitment is required from both sides of the Atlantic.

Euro-Atlantic security is only manageable with the United States and Europe as close partners. There is, however, the perception of a growing mentality gap between Europe and the United States. The Europeans tend to be particularly thoughtful and effective in the soft aspects of security, while the United States prefers a pragmatic and effective approach to the hard security aspects. The

Europeans tend to over-civilianize security, while the United States tends to engage in overly militarizing security solutions. The Europeans frown on what they perceive as unilateralist behavior on the part of the United States, and the United States scorns Europe's inability to overcome the increasing capabilities gap. Allowing these and other differences in opinion and approaches to become moral battlegrounds would be corrosive for the alliance's long-term cohesion. The United States cannot do it unilaterally. The idea that the United States can handle expeditionary warfare on its own and leave stability operations to its European allies is most dangerous and would foster political divisiveness and operational confusion. The present discussion in the United States about "peerless" America is not helpful in this respect.

Strengthening and consolidating the Euro-Atlantic area of stability, and thus contributing durably to peace, security, and prosperity in and for Europe, means the early recognition and containment of the globally developing risks and dangers to our security. The range of the threat spectrum of terrorism and its complex causes requires long-term strategies and a preventive policy. Only internationally and nationally developed and harmonized concepts can contain terrorism or other asymmetric threats and their causes, or protect against their manifestations. Consequently, Europe needs to accept responsibility for preparing for and participating in the entire mission spectrum—homeland defense and stability operations, power projection and expeditionary warfare, including all its costs and risks. Europe and the United States need to develop a shared conception of why and how they may have to use force—shoulder to shoulder—in the service of peace and well-being, security and stability, common interests and common values. The United States needs to develop and sustain a preference for coalition operations and strategies instead of unilateral operations and strategies.

A militarily capable Europe would expect the United States to be genuinely willing to integrate allied forces in coalition warfare.

Were the European allies to sense that the United States welcomed their effective military involvement and granted them increasing influence in crisis diplomacy and the respective decisionmaking, this would be a major incentive for them to increase their capabilities and contributions. A militarily capable Europe would expect the United States to be genuinely willing to integrate allied forces in coalition warfare. That kind of cooperability involves questions of strategy and capabilities, structures and operational concepts, technology and shared decisionmaking.

Consequently, a clear American commitment to coalition crisis management and coalition expeditionary warfare is an important incentive for the European nations' willingness to transform their forces and to make them cooperable with U.S. forces, including in the more challenging missions. A European choice to transform their forces would not only strengthen Euro-Atlantic military cooperability and NATO, but also ESDP military capabilities and the EU's ability to act – just as security is indivisible, so is European defense. Transformed European forces would surely strengthen the U.S.-EU relationship, the core security partnership for global security in the twenty-first century.

Managing the Transformation

Already a decade ago, the major European allies had concluded that traditional territorial defense needed to be replaced as the object of NATO and European military strategy. The "out-of-area" discussion put it in a nutshell: "out of area or out of business." Today, the Europeans are back in the real world's security management business. Hiding behind the in-area/out-of-area mentality that so much limited strategic thinking is no longer an option.

To this end, NATO's DCI and the European Collective Capability Goals aimed to develop the necessary capabilities for power projection. DCI was supposed to improve European power projection capabilities, as well as the ability to cooperate with U.S. forces. It lacked, however, doctrinal and institutional links to the U.S. force transformation process. It also lacked priorities and, consequently, failed to ensure European force modernization. The Collective Capability Goals did not take Europe's ability to act in security policy matters far, either. As they were aimed neither at initiating force transformation nor at fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperability, the concept lacked two indispensable ingredients.

U.S. operations in Afghanistan have provided—with regard to concepts and capabilities—a first insight into what military transformation is all about. Transformed forces are highly integrated, capable of high-tempo operations, and widely dispersible. Information technology is being used to achieve a decisive military advantage by networking forces, giving them unprecedented operational awareness in real-time operations. Traditional military capabilities can neither keep up with these forces nor be integrated into their operating structures. The romantic scenario of horseback warriors integrated into a complex web of technologies as exercised during the battle of Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan to trigger the Taliban's fall from power—the first U.S. cavalry charge of the twenty-first century—works only to a certain extent. If there is any reasonable chance of getting the grimy job done, direct ground pursuit and direct infantry engagement with own, highly capable forces remain essential. Looking at the options between the nineteenth-century horseback warriors and the twenty-first-century transformed forces, the necessary European choice is obvious.

Given the intensity and scale of the U.S. military transformation, the NATO summit in Prague is shaping up as a defining moment to begin building the required bridge across the Atlantic.

Most European allies are now beginning to accept the relevance of the strategic considerations that are driving U.S. force transformation. Given the intensity and scale of the U.S. military transformation, the NATO summit in Prague is shaping up as a defining moment to begin building the required bridge across the Atlantic. The key to achieving this objective is to initiate force-transformation planning, at least among key European force providers, and to couple it with the respective processes in the United States. Gaining cooperability with U.S. forces would also ensure closer interaction at the high end of the task spectrum with each other's forces and, eventually, with other European forces. It would strengthen NATO and also give the EU the much-needed capabilities. The United States and key European allies need to make this the focal point of an urgent, determined, and sustained campaign.

NATO's force planning and decisionmaking, its command structure and operating doctrines have only changed marginally since the end of the Cold War, while the global security environment is far more dynamic. NATO must develop the ability to prepare for those military operations that will be most crucial for the security interests of both the United States and the European allies—especially outside Europe where the security dangers are most acute. Prague needs to make NATO more effective in ensuring the cooperability of its members' forces. NATO needs to become the vital Euro-Atlantic military alliance that sets real force goals, clarifies a common strategic outlook, adopts innovative military doctrines, and actively pursues and maintains cooperability.

Linking the U.S. force transformation efforts with those of the major European allies for the purposes of joint advanced expeditionary warfare should be the objective. Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is the tool to meet that objective. As a practical mechanism, multinational CD&E would also be a fitting tool for multinational transformation and the explicit process of adjusting armed forces to changing parameters in a time-critical and ambitious process with inter-ministerial aspects. CD&E would link U.S. and European transformation planning and action—an excellent method of ensuring interoperability with the dynamically developing U.S. armed forces, while at the same time providing clear impulses for advancing national forces and the military NATO and EU capabilities.

The Bundeswehr has decided to join its U.S. partners in transforming its forces through CD&E. In so doing, it aims to establish a learning domain in which the German armed forces can learn, experiment and train for the future. Positive findings will then be introduced and implemented. Using the most up-to-date computer hardware and software, new operational concepts are designed, modeled, tested, and trained in "experiments" before being made available to field units. At the same time, the program provides an important tool for developing future command and control fundamentals, as well as for adapting the German armed forces' organizational structure and equipment. With respect to multinational development and testing, it also promotes a common understanding of command and control functions and improves interoperability.

To enhance its respective capabilities, the alliance needs to concentrate on an extremely limited number of critical capabilities.

Ensuring the Capabilities

With regard to the extended task spectrum in the changed security situation, several increased operational requirements in some critical fields will need to be addressed at the Prague summit:

- defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks;
- ensuring communications and information superiority;
- improving combat effectiveness and interoperability of deployed armed forces;

- ensuring rapid deployment, survivability and sustainability of forces and infrastructure, including logistical aspects.

To enhance its respective capabilities, the alliance needs to concentrate on an extremely limited number of critical capabilities rather than aiming at large, unrealistic, and often unnecessary quantities. The challenge is to determine national commitments with target dates, to extend multinational cooperation and possible role sharing, and to determine realistic and achievable goals while cooperating as closely as possible with related EU efforts. The DCI update that is expected to result from the Prague summit needs to clearly focus on a few but crucial capability areas to enhance NATO's efficiency and to considerably improve its interoperability capacity. Securing the related capabilities for the Europeans will also be important for linking them up with the U.S. force transformation process.

What capabilities would the allies need as a minimum set of common requirements in order to carry out key tasks throughout an entire operation? Certainly, these would include a whole array of functions: a common interoperable C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) grid; a major expansion of strategic airlift/sealift capacity; diverse tactical precision-strike platforms and weapons; rapidly deployable, theatre-mobile, light but highly effective ground forces; and, finally, missile defense for force protection. The modernization of European forces is particularly imperative. NATO and EU defense initiatives point in the same direction. One of the key lessons of September 11 is the need to go ahead with a comprehensive program to strengthen the European capacity to act in security matters—in both NATO and the EU.

With regard to the budgetary implications of that transformation process, the Europeans should agree on a specific scaled approach for their investments—investments that should increase within agreed margins. Given Europe's continued lag behind the United States—not because of some technology gap, but due to lack of determination—the Europeans will need to better harmonize their forces and to make more efficient use of their defense investment budgets. It is, therefore, important to strengthen intra-European military cooperation. The United States should support such efforts by being more ready to open markets to European products and to allow technology transfer.

ESDP should have not just one but two military purposes: stability operations with or without the United States and advanced expeditionary warfare with the United States.

Enhanced European military cooperation by multinational corps, such as the Dutch-German Corps, the Euro-Corps, the European Air Defence Task Force, the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell and, of course, the tri-national Multinational Corps Northeast, is key to increased efficiency and wiser use of resources. Yet, there is still more room for improvement and deeper integration in the areas of procurement, structures, training, and education. Training and education offer enormous potential for intensified cooperation in Europe. European CD&E would also set a good example.

The necessary progress could be realized more easily if the leading European allies focused and integrated their efforts on transforming their forces. What Europe lacks in quantity, it should seek to make up for in quality through more efficient spending and by focusing on strategic shortcomings. Since Europe's focus, in line with current ESDP goals, is on improving and pooling capabilities, future approaches should include greater Euro-Atlantic cooperability, particularly in the more challenging part of the mission spectrum. Consequently, ESDP should have not just one but two military purposes: stability operations with or without the United States and advanced expeditionary warfare with the United States. The former would be mainly for contingencies in and near Europe, while the latter could be for contingencies anywhere in the world where U.S. and European common interests are threatened.

Concluding Remarks

Since its foundation, the alliance has always adjusted successfully to new situations and changed parameters. Not least since the end of the Cold War, crisis management and comprehensive cooperation with all the European states have succeeded in stabilizing Europe. The impending enlargement will entail an important political gain for NATO, further reinforcing its unique position in the Euro-Atlantic area. But it will be necessary to continue this permanent adjustment process with respect to new challenges.

The internal structure of the alliance will be changed considerably by the relationship between NATO and Russia, or NATO and Ukraine and a new round of enlargement. Against this background, the discussion has already begun on the development of new tools for managing the alliance. The NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure have to be adjusted to the future challenges, as the preservation of the alliance's ability to act and decide will be key to future security and stability. This will also require an adjustment to the working procedures and structures and the decision and command and control processes in the alliance's political and military sectors.

As a direct consequence of the events of September 11, the United States has focused its own efforts on homeland defense. This focus on its own territory has resulted in a revision of its own military command structure, with clear implications for the NATO Command Structure following the relief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) of its Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) tasks on October 1, 2002. The option to maintain a Strategic Command (SC) on American soil is still viable: SACEUR would get exclusive responsibility for the Operational Command and the SC in the United States—as a functional command—would be assigned responsibility for armed forces development.

The upcoming Prague summit will have to cope with these issues of commitment, transformation, and capabilities to produce lasting success. ...[It] will need to take the ongoing discussions on the future role of NATO a step forward.

The upcoming Prague summit will have to cope with these issues of commitment, transformation, and capabilities to produce lasting success. It should aim at explicit national commitments with precise target specifications. It should constitute a realistic approach towards achievable capabilities, and it should be economically feasible. It should lead to multinational cooperation, interoperability, and cooperative procurement, as well as common and multinational financing. There is no doubt that the alliance's European members must develop new means and ways of identifying and implementing cost-effective solutions to overcome the present shortcomings as well as future ones that are already in sight. The United States will need to embrace the concept that coalition operations are better than going it alone, especially in intense expeditionary warfare.

In particular, the upcoming summit will need to take the ongoing discussions on the future role of NATO a step forward. NATO has played and will continue to play a decisive role in prevention and conflict management, in providing for stability and defense. This might be in Europe, but it might equally well be anywhere else in the world.

TRAPPINGS OF PARITY: NATO AT 20

John Newhouse

The dynamic released by September 11 should sooner or later reshape Western security arrangements in a manner that will enable Russia to acquire some of the trappings of parity with the United States. Russian president Vladimir Putin may envisage "NATO at 20" as the first step toward new collective security arrangements. The United States would, of course, continue to be Number One, but Russia would deploy the largest of the European military forces. Putin might even see the new arrangements as foreshadowing a two-generation-long Russian dream of a pan-European security system, with Russia deploying the dominant land force. That would play very well at home as would steps aimed at fulfilling another of Putin's goals—embedding Russia in the world economy.

At this stage, however, it is difficult to see just how the new NATO-Russia Council, launched officially in Rome on May 28 of this year, will evolve. The new arrangements are a work in progress. They will be shaped by events and experience; another crisis in the region, should it occur, would be a defining event.

NATO at 20: Risks and Opportunities

Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, who took the initiative, had something broader in mind. Last December, he proposed scrapping the old Permanent Joint Council (PJC)—created in 1997 for consultations between NATO and Russia based on a 19-plus-one formula—to capitalize on President Putin's turn toward the West. But the newer members of NATO, the East Central Europeans, were opposed to granting Russia a pivotal or highly visible role. So they and a few of the other members were mollified by a condition attached to the new arrangements that would allow any member to withdraw an item from the Council's agenda and refer it to NATO's governing Council, to which Russia does not belong.

NATO at 20 will require some serious adjustments. All sides will have to be flexible; a culture of cooperation will have to develop. The adjustment will be difficult for Russia because of the outright hostility of its bureaucracy to the new arrangements. There will be difficulties on the Western side because the attitude of some members is essentially negative, while a few others have mixed feelings. These and various other members also worry that as the NATO structure becomes larger and looser,

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the organization will become less relevant; the focus of security concerns is likely to be on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—issues that NATO is not well equipped to deal with. September 11 reminded us that momentous events create the impetus for momentous change. Still, two and only two capitals—Washington and Moscow—are in a position to turn what occurred then into serious advantage. Doing so, however, will require that each of them find a stable balance between its own priority interests and those of the other.

Stated differently, although Washington and Moscow do share some high-priority interests, they also have differences, some of which may be serious and must not be lost sight of. Iran is one; Russia wants to continue marketing nuclear technology to Iran—a prospect to which Washington strongly objects. There are also strategic differences. The administration of President George W. Bush favors missile defense over deterrence, whereas Russians continue to see mutual deterrence as the sole purpose of the strategic forces deployed by the two countries.

The Origins of the NATO-Russia Council

Putin's spontaneous reaction to September 11 is now the stuff of legend. More rapidly than any of his peers, with the possible exception of Tony Blair, he saw the events as allowing Russia—even a much-diminished Russia—to align itself with the United States in a campaign against terrorism. In effect, Bush's new first priority was converging with the Russian president's: Putin ran for election on an anti-terrorism platform.

Blair is clearly Putin's role model, if only because he, too, grasped the significance of September 11 and, more important, because he has sustained Britain's privileged relationship with the United States.

Even before September 11, however, Putin was steering foreign policy westward. He clearly aspires to an arrangement in which America would share an increasingly large share of the leadership with Russia, a potentially great power that is currently power-lite, has vital interests in both Europe and Asia, and can influence events in both regions. Indeed, the most worrisome problems originate in Eurasia, Central and Southwest Asia. Within this vast contiguous area, Russia's influence on a given matter can be pivotal; its role could be that of de facto partner of the United States, not least because Russian intelligence may be essential to joint operations. Still, the path to a *modus operandi* along these lines may be tricky. Russia could take the position that if it protects NATO's interests in Eurasia, its Western partners must, in turn, help advance various Russian interests elsewhere. Washington's unilateral approach to various regional problems could spell political difficulties for Putin. He probably counts on Blair and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to exercise some moderating influence on the current U.S. administration's approach.

Blair is clearly Putin's role model, if only because he, too, grasped the significance of September 11 and, more important, because he has sustained Britain's privileged relationship with the United States. The special quality of that relationship is what Putin seeks to acquire for Russia. He is not tempted to play off any of the Europeans against the United States. He wants to be influential in

Europe by using Blair and to strengthen Russia's new relationship with NATO. Indeed, the idea of NATO at 20 is traceable to Blair who had concluded that Western and Russian strategic interests had been converging, and that collective security arrangements that lacked Russian participation no longer made sense. Blair apparently sold some of this thinking to Bush during their meeting in Texas last November. Blair and his people had then to wage a see-saw battle with some of Bush's advisers, leaving the outcome in doubt for a while. Secretary of State Colin Powell supported Blair and, as on so many issues, clashed with his counterpart in the Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who drew support in varying degrees from most of the other senior people around the president.

Prospects for a New NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia Relationship

What becomes of NATO at 20, as well as much else, is likely to depend, in large part, on whether Putin's bid to align Russia with the West prevails over the all but pervasive resistance to such a move within his national security bureaucracy. Unlike his predecessor, he can count on a degree of support and credibility at home that allows him to make deals. Moreover, because he was not complicit in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russians perceive him as having a stronger connection to their interests. In short, by having succeeded in consolidating presidential power, Putin now has more room for flexibility than Yeltsin had, and can maneuver against the grain, which is exactly what he is doing—taking on and dominating for the moment the larger part of Russia's political elite that sees anti-Americanism as the right strategic direction.

In that light, a few of Bush's closer entourage began to see Putin as someone who could make deals that stuck. This view was a major departure from the sharply negative line on Russia they had first set out on—a time when the status of Russian policy was consciously downgraded and Bush's national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, could suggest in a newspaper interview that Russia was still regarded as a threat.

What becomes of NATO at 20 ... is likely to depend, in large part, on whether Putin's bid to align Russia with the West prevails over the resistance within his national security bureaucracy.

Putin's aspiration—a role that accords with Russia's potential reach and impact on world affairs—carries the support of key Western governments, including Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. Simply put, Putin's Russia is becoming part of Europe and maneuvering closer to the center of collective Western security arrangements. NATO members need Russia's help in neutralizing threats from WMD, waging the campaign against HIV/AIDS and its spread, and combating organized crime, some of it with roots in Russia. Putin, in turn, is seeking what could be called parity of esteem, but for much of Russia's foreign policy establishment, the anti-American chord still resonates. A comment one hears in Moscow is that after the Cold War there was no money to be made in Washington fighting Russia, whereas Russians can still make a living fighting the United States. Anything good for America, they think, must be bad for Russia.

The 1999 war against Yugoslavia created a strong wave of anti-Western/anti-NATO and, above all, anti-American sentiment in Russia. NATO enlargement, like most such issues, was a topic mainly discussed within elite circles, but it, too, became a popular issue after NATO intervened in Kosovo. Russians tended to see the first round of NATO enlargement as an example of the West taking advantage of Russian weakness and, in Dmitri Trenin's words, as "redrawing the lines" that divided Europe. "The bulk of the Russian establishment (still) resents what some refer to as NATO's eastern march, because it eats away at their self-esteem and the traditional notion of Russia as a great power."

Aside from the need to fix Russia's economy, Putin was under no pressure from anywhere to forge a Western connection. So he began, in effect, surrendering long-standing Russian strategic positions and, thereby, more or less isolating himself from the power ministries. Most Russians deplore the new round of NATO enlargement, which they see as bringing the Western alliance into space they once controlled. Putin did not challenge the proposed expansion to Russian borders, even though his minister of defense, Sergey Ivanov, and other senior officials have remained openly hostile to the move. He also quietly accepted cancellation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

These and other concessions that appear to collide with Russian interests are judged by various Bush advisors as not affecting Putin. They think he can handle any flare-up from them. They could be wrong, however. The withdrawal from the treaty was seen as a massive snub of Putin, even if unintended, especially since it served no immediate purpose. Much or most of the development and testing of components involved in the National Missile Defense (NMD) program could be done over a period of several years without violating the ABM treaty. In addition, Putin had made clear his willingness to amend the treaty in ways that would have increased Washington's comfort level by making the agreement more relevant to the altered environment.

A latent danger for Putin lies in the Bush administration's dismissive approach to other countries.

A latent danger for Putin lies in the Bush administration's dismissive approach to other countries. Although relations between the United States and Russia are reasonably good, they still rely significantly on events, especially events that bear on strategic stability. Washington's insistence on having free hands—the assertion of its right to act peremptorily or preemptively—could create a rift with Putin. The resumption of nuclear testing would be such an act, because it would be perceived widely as lowering the nuclear threshold. Putin might have to take a stand against it, in which case various members of NATO, not just the French, would almost certainly support him.

Putin has positioned himself as the reasonable partner who takes an international approach to arms control and other strategic issues. In trying to become part of the Western system, he has swallowed a lot. Yet, he must feel that he will get back as much as he needs. If so, he will trump his legion of critics in Moscow, as he may have to do. The Russian elites say that NATO at 20 will not work, because Washington will not let it work and will treat Russia unfairly. Some recent signs, however, indicate that mainstream elements are taking a more relaxed, or even positive, view of Westernization, equating it perhaps with efforts to boost the economy.

Putin's position is anomalous. His approval ratings have hovered at around 80 percent. After Yeltsin, Russians liked the idea of a president who came to work every day. The first book about him was called "The German in the Kremlin." His use of four-letter words in news conferences has also played well. But the novelty will wear off if it has not done so already. The power ministries and opinion makers will continue to see Putin as maneuvering against their country's larger interests. For now, however, he appears to be in absolute control. As Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of Russia's liberal Yabloko Party, says, "Anyone who predicts what will happen in Russia is an idiot."

MAKING ROOM FOR RUSSIA: HOW CLOSE IS TOO CLOSE?

Andreas Pfaffernoschke

Much has recently been achieved in NATO-Russia relations. Since the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, and notwithstanding some setbacks, NATO and Russia have succeeded in putting their relationship on a new basis. The recent signing of the Rome Declaration, creating a new NATO-Russia Council, is so far the climax of NATO-Russia relations. The signing was a clear signal for a qualitative change in NATO-Russia relations and, hopefully, for the historic step many of our politicians have been talking about. Is this the end of a development bringing NATO and Russia closer together, the maximum convergence that can be achieved? Is it the basis for new disappointments resulting from the ongoing lack of confidence between NATO and Russia? Or is it an historical step leading to Russia's full-fledged future membership in NATO?

Drawing the Limits of NATO-Russia Rapprochement

The answer to the question "how close is too close" as far as relations between NATO and Russia are concerned depends mainly on what answers we give to two other questions: first, what functions do we want the NATO of the future to perform and, second, what can and should Russia contribute to the performance of these functions, and on what terms?

As long as there is no clear answer to the first question, as long as NATO is in the process of redefining its identity and discussing its future role in the twenty-first century, it is almost impossible to give a consistent answer to Russia's relationship with NATO. I will, therefore, confine myself to some general thoughts about NATO-Russia relations in the light of the recent events and the general trends of Russian foreign policy.

Let us return to the original question, "How close is too close?" It may well be that, after September 11, there is no longer any such thing as "too close." Times have changed significantly since Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, justified NATO's existence with the task of "keeping the Russians out and the Germans down." That justification for NATO's existence has been outdated more than ever since September 11. Today's NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, wrote recently that "NATO can keep the Russians out of today's Euro-Atlantic security structures only at its own

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peril." That certainly suggests that the answer to the question as to "how close is too close" can only be that there is no "too close."

Both sides, however, have explicitly excluded Russian NATO membership for the foreseeable future. For as long as the mutual defense guarantee is a core element of NATO, offering Russia full-fledged membership would imply defending Russia against an attack from a non-NATO member country, and no NATO member is willing to extend this guarantee to Russia. On several occasions, Russian president Vladimir Putin has pointed out that, aside from NATO membership, which is not on Moscow's agenda either, the limits to the rapprochement between Russia and NATO are a matter for the alliance to decide. So, the question of distance between NATO and Russia will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future.

Integrating Russia: A Key Task for NATO

It is commonplace today to say that security in Europe and the transatlantic area can only be built by working with and not against Russia. NATO and Russia are already security partners. Cooperation in the Balkans has proved that NATO and Russia can work together constructively and take joint responsibility. The threats we face today are radically different from those of the past. We are no longer concerned with defending ourselves from a military threat posed by what used to be the Soviet Union, but with responding to new and much less tangible threats that are much harder to counter with military means. Virtually all current challenges threaten Russia and NATO in equal measure. Obviously, it is more effective for NATO and Russia to respond jointly to such threats than for each to deal with them separately.

A policy of integration remains key to an effective Western policy toward Russia, not only to gain from Russia's assets but also to limit the possible negative consequences resulting from non-inclusion.

Yet, it is not just the nature of new threats that calls for a joint approach. A joint approach is also crucial because the risks posed to our security by an isolated and weak Russia make these new threats more, not less acute. An economically weak and politically isolated Russia will be more inclined to accept the risks posed to its own security as a result of increased proliferation than an economically strong Russia that is not dependent on proliferation and that is integrated as far as possible into the transatlantic security partnership. One important goal of our cooperation, also within the NATO-Russia context, must therefore be to limit any capacity Russia may still have to be obstructionist. A policy of integration thus remains key to an effective Western policy toward Russia, not only to gain from Russia's assets but also to contain the possible negative consequences resulting from non-integration.

So far, cooperation within the anti-terror coalition has shown that Russia and the West can indeed cooperate constructively if they have shared interests. Such cooperation is not so much concerned with military cooperation in the narrow sense. This is not only because the Russian armed forces are not ready for it, both politically and in terms of training and equipment, but also because, with the exclusively military responses to the new threats ever less effective, purely military cooperation is today simply less relevant.

Cooperation means essentially cooperation at the political level. The fundamental decisions taken by President Putin in the immediate aftermath of September 11 were clearly political in nature. The imperative now is to expand and build on this political common ground. In addition to the fight against international terrorism, which will remain a significant cohesive force over the years ahead and where it is crucial that we preserve the common ground that now exists, we must identify other fields where we also have complementary interests. Some possible areas are specified in the Rome Declaration and the work program of the new NATO-Russia Council—such as disarmament, non-proliferation, confidence-building measures, peacekeeping missions, and much more. Cooperation in these areas is less a question of military capabilities than of political will. Accordingly, the less NATO defines itself in purely military terms and the more it becomes a broadly-based, multidimensional, and essentially political organization serving as a facilitator for cooperation, the greater will be the scope for close and successful political cooperation with Russia.

Shared Decisionmaking, Shared Responsibilities

Our aim should be to give Russia a progressively greater share of responsibility in as many areas of common interest as possible, not only to test how far Russia is genuinely committed to cooperation, but also to convince it of the benefits of such cooperation and encourage a "change of culture." Exercising responsibility means that those concerned must contribute to resolving the problems at issue and, by the same token, also be involved in decisionmaking. Sharing responsibility and sharing in decisionmaking go hand in hand.

That is precisely what the NATO-Russia Council in its new format is all about. How far it will succeed will largely depend on how far both sides—NATO and Russia—are willing to cooperate constructively. Here, the problem is very much on the Russian side: as long as the Russian diplomats and the military officials in Brussels are not convinced of the usefulness of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation, as long as they continue to look at NATO as the old military organization threatening the former USSR, and as long as they remain critical of a policy that brings Russia and the West closer together, NATO-Russia relations will not really improve at the working level.

Sharing responsibility and sharing in decisionmaking go hand in hand.

So, one precondition for the success of the NATO-Russia Council's work will be the "right" people on the Russian side in Brussels. Apart from that, the NATO-Russia Council is also a kind of pedagogical tool we should use to accustom Russia to Western ways of thinking and to help it subscribe to Western views on security policy. It can serve as an important tool to create transparency and confidence.

Shared Security Interests and Common Values as a Basis for Close Cooperation

Russia and NATO enjoy a growing number of shared security interests. But NATO is more than an organization offering a mutual security guarantee. It is based on the member states' common values and remains an alliance of democratic states that are willing to protect democracy and human rights. Russia is evolving from the legacy of a totalitarian regime to a democratic country. It is a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and has made considerable progress along the path toward democracy over the last ten years. Yet, given all the various shortcomings and the continuing failure to implement democratic principles in Russia, as well as the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, which still poses a stumbling block to improved relations between Russia and the West in general, the pool of shared common values remains fragile as the basis for NATO-Russia cooperation. Mental asymmetries between the West and Russia will not vanish overnight. The answer to the question of "how close is too close" therefore depends also on closing this gap in mentalities.

Preconditions for Further Rapprochement

Since his coming into office and especially since September 11, President Putin has been steering a radically different course in international affairs—a course that clearly breaks with old stereotypes and is shaped by two fundamental insights. First, given its real economic potential, Russia must abandon the myth that it is a superpower on a par with the United States and make a realistic assessment of its foreign policy objectives and the resources available to it to achieve those objectives. Second, the only way for Russia to prevent a further loss of status is to open up economically, to integrate into the global economy, and to opt for an enhanced partnership with the West.

If this new sense of realism and the pragmatic approach prevail, Russia and the West in general, and NATO and Russia in particular, will become partners in many areas.

These two fundamental insights have led to practical consequences in Russian foreign policy. Russia has abandoned the concept of multipolarity, which had dominated its foreign policy for many years and stipulated that the role of Russian foreign policy was to counterbalance an assumed U.S. dominance in world politics. It has also significantly improved Russia's relations with countries in Eastern Europe in particular and, surprisingly, with those countries that joined NATO in 1999. Russia's resistance to NATO enlargement, especially as far as the Baltic states are concerned, has significantly diminished—certainly as a consequence of growing understanding in Russia about what NATO really is, as well as a result of Russia's own changed approach toward NATO.

The closing down of military bases in Cuba and Vietnam is a direct consequence of the reallocation of Russian foreign policy resources and of a more pragmatic approach. The immediate Russian reaction to the tragedy of September 11, when Putin was among the first to convey his condolences to President Bush and offer his assistance and solidarity, the acceptance of the use of military bases in Central Asia by the United States, and the deployment of U.S. advisers to Georgia are further proof of a changed Russian position. As a result of improved Russian-U.S. relations, Russia has accepted the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty—which Russia had long praised as the cornerstone of world strategic stability—without any significant resistance. Finally, growing convergence can be observed on many issues of international politics, with the exception of Iran and maybe Georgia.

Even if this new foreign policy course is in line with Western interests, its core is "pro-Russian," based on a sober appraisal of the options now open to Russia and which best fit its interests. I would qualify this new approach as a realistic approach—realistic in terms of cost-benefit analysis and in terms of Russia's potential role in world politics. If this new sense of realism and the pragmatic approach prevail, Russia and the West in general, and NATO and Russia in particular, will become partners in many areas. In other words, this sense of realism is a precondition for future cooperation and further rapprochement.

Will the New Approach Prevail?

The new approach in Russian foreign politics is so far limited to the president, who seems to be the driving force behind this policy, and to a few decisionmakers and leading advisers to the president. To a large extent, the military and foreign policy elite does not support his policy, but the foreign policy elite is not key to the president's success. As long as he can maintain high rates of popularity by offering the Russian people a brighter economic future, he can be assured of a free hand in foreign policy. President Putin's position is not questioned seriously by anyone in Russia, and his position seems firm and invulnerable. Foreign policy in Russia is irrelevant to most people, as long as their emotional yearning for respect and national glory is satisfied. It is interesting to note that the president continues to pursue his current foreign policy despite the population's disagreement with this policy. This may be proof of the seriousness of his intentions as well as of the stability of his position.

As the "Westernization" of Russian foreign policy continues, the prospects for closing the gap between NATO and Russia and for further strengthening NATO-Russia relations will steadily improve.

The chances of the new foreign policy approach prevailing are promising for two reasons: first, there is no rational alternative to this policy for the rational politician Putin is; and, second, his power basis is stable and not endangered by anyone. The "Westernization" of Russian foreign policy—characterized by the diminishing importance of the military and ideological elements—will continue, although it will take time to phase out the old elites, who were socialized during Soviet times, and to bring in new people. As this process continues, the prospects for closing the gap between NATO and Russia and for further strengthening NATO-Russia relations will steadily improve.

The question of "how close is too close?"—the starting point for this essay—can thus not be answered with any degree of scientific precision. But the answer must clearly be "as close as possible." NATO and Russia have the chance of becoming a security pillar for the twenty-first century, provided that NATO can redefine its role in a convincing manner, leaving room for Russia to make its own contributions, and that Russia finally succeeds in playing a constructive role, not only toward NATO but also in world politics in general.

TAKING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BEYOND EUROPE

Ronald D. Asmus

For more than 50 years, the United States and our European allies have worked together in a grand strategic venture to create a democratic, peaceful, prosperous Europe. At the dawn of a new century, that task is now, for the first time, within our grasp. This fall NATO and the EU are likely to launch so-called "big bang" rounds of enlargement that will help lock in democracy and security from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Relations between Russia and the West are also on track. Russian president Vladimir Putin has opted to protect Moscow's interests by cooperating with the United States and Europe rather than by trying to play the spoiler's role. The certitude of that decision and the depth of Moscow's commitment to democracy at home remain open questions. But Putin's turn to the West has further reduced the risk that Russia could become a strategic adversary and has opened a window to put relations with it on a more stable and cooperative footing.

Not all of the European democracies are fully functional, and not all of the European economies are prosperous. Completing the integration of Central and East European countries will take time even after they join NATO and the EU. Balkan instability has been stemmed, but the underlying tensions remain unresolved. Ukraine's westward integration and that of Russia will remain works in progress for years to come. And the West is only waking up to the challenge in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

But the cornerstones of a new European peace order are in place. The grand issues of war and peace on the continent that preoccupied statesmen and strategists for the second half of the twentieth century—Germany's place in Europe, the anchoring of Central and Eastern Europe to the West and creating the foundations for a democratic Russia—either have been or are in the process of being resolved. Europe today is at peace with itself and more democratic and secure than at any time in recent history. If President Harry Truman could look down upon us today, he would be proud of what has been accomplished in his name.

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Unfortunately, success on the continent has been matched by the emergence of new threats from beyond it. September 11 has brought home what a number of strategists have predicted for years—that the new century would usher in different, yet very dangerous threats to our societies. No one can doubt that Osama bin Laden would have used weapons of mass destruction (WMD) if he had them. We know that Al Qaeda and similar groups are trying to obtain such weapons and will, in all likelihood, use them, if they succeed in doing so. The odds of them eventually being successful are high. Indeed, the likelihood of WMD being used against our citizens and societies is probably greater today than at any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

While America is the target of choice for these terrorists, Europe may not be far behind. It was not an accident that the United States was targeted on September 11. But it does not take much of a stretch to imagine a similar attack on Europe in the future. There is ample evidence of past terrorist plots by these groups on the continent. As the United States hardens as a potential target, the temptation to strike in Europe may grow. If one examines the ideology and goals of many of these groups, their hatred is rooted as much in who we are as in the details of specific policies. For such groups, shifting the focus of terrorist activity from Washington to London, Paris, or Brussels need not imply a great leap.

The intersection of these trends requires that the United States and Europe rethink the purpose of the transatlantic relationship. For the last half century, that purpose was to defend Europe from threats on the continent. Today the most dangerous threats we face come from beyond Europe. The greatest likelihood of large numbers of our citizens being killed no longer comes from a Russian invasion or even ethnic war in the Balkans. It comes from terrorists or rogue states in the Greater Middle East armed with WMD, attacking our citizens, our countries, or our vital interests abroad. Addressing this threat is the strategic challenge of our time. For our generation of leaders, it is the modern-day equivalent of what facing down Stalin was for Truman and his counterparts in 1949. The question is whether both sides of the Atlantic have the wisdom and strategic foresight to recast the transatlantic relationship to meet this new threat.

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The New Challenge

Neither the United States nor Europe has fully come to terms with the new threats we face, with our inherent vulnerabilities as Western democracies or the consequences thereof for our future national security policies. This threat is not just terrorism of the sort many countries, particularly in Europe, have known in the past. It is the combination of terrorism, WMD, failed and rogue states that roil the lands from Marrakesh to Bangladesh. Moreover, these problems are themselves only symptoms of the deeper economic and political turmoil afflicting this region.

German foreign minister Joschka Fischer has called the combination of WMD in the hands of terrorists driven by anti-Western ideologies a “new totalitarian threat.” Like other twentieth-century totalitarians, today's Islamic fanatics are convinced that they possess absolute truth, despise Western modernity and yet borrow from its technological accomplishments in an effort to destroy it, and believe that force and terror are necessary for a new utopia to replace the current corrupt and decadent world.

It is understandable that the initial reaction to September 11, especially in the United States, was to bolster the defense of our homeland and go after the perpetrators of these attacks militarily. Even so, we can only reduce but never eliminate our inherent vulnerabilities as democratic nations whose vitality rests on our openness to the world. Even if we dramatically improve homeland defense, a 90-percent success rate is not good enough when we are dealing with terrorists groups and regimes willing to use WMD against us. We, therefore, need to go on the offensive to address the root causes and not just the symptoms of terrorism. Such a strategy must have a military component. But terrorism is primarily a political problem, and the war against terrorism must be won on the political battlefield as well as the military one. We need to think not only in terms of military preemption but political preemption as well.

While we often talk about the terrorist threat as a global one, the challenge we face is de facto concentrated in a specific geographic region that starts with Northern Africa, Egypt and Israel at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and extends throughout the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In some ways, it encompasses the Caucasus and Central Asia, too. Today, the Greater Middle East poses the greatest threat to Euro-Atlantic security. It is in these countries that the greatest threats to our security originate—be they in the form of the foot soldiers for future terrorist attacks, the funding and financing for such attacks, the proliferation of WMD that can be used against us, the overflow of civil wars from one state to the next, and the refugee flows that all of these developments inevitably trigger.

Today, the Greater Middle East poses the greatest threat to Euro-Atlantic security. It is in these countries that the greatest threats to our security originate …

The Greater Middle East suffers from a crisis of governance and the inability of its regimes to meet the challenges of modernity and globalization. While most of the world marches forward into the twenty-first century, the Middle East clings to the fourteenth century. Its regimes are increasingly out of step with its people. Its economies, even those buttressed by massive oil wealth, fail to provide prosperity or even dignity. Its educational systems produce masses of literate but badly educated young people ripe for exploitation by the purveyors of hate and terror. Meanwhile, a new wave of modern communications has given voice to hate-mongers seeking to blame that backwardness on the plots of the West.

The failure of these regimes has, in turn, helped breed the extreme ideologies, movements, and rogue states that now potentially threaten the West. Not all of the region's woes can be traced to the underlying problems of political, economic, and social stagnation, but even those that can have been greatly exacerbated by the larger problem of the failure of the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict started for other reasons, but these deeper problems are now feeding it. Saddam Hussein is as much a symptom of the problem as its cause, but he too is capitalizing on it, making himself a far greater threat to the West than if the region were not so volatile.

To meet this challenge, the West needs a strategy that relies on more than a military campaign plan. While killing Osama bin Laden or toppling Saddam are important and worthy objectives, by themselves they are not enough. We need to attack the capacity of terrorists and rogue states to inflict harm on us, as well as to change the dynamics that created such monstrous groups and regimes in the first place. If we do fail to take such action, the names of the failed states, rogue states, and terrorists may change, but their causes and the threats we face will not. Instead, in five or ten years time, we could face new terrorist groups and new rogue states that have learned from the experience of their predecessors, and so will pose even greater dangers.

Thus, while continuing to wage the military war on terrorism, we must make an equally firm commitment to a political strategy to help transform the Middle East itself. This means working on changing the nature of the anti-Western regimes from which our enemies draw sanctuary, support, and successors by seeking to create more participatory, inclusive, and accountable regimes that can live in peace with one another. It means helping Middle Eastern societies come to grips with modernity and create new civil societies that allow them to compete in the modern world without losing their sense of cultural uniqueness. In short, it means instituting a new form of democracy in the Greater Middle East. Working to secure these changes must be at the center of our strategy. In the end, they will be critical to bringing peace and stability to this region.

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This is a tall order. Heretofore such goals have been considered unreachable or simply a bridge too far by many. September 11 has shown us, however, that the status quo is no longer tolerable and that past policies have led us into a strategic dead end. We, therefore, need a strategy to help this region transform itself from within into more equitable and open societies that no longer produce ideologies and people intent on killing us. Regime change means not only getting rid of the current set of bad guys. It must mean a commitment to ensuring that the right kind of successor regimes follows in their wake.

Elements of A Strategy

What would a common transatlantic strategy to address this threat look like in practice? The starting point would be the recognition that the greatest threats to both sides of the Atlantic today no longer come from within the continent but beyond it, and from the Greater Middle East in particular. We also need to stop looking at the problems in the region as distinct problems that can be addressed in isolation from each other. A common set of drivers and dynamics across the region from Northern Africa to Pakistan are contributing to the toxic brew of radical anti-Western ideologies, terrorism, rogue states, and the drive to acquire WMD. If the problems are multifaceted, so must be our strategy to address them.

The first place to start implementing this policy in practice should be in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the United States made the mistake of walking away from Afghanistan—and reaped the harvest of that mistake on September 11. Afghanistan is an opportunity to set a precedent for positive change and transformation, and to show the rest of the region the degree of Western commitment.

Second, the United States and Europe need to bury their differences and make a more determined and sustained effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although solving this puzzle may take years or decades, we have learned that ignoring the problem only makes it much worse—and much harder for the United States to do anything else in the region. President Bush is right in pointing out that a successful Palestinian state will require democracy and that, therefore, the old leadership will have to go at some point. But we cannot allow a festering Arab-Israeli wound to prevent the pursuit of our broader agenda in the region. We may not be able to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem in the near term, but we need to get it under control. Consequently, the United States and Europe must find a way to come together behind a common approach—and to use their political, economic, and military clout to maintain a settlement once it has been reached. If required, NATO allies should be prepared to help secure such a settlement.

Third, Saddam Hussein and his regime must go, because his pursuit of nuclear weapons endangers the region and because a longer-term strategy of promoting democratic change in the Greater Middle East is impossible as long as this modern-day Stalin maintains his brutal totalitarian state. Such a strategy is going to require an invasion. It would be far better for all concerned if the United States and Europe were to wage this campaign together, relying on NATO if possible. Reconstructing Iraq will be a test of the transatlantic community's determination to help build pluralism, economic progress, and a new civil society across the region. Establishing a more democratic successor regime is as critical to our collective future as the destruction of Saddam's WMD arsenals.

If the problems are multifaceted, so must be our strategy to address them ... It will require systematic and sustained U.S.-European coordination and cooperation. In other words, it requires an alliance.

Fourth, Iran, too, is a country where the United States and Europe need to help the process of regime change, albeit in very different ways than in Iraq. The good news is that nowhere is the process of change more apparent than in Iran, where reform is only a matter of time and demographics. The bad news is that the country continues to be run by a narrow theocracy that has fought the process of democratic change at every step and which pursues a foreign policy that is anathema to the country's interests. In the short term, this means finding ways to prevent the current Iranian government from terrorizing the region while finding ways to help the emergence of a new Iranian polity.

Finally, the United States and Europe need to promote change among our friends and allies in the region. We cannot credibly insist on regime change in countries like Iraq and look the other way when it comes to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. September 11 drove home the simple fact that the recruiting and financial base for many terrorist groups is in these countries. New opportunities to facilitate change may also be starting to emerge. There are now political forces in the region and an emerging civil society that itself embraces the need for change. Thus our job is not necessarily to force change on a wholly reluctant region, but to empower those striving for change and provide them with the support necessary to achieve it.

Taken together, such steps could serve as the blueprint for a grand strategy to win the war on terrorism and build the foundation for peace in the region through political transformation. Successfully implementing such a strategy will, in all likelihood, take not years but decades. It will require systematic and sustained U.S.-European coordination and cooperation. In other words, it requires an alliance.

Can It Be Done?

Can the United States and Europe forge a new consensus to address the greatest strategic problem we face today—transforming the Greater Middle East? The tone of recent transatlantic discourse suggests that maybe we cannot. Although September 11 initially produced a tremendous outpouring of solidarity across the Atlantic, the mood has since soured into one of the ugliest U.S.-European spats in recent memory. Euro-trashing is as much in vogue in some rightwing circles in Washington as America-bashing is in other leftwing circles in Europe.

At first glance, there are few areas where the gap across the Atlantic would appear to be greater than the thorny strategic issues of the Greater Middle East. Without underestimating or downplaying these differences, several caveats are in order. First, until the present, neither the United States nor Europe felt a compelling strategic need to have a common strategy on these issues. The United States has preferred to keep Europe on the sidelines, and key European countries had their own reasons to go it alone. In the wake of September 11, that luxury is no longer available to either side

Second, U.S.-European differences on the Greater Middle East, while often bitter, are largely tactical and not strategic in nature. They relate largely not to ends but rather to the means to reach those ends. Frankly, they are not necessarily deeper than the issues that divided us during the Cold War, when alliance members differed deeply and passionately over the best strategy to pursue vis-à-vis Moscow.

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Third, past differences did not prevent the West from winning the Cold War. We won not because we agreed on everything all the time but because there was a commitment to face this challenge together and work in a common framework to iron out differences. Nor did the West prevail simply because of U.S. military power. Americans and Europeans still debate whether Ronald Reagan's arms buildup or Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* brought communism to its knees. Ultimately, it was the one-two punch of soft and hard power provided by Europe and America that helped topple communism.

All of this suggests that bringing the United States and Europe together around such a new and ambitious strategic agenda centered on the Greater Middle East, while certainly difficult, is doable. Achieving such a new consensus would have clear-cut strategic benefits. It would give our adversaries less room for maneuver. It would give Washington a degree of international legitimacy it cannot acquire on its own. The enormous long-term task of transforming the politics and societies of this region can (if at all) only be accomplished if the United States and Europe work together.

A common approach could also give the United States more and better strategic options. If the United States goes it alone, our actions will be circumscribed by what we can do alone. This will tempt us to opt for a more limited approach that fails to get at the root causes of the problem and, therefore, is less likely to be successful. While the administration often points to the problems that can come from trying to mount a coalition effort, unilateralism can also lead us into dangerous strategic choices.

As strong as the United States is today, we cannot meet this strategic challenge by ourselves. Afghanistan is a sober reminder in this regard. The same is even truer when it comes to the other pieces of the Greater Middle Eastern puzzle. Ultimately, Europeans—precisely because they share our values—are likely to be the most dependable allies we have. Indeed, for the more ambitious strategy this article lays out, their future cooperation would be indispensable—and the more ambitious agenda called for here is more likely to attract their support.

Toward A New Purpose and Paradigm

On April 4, 1949. Harry Truman spoke at NATO's founding in Washington. He defined NATO as an alliance to defend the common values and civilization of democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. The existential threat that Truman and his colleagues faced was Stalin and the then Soviet Union. Today the United States and Europe again face a potentially existential threat, albeit from a different source. But there is little doubt that the same values and civilization that Truman spoke about in 1949 are again at risk. Meeting that challenge today requires no less of a unified strategic response than standing up to Stalin did 50 years ago. What is less clear is whether today's leaders on either side of the Atlantic are capable of responding to such a challenge.

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History occasionally grants leaders opportunities to turn tragedies into opportunities. September 11 has given President Bush such an opportunity. As before, a U.S. president and his European counterparts have a chance to recast the transatlantic relationship to meet the new dangers of this new era. Thus far, neither side of the Atlantic has met that challenge—and that needs to be the first change we make, together.

ADAPTING NATO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Stephen J. Flanagan

NATO has weathered countless crises since 1949 and shown remarkable agility over the past decade in adapting to the post–Cold War security environment. However, the increasingly divergent transatlantic responses to the challenges of globalization, particularly with respect to terrorism and other transnational security threats, coupled with the widening gaps between the United States and Europe in risk assessment and military capabilities, present the alliance with profound new challenges.

In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, most Europeans see the United States as increasingly unilateralist and disinterested in using the alliance for fear that it will constrain Washington's freedom of action. This apparent disinterest causes great concern among the alliance's newer and prospective members, who fear that NATO no longer offers the certainty and hard security they have long sought. Indeed, many Europeans are concerned that Russia has emerged as a more important and capable strategic partner for the United States in waging the war on terrorism. Official Washington finds Europe a less capable partner in combating terrorism and new security threats and is dismayed that its longtime allies do not come to these struggles with the same sense of urgency or a common assessment of the nature of the problems.

To assure NATO's survival in the coming decades, the allies will need to take concrete steps at the Prague summit to bridge divergent transatlantic risk assessments, narrow the military capabilities gap, adapt alliance decisionmaking to its much larger size, develop a strategy for managing its new relationship with Russia, and address the future of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and relations with other non-members who share the Eurasian security space.

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Diverging Risk Assessments

The United States has always had a more global perspective on defense planning, but this perspective has intensified in recent years, particularly as the war on terrorism has unfolded. Washington sees the main threats to its security as emanating from outside Europe. While the United States is waging a *war* against terrorism, with all the urgency and commitment of resources that term implies, Europe is decidedly *not* on such a footing. Even more corrosive, there is a sense in Europe that terrorism is largely a U.S. problem that Americans have brought on themselves as a result of what they see as unbridled use of military force in the Islamic world and unfailing support for Israel.

Europeans have been dealing with low-level terrorism for decades and have found means to cope with it. They do not have the same sense of urgency about Al Qaeda and other contemporary terrorist groups with global support networks. There is grave danger in this complacency, particularly in light of evidence that Al Qaeda had planned attacks on major European cities and the enduring potential for these groups to take actions using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Some of these terrorist groups pose a profound challenge not merely because they have demonstrated a capacity for a more deadly and effective form of terrorism, but because they are determined to do whatever is necessary to undermine the core values and social fabric of Western, free-market democracies, which they see as inimical to their vision of Islam.

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This fundamental divergence has shaped the scope and nature of the responses on both sides of the Atlantic. Global terrorism has achieved somewhat greater political salience in the UK and France. For the most part, however, the events of September 11 have not resulted in a fundamental shift in the security paradigm of most European governments. Most European governments and elites see the U.S. response as overly militarized, too focused on punitive actions, and neglecting what they see as better and more effective steps to get at the sources of terrorism—through "constructive engagement" and development assistance. They are also appalled by what one French observer has characterized as U.S. "unilateralist fever" and "a staggering casualness regarding NATO," that is, changes that are "in direct contradiction to the corpus of Europe's principles on security."[1]

Such expressions of European anxiety have come in waves. Despite many predictions in Europe and elsewhere, the initial U.S. response to the events of September 11 was not a series of spasmodic military strikes, but a deliberate and considered chain of diplomatic, law enforcement, and financial measures. There was a noticeable sigh of relief in Europe last October and November, but by December 2001, Europeans became very apprehensive as to the next steps the United States was contemplating in the war on terrorism. All European governments currently oppose a military campaign designed to eliminate the Iraqi WMD capabilities and/or topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The new U.S. defense concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report[2] moved away from regional-based scenarios to capabilities-based planning, and sees the need for forces that can handle two major conflicts and multiple smaller military operations simultaneously. The shift in U.S. defense strategy away from planning to win two simultaneous major theater wars had been articulated in the QDR report before its official release in late last September. The events of September 11 confirmed the strategic direction of this review particularly its emphasis on homeland defense, preparing for surprise and asymmetric threats, and the need for expeditionary operations in diverse and distant places. The new force planning construct calls for U.S. forces that can perform a wide range of tasks:

- defend the United States;
- reassure allies and friends, deter aggression, and counter coercion in various regions around the world;
- swiftly defeat aggression in major overlapping conflicts while preserving the option to achieve decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and
- conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime, preferably in concert with allies and friends.

This shift in strategy moved the strategic focus of defense planning from Southwest and Northeast Eurasia to the southern and eastern regions of the Eurasian landmass, North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The QDR recognized that growing turmoil in this "southern arc" is acquiring greater strategic importance because it can have a significant detrimental impact on the global economy and stability and trigger U.S. security commitments. Significant engagements are also seen as possible in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America for humanitarian and certain security interests. Coping with these needs will require maintenance of military capabilities to project power rapidly into the outlying world, continued forward presence, and the enhancement of military cooperation with allies and partners. This new strategy also notes the need to cope with the further proliferation of WMD.

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Although large U.S. forces are likely to remain stationed in Europe and Northeast Asia, the QDR notes that they often will be called upon to deploy elsewhere and to serve as instruments of power projection. The review underscored that U.S. forces will need to be highly flexible and adaptive. The new strategy places demands for more "low density/high demand" units, such as special forces, construction engineers, C4ISR units, and defense-suppression aircraft that can support peacekeeping and warfighting operations.

In contrast, the EU's geographic focus and security goals are limited. Europeans continue to focus ESDP on handling Petersberg tasks on Europe's immediate periphery. A common "European" threat perception has yet to emerge. Europeans evince increasingly grave reservations about the role of military force in international affairs, stressing the need to seek compliance with international norms, and are unwilling to spend the resources on defense to maintain robust forces. Some have even expressed the dismaying assessment that European governments might not have acted any differently, had there been major terrorist attacks on European cities in 2001. Despite the euro hubris after Maastricht and Amsterdam, the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) now seems confused and impotent.

Many also question the seriousness of the European response to the events of last fall. No EU government has made the case for increased defense spending since September 11. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative Javier Solana have been urging Europeans to take this opportunity to bolster defense capabilities and the development of the CESDP, but nobody seems to be listening. Yet opinion polls in early 2002 suggest that even in Germany, European publics would be prepared to support increased defense spending. The political will, however, is simply not there. Europeans have been happy to reap the peace dividend. Most countries spend 1 to 2 percent of their GDP on defense, resulting in a major under-resourcing of defense plans. A commitment to 2 percent of GDP for defense by all participating states would likely ensure the realization of the rapid reaction force (RRF). With current resource plans, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and other sources project that while the RRF may be declared operational in December 2003, it might not be capable of taking on the high end of Petersberg tasks until 2010.[3] In addition to resources, EU leaders will have to enhance their defense planning and review process in order to ensure that the RRF is not a hollow success.

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Many Europeans seem quite comfortable with keeping ESDP's capabilities limited to Petersberg Tasks within a narrow geographic perimeter, rather than expand them to support wider actions in the war on terrorism. However, this division of labor with Europe more focused on peacekeeping and global support to development as a "complement" to U.S. global military action could prove corrosive to the transatlantic security community over the long term. Such a narrow application of European security cooperation would make it less relevant to the United States.

U.S.–EU and NATO–EU Cooperation

That said, NATO is clearly not the right instrument for orchestrating all aspects of the campaign against terrorism. Countering terrorism requires the integration of diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence, information, and law enforcement actions among a broad range of partners. Transatlantic cooperation must also be measured by joint efforts to shut down terrorist financial networks, investigate terrorist organizations, and bring terrorists to justice. While Europe's response to September 11 remains circumspect on the military front, important strides have been made in European law enforcement, financial tracking, and justice actions relating to terrorism.

EU cooperation on justice and home affairs, the "third pillar" of the Union, has been very slow to evolve due to national differences. Since September 11, however, in contrast to ESDP, there have been significant enhancements in EU third pillar cooperation and in bilateral EU–U.S. cooperation in these areas. While there have been some differences in designating certain terrorist organizations and the pace of pursuit, the United States and the EU did agree in December 2001 to designate several European-based groups as terrorists and announced, at the May 2, 2002 U.S.–EU summit, the coordinated targeting of an expanded list of terrorists and terrorist entities. These groups and individuals were subject to asset freezes and other sanctions in accordance with national laws. EU foreign ministers agreed to expand the EU terrorist blacklist such that it is now further in line with the U.S. list of June 18. The EU has also made good progress in working with other G-8 countries to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering. Eight special recommendations on terrorist financing, combined with the FATF's 40 recommendations on money laundering, have set out the basic international framework consistent with UNSC Resolution 1368 to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. So too, the United States and the EU have assigned liaison points of contact between EUROPOL and EUROJUST, entered into agreement on the sharing of terrorism and crime data between the U.S. authorities and EUROPOL, and collaborated on threat assessments.

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Credit does need to be given to the fact that the EU is making major contributions to addressing the sources of terrorism through its extensive development assistance programs. While the United States spent $9 billion in foreign aid in 2000, the top seven EU countries combined spent $22 billion.

Thus, if the United States and Europe want to work together, a new EU–NATO institutional relationship is needed, in part, due to the overlapping responsibilities that have become evident with NATO's involvement in both the war on terrorism and post-conflict stability operations in the Balkans. The long-term health of transatlantic relations will require better ways to integrate EU and NATO actions to address such diverse threats to international security. This could help slow further divergence of threat assessments as NATO and EU memberships differ. This new institutional framework should also provide modified decisionmaking for counter-terrorism operations to include the G-8 to allow for engagement of Japan.

Diverging Capabilities

Although the April 1999 Washington summit adopted the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to bridge the growing capabilities gap between the United States and NATO European allies, that gap has widened. It will likely widen further not only as a result of the rise in the U.S. defense budget by $48 billion after September 11, but also after the accession of NATO's new allies sometime following the November 2002 Prague summit. The capabilities gap cannot be closed, but it must be "filled."

Considering available resources, the 58-task-long DCI was too ambitious. It also failed because it did not prioritize force goals. The new NATO Defense Initiative should be reduced to some three to five priorities (such as transportation, C4ISR, and air traffic control) and incorporate successful national experiences, such as the U.S. use of commercial assets (e.g., CRAF) for strategic lift. The new NATO Defense Initiative also needs to focus on niche specialization as a way to "extend" national capabilities and "fill" (not close) the gap; it needs to develop new NATO projects that focus on role specialization, niche capabilities, and multinationality.

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Among the "lessons learned" by the three members who joined NATO in 1999 were the following: (1) the process of developing capabilities involved "severe bumps;" (2) NATO did *not* increase common support funds; and (3) the anticipated "savings" from cutting armed forces for modernization did *not* materialize. These "lessons" have relevance for NATO's prospective new members.

Unless NATO introduces and institutionalizes a new approach to defense and force planning, any capabilities goals adopted at Prague will likely remain only headline goals. The new defense and force planning approach should include the following:

1. NATO needs to provide specific advice for specialized force planning. The Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) experience demonstrated that NATO needs to develop a new approach to joint training. NATO needed 30 nations to field 50,000 troops. Bosnia demonstrates that NATO's concept of "national responsibility" is no longer useful.

2. NATO needs to provide international training support (especially for counter-terrorism operations) and develop a new approach to multinational formations. NATO's 45 years of Cold War experience that national-level military operations below corps size was "folly" has been turned on its head with the new concept of niche capabilities. But NATO's new members will have different capacities to develop such capabilities. Acquiring these capabilities will be easier for those countries that are building their militaries from the ground up than for those that have inherited Warsaw Pact force structures.

3. NATO also needs to develop a new system to finance international military operations. NATO's new members have found it difficult to finance their military participation in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. All new members have had to finance operations abroad by either increasing defense budgets, postponing modernization, increasing debt, and/or borrowing funds by floating government bonds.

Managing A Larger NATO After Prague

After November 2002, when NATO is likely to invite seven new members, the alliance will face many new political and military challenges.

Political Challenges: Consensus building in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and in various committees has worked thus far. This will not necessarily continue to be the case in the future. NAC decisionmaking will likely be further complicated by enlargement to 26 countries, countervailing pressures that EU membership will place on certain allies, and divergent EU and NATO memberships. Some observers argue that the size of the NAC will not necessarily complicate decisionmaking, claiming the Atlantic dimension will be strengthened once all 21 of the future 26 NAC members are in the EU. While possible, experience suggests this is unlikely; NATO's present committee structure—with working groups numbering 400—is too cumbersome and in need of overhaul. Consideration should also be given to expanding the authority of the NATO secretary general to initiate and orchestrate action.

While Article 5 actions might still require consensus, the NATO concept of "constructive abstention" ...might be expanded to include implementation of Article 4 operations.

The alliance may also want to reconsider the way the NAC makes decisions. While Article 5 actions might still require consensus, the NATO concept of "constructive abstention"—not breaking silence for minor issues—might be expanded to include implementation of Article 4 operations.[4] Certain Article 4 actions might even be undertaken under a broadly endorsed NAC consensus on "principle," with the main operational contributors providing military guidance. In effect, the main contributors would act more like a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) "within" NATO than a CJTF to the EU. Still another approach worth considering would be a modified "NAC minus, plus" concept for Article 4 operations. This would allow for the participation of countries like Finland and Sweden that provide peacekeepers to NATO operations but have no political voice in the NAC.

NAC decisionmaking will increasingly be challenged by the need to coordinate with the EU and to make the two processes complementary. In order to improve coordination, after enlargement more dual-member states might consider assigning the same ambassador to the EU and NATO. The creation of a NATO–EU political-military committee could facilitate cooperation and coordination.

Military Challenges: NATO's military structure will also require a major overhaul. Targeting decisions during the 1999 Kosovo air campaign became very contentious within the alliance. If another NATO-led operation outside the North Atlantic region is unlikely for the foreseeable future, then perhaps NATO's military command functions should be altered to *prepare* forces, rather than to command them operationally.

The war on terrorism has different requirements from defense against a traditional aggression in Europe. NATO's command structure for Afghanistan does not exist. The United States used CENTCOM instead; the Afghanistan operation involved a coalition of the willing under U.S. command. If NATO is to ever operate in a counter-terrorism role, it will need to set up a Special

Operations Joint Task Force (JTF) Coordination Cell that can be flexible for counter-terrorism and include intensified intelligence sharing on terrorist activities and WMD.

Finally, NATO needs to reduce and reform its already overburdened, politically driven military command structure. Simplification is also necessary because many of NATO's new members will find it very difficult to fill personnel positions at various other commands as well as at Mons and Evere.

NATO's Relations With Russia and Ukraine

Since September 11, 2001, Russia has made more concrete contributions to U.S. objectives in the war on terrorism than most NATO allies by not blocking U.S. military operations in Central Asia. That said, it is not at all clear that this convergence of interests will form a foundation for a more robust NATO-Russia cooperation. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established at the May 28, 2002 Rome summit with the goal of building a cooperative security structure in the Euro-Atlantic region to deal with nine areas. Counter-terrorism cooperation may prove quite problematic in the long term. The Chechen legacy and Russian assessments of the causes of terrorism might lead to the perception that NATO and Russia have joined forces against the "Islamic threat." There may be better potential for cooperation on problems in Central Asia and theater missile defense (where the Russians have expertise and hardware to sell), arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs), search and rescue operations at sea, and slowing proliferation of WMD and dual-use technologies (vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq).

In reality the NRC may not differ too much from the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) created in 1997, but the perception that this is a new start, formed under different circumstances, makes it different. The PJC did not engage in real dialogue. It was not a forum of 19 plus one but of 19 against one. The RNC is also different from the PJC, which operated on the basis of the "troika" process. The RNC will have the NATO secretary general act as chairman with all 20 partners sitting around the table. A "pre-cooked" agenda, as formed for PJC sessions, does not have to prevail in the RNC. Hence, the RNC will be more similar to the NAC in form, and it remains to be seen if this will carry over to process (where the NAC often divides along Greece-Turkey or U.S.-France lines). One challenge of the new structure is that pulling back an issue from consideration in the NRC to the NAC could be immediately perceived as a crisis in NATO-Russia relations. It may well depend on how Russia chooses to play such an action.

In reality the NRC may not differ too much from the PJC ... but the perception that this is a new start, formed under different circumstances, makes it different.

The NRC is both a tremendous chance and a significant risk for NATO. Will Russia use the NRC to develop constructive cooperation or to attempt to exploit national differences and weaken the alliance? Optimists argue that it will take time to build trust, in part, because the "trust deficit" brought the PJC to a halt. Skeptics argue that September 11 did not change Russia overnight; that it still pursues an imperialist policy in Abkhazia, Transdniestria, and Ukraine, and that it hides its brutality in Chechnya under the banner of the war on terrorism. The proof will come soon enough.

Russia's decision to seek a new relationship with NATO, coupled with NATO's commitment to a robust enlargement at the Prague summit and a post–September 11 recognition by Ukraine's leadership that the country's security could not be guaranteed outside the framework of transatlantic security institutions, set the stage for the May 23, 2002 decision of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council to make membership in NATO a long-term goal. Kiev recognized that these developments could marginalize Ukraine in Euro-Atlantic security structures. Ukrainian public opinion toward NATO has also shifted, reducing the risk that closer relations with the alliance would exacerbate internal polarization. Ukrainians no longer fear a NATO-Russian confrontation. Now 40 percent of the population supports joining NATO, with 30 percent opposed compared to 50 percent in the past.

Although the original 1997 Ukraine Commission, compared to the PJC, contained extensive language of cooperation, Ukraine remains a NATO "gray area." United States policy has also been seen as tepid in Ukraine—beginning with President George Bush Senior's "chicken Kiev" speech and continuing through the Clinton administration's focus on cooperative threat reduction (CTR) efforts to Secretary of State Colin Powell's lukewarm reaction to Ukraine's May 23 decision to move closer to NATO. Most West Europeans do not have a Ukraine policy either. The United States needs to energize its bilateral policy toward Ukraine and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Poland, which sees Ukraine as part of the European security solution, is concerned that Ukraine will get pushed aside as NATO seeks cooperation with Russia.

The Future of MAP and PfP

If, as expected, the Prague summit decides on a "big bang" enlargement, NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) and PfP programs will require substantial modification. In light of the experience of the three July 1997 invitees, with seven more expected in November 2002, there is the very real danger of integration fatigue and waning interest in the MAP and PfP. A NAC at 26 will bring about a fundamental shift in the balance between members and partners. A smaller number of less enthusiastic partners without membership prospects will remain in the PfP, and the MAP will continue with only three partners.

A NAC at 26 will bring about a fundamental shift in the balance between members and partners.

The Reykjavik summit communiqué of May 14, 2002 was quite specific in continuing the 2002–2003 MAP cycle through spring 2003, adding that "invitees will participate in subsequent MAP cycles until the ratification process has been completed." While the "goal is that all invitees should accede on a common date before the next Summit," individual invitees will discuss specific issues and reforms and a "timetable for the completion of these reforms should be established, including for those unlikely to be realized until after accession."[5] Croatia was invited to join the MAP (paragraph 9) and expects NATO to maintain an "open door." Some Poles argued that since Ukraine has stated its intention to join the alliance, NATO needs to clarify Ukraine's role and suggest establishing a MAPbis relationship. Indeed, the balance of attention and energy will shift more toward integration than toward a smaller MAP. The new NATO Defense Initiative also will have an impact on MAP Annual National Plans (ANPs).

After the accession of the seven most recent candidates to NATO, there will be more members in the alliance (26) than in the PfP (17)—comprising eight from Central Asia and the Caucasus, five "neutrals," Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova—or in the MAP, which will be reduced to only three participants—Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia. Will the changed NATO-PfP balance in membership affect the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)? Can the PfP framework and EAPC maintain their significance? Both remain important incentives for Bosnia and Serbia, and their weakening can have ramifications on Balkan stability and security.

After the next round of enlargement, NATO may need to augment PfP's resources and reexamine some of its original concepts regarding self-differentiation and geographic coverage. The 1999 Strategic Concept defined PfP as a "core function" of the alliance, but it remained a "headline goal" because of resource scarcity. Unless resources are added, PfP will not likely actualize its potential. PfP will require broadened activities with a more global view on asymmetric threats. When the notion of self-differentiation was introduced with PfP in 1994, it worked for many partners but proved disastrous for those from the Caucasus and Central Asia, because their internal absorptive capabilities were lacking and NATO also failed to attract their interest. Future PfP activities in the latter regions, particularly in a cooperative counter-terrorism campaign, suggest the need for a more directed program rather than one based simply on self-differentiation.

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Finally, NATO needs to assess whether PfP's present geographic area is still valid. Improved relations with the Islamic world should be a larger priority of NATO's political and security dialogues than has been the case in the past. Most Mediterranean countries are not very interested in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. This may provide a potential avenue for greater EU–NATO cooperation with the EU Mediterranean Dialogue countries and PfP partners.

Conclusions

While U.S. and European risk assessments since September 11 continue to diverge, they are not irreconcilable. Common U.S. and European interests in the stability of the global economy remain more closely aligned than U.S. interests with any other group of states. These enduring interests form a strong foundation for maintaining NATO, even as its military and decisionmaking structures evolve to take into account the new security challenges of the twenty-first century.

While the alliance is no longer a focal point of U.S. security planning, fears in Europe that Washington is loosing interest in NATO as a military body or that it views the alliance as a military "chop shop," useful only for spare parts that can be cobbled onto a U.S. military operation, are overstated. The promotion of a new defense capabilities initiative at the Prague summit reflects Washington's desire to have allies who are prepared to take more serious actions, to narrow the military capabilities gap in key areas, and to work as fuller partners in the more stressful aspects of the war on terrorism.

A significantly enlarged NATO will have to find new ways to organize its decisionmaking and operations, if it is to maintain consensus and flexibility. If the NATO-Russia Council is to work, Allies will have to work hard to give it more operational content and to be prepared to pull back an issue from consideration in the NRC to the NAC when allied and Russian interests diverge. Much will depend on how Russia chooses to deal with an enlarged NATO. At the same time, the alliance must not loose sight of its relations with Ukraine and other potential members. Finally, as the war on terrorism has shown, NATO needs to consider more programs specifically directed at the Caucasus and Central Asia, as part of an integrated strategy to provide security and stability throughout the Eurasian security space.

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Notes

[1] Nicole Gnesotto, "Preface," in Julian Lindley-French, "Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post–11 September," *Chaillot Paper* 52 (Paris: ISS, May 2002): 5.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 11–16.

[3] IISS notes that "achievement of *full* operating capability by December 2003 is unlikely" suggesting that the EU "acknowledge openly that final operating capability can only be achieved by a much later date, say 2012 [emphasis added]." *The Military Balance 20001–2002* (London: IISS, October 2001), 290, 291. See also Jolyon Howorth, "The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11, 2001," *Policy Paper* 1 (Paris: Notre Europe, March 2002), 13.

[4] Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that "The Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

[5] NATO Summit Communiqué, May 14, 2002, paras 6–8.

ORGANIZING NATO FOR THE FUTURE

Klaus Becher

NATO's Prague summit has been burdened in advance with an overwhelming agenda. It is to launch the next round of enlargement, substantiate a new focus on terrorism, make another push at improved capabilities and outline the adaptation of the alliance's institutional structures to a new era. Nobody should be surprised if this summit proves to be only the beginning of a longer period of transformation in the alliance. This transformation will take time, especially since member states have not yet been able to focus sufficiently on what direction they want it to take, having been preoccupied by September 11 and its consequences, as well as (notably in France and Germany) by elections. The transformation, though slow in its gestation, is likely to be a fundamental one. Even those at the heart of today's NATO know that the alliance will have to change in many ways to be able to continue in its role as the key element of defense cooperation and common transatlantic security.

While it is important that the Prague summit provides a strong positive perspective to all stakeholders of the alliance—including all the membership candidates of different degrees of preparedness, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as the EU countries that are not NATO members—it will be a good idea to give members more time to develop a new formula that would allow NATO to adapt itself to the changed expectations in a new strategic environment. Enlargement remains a key element of any such new formula, as the unfinished agenda of restoring and widening a coherent space of democratic stability, security, and prosperity in Europe after the end of the continent's East-West division is still the most important task. Since enlargement will eventually require the ratification of accession agreements in member states, it may well be worth thinking about combining this process with any other potentially useful statutory adaptations, such as possible changes to the Washington Treaty of 1949 that may recommend themselves during early discussions about how to transform the structures and institutions of the future shape of the alliance.

Who Needs NATO?

Many are still accustomed to considering NATO as an American institution—a tool of U.S. power vis-à-vis Europeans. Leaving the question aside of whether this view was ever quite accurate, it certainly now fails to take into account that, for the United States, investing a major portion of its power resources on European soil seems increasingly pointless after Russia has turned

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into a close ally and new vital threats have emerged elsewhere, as demonstrated on September 11, 2001. The U.S. military presence in Europe is likely to be reduced even more substantially over the next ten years, driven not only by a shift in defense priorities but also by strong budgetary pressures to cut manpower and bases.

A strong U.S. political and economic presence in Europe will be a given fact of life in any case—with or without a NATO presence—as a consequence of the pre-eminent role of the United States in our shared international system. In addition, it will remain in the U.S. interest to closely interact with European countries on the level of security agencies to counter multiple domestic and trans-national security threats, both in cooperation with others and on its own. Such arrangements, however, can equally well be organized bilaterally, without recourse to NATO as a multilateral treaty framework. In fact, in most cases such U.S. presence has already been dealt with bilaterally in the past. It comes naturally to the United States to prefer bilateral channels; these are generally considered quicker, safer, and more practical than multinational forms of cooperation.

This relapse into a system of bilateralism is likely to weaken not just the allies but also the United States.

Indeed, multinational frameworks, such as NATO, tend to offer more advantages to second- and third-tier countries than to the dominant member state, which can normally pursue its policies more easily (though, in the long term, not necessarily more effectively) by working bilaterally with individual countries. Above all, in a multilateral organization these other countries can add their weight to produce a more noticeable impact on decisions than they could have individually.

In the wake of September 11, it became obvious that the United States is the only country in the world that is in a position to muster a swift, coherent, and successful response to that kind of existential challenge. In the immediacy of events, allies in Europe, just as elsewhere, reacted by stepping up their bilateral links with Washington at the expense of existing multilateral frameworks, such as NATO, the EU, G7/G8, OSCE, and the UN. At least temporarily, this created a hub-and-spoke architecture with Washington as the pivot of action—along with the notions of multilateralism *à la carte* and ad-hoc coalitions.

This is a worrying trend. It is apt to breed an increasing notion of unilateral dependency among allies that undermines, politically as well as organizationally, their ability to employ their strengths alongside the United States where that is in the common interest. At the same time, it diminishes the prospects of working out common political and strategic approaches between the United States and its allies as a sustainable basis for joint action over the long term. In effect, this relapse into a system of bilateralism is likely to weaken not just the allies but also the United States.

On the military side, the campaigns in Kosovo and Afghanistan sent the message to European allies that the United States was increasingly unlikely to use established NATO command structures for U.S.-led operations with European allies. While the United States may reconsider this negative approach in the future, it must be clear that the U.S. military is perfectly capable of conducting any operation it is ordered to perform without recourse to allied capabilities—except for base access and support in theaters of operation. Militarily, NATO's integrated military structures may be nice to have for the United States, but they are neither indispensable nor high on the list of strategic priorities.

Here is the decisive difference. European NATO members (and Canada) have organized their defense efforts on the assumption that the integrated multinational military structures of NATO are available as a framework for their national contributions. This has become true even for France since the early 1990s. No European country would wish to be left without such a framework. To the contrary, the combination of rapid defense technological advances, limited defense budgets, and changing roles and missions makes more, not less defense integration desirable from a European viewpoint.

Can this be done just through the EU and its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)? In theory, yes. It would of course be possible for Europeans to let go of NATO and SHAPE and build up a new integration structure of their own over time and at large cost. But where would non-EU members of NATO then turn? Where would defense cooperation with the United States be dealt with in a strategic environment where a majority of potential future military operations are likely to be conducted in coalition with the United States?

Given that all but two of NATO's member states are European and that NATO has developed working mechanisms that have already put European commanders in charge of some NATO missions, there is much more sense in conceptually and practically adopting NATO as Europe's own defense alliance—an alliance that also preserves a reliable anchor for transatlantic defense cooperation and actively includes non-EU members in common defense structures as full alliance members or close cooperation partners. In the mid-term, it would be a consequent step to fill the post of SACEUR with a European who would command European-led operations, including NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) missions with U.S. participation.

If NATO did not exist, Europeans would want to invent it.

The bottom line is that if NATO did not exist, Europeans would want to invent it. It is Europeans who should work hard to make sure that the future NATO is shaped in such a way that it can serve their needs, while keeping the United States attracted to this kind of cooperative engagement.

A Guiding Idea for the Alliance

To be successful in a durable way, alliance members and their publics need to arrive at a new, strongly held common purpose. In the past, the unifying Soviet threat helped to provide that common sense of purpose, but it alone was hardly sufficient. Nor was it a necessary condition for Western unity. In the transformed environment of the early twenty-first century, the common purpose for a new NATO must be derived from an understanding of the main security and defense challenges of today and tomorrow and, at the same time, be embedded in an understanding of the nature of our networked, interdependent democratic societies whose fate is often inextricably linked to each other.

It is above all the shared vulnerabilities of the Western way of life, including its international economic and monetary system and the globalization of markets and capital flows, that provide a strong unifying bond and a strategic purpose for the common security and defense efforts of NATO—the Western way of life that provides not only the foundation for peace, freedom, and prosperity for EU and NATO countries, but also a sense of perspective and hope to those nations currently at the periphery that are set to face tremendous social and political challenges in the decades ahead.

When trying to define the new NATO's nature and mission, it is useful to distinguish between NATO as a treaty framework for political cooperation and common security based on the Washington Treaty, on the one hand, and NATO as a home for multinational military integration at SHAPE and other common defense institutions that have been established by member states under the roof of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the other hand.

War-like terrorism, the specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deliverable at short notice and at any distance, and the risk of demographic dynamics and bad governance leading to the violent collapse of order in various regions, some of them adjacent to Europe, are indicators of the scope of key challenges ahead. What is in short supply internationally, for individual nations as well as for multinational groupings, is the sufficient ability to act in response to this spectrum of emerging challenges.

The new NATO, within its specific regional field of focus and sometimes beyond it, will have the purpose to add to the combined abilities of its members, and thus the international community as a whole. These include their ability to act successfully in shaping, preserving, and defending a regional and global environment capable of improving the conditions for peaceful and benign development in harmony with democratic values and the sustained freedom and prosperity that underpin them.

The principal benchmark for the new NATO's future performance will be its incremental success in providing such an ability to act to its European and North American members. In almost all cases, this will require working in coordination with other nations. It will, by necessity, involve the full range of tools of international security policy. It will probably not allow a strict separation between external security challenges and transnational multi-domestic challenges. In this context, the new NATO will be only one among several frameworks of international security cooperation. Its particular strength is likely to always flow from its standing multinational military structures and the wealth of experience and interoperability associated with them.

Were it not for the ability of the two key actors—the United States and the EU—to work together in their shared role as guardian powers in the turbulent period of social and political transformation that lies ahead, prospects for international peace and development would hardly be encouraging.

Essentially, NATO has its future raison d'être in serving as one of the instruments designed to facilitate the co-management[1] of the international system by its two most capable actors—the United

States and the EU, who together account for more than 60 percent of the world's economic weight and an even higher share of world-wide military power. Indeed, were it not for the ability of these two key actors to work together in their shared role as guardian powers in the turbulent period of social and political transformation that lies ahead in many regions over the next decades, prospects for international peace and development would hardly be encouraging.

Politically, NATO will also continue to help its members, particularly in Europe, to gain strengthened legitimacy for their security and defense policies and the use of force where necessary. It will also continue to provide its non-U.S. members with a platform where they can hope to have some early input into U.S. decisionmaking as a basis for sustainable cooperation.

As the United States is likely to establish new, mission-specific alliances in other regions of the world of more immediate strategic relevance than Europe, it should be noted that NATO's transatlantic consultation framework is only likely to provide such influence to Europeans if they are willing and able to participate actively in such new alliance relationships, for example, in Central Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. It is unclear whether Europe's acceptance of a global role and responsibility will include such strategic commitments, including the ability to project power.

Yet, if NATO is needed above all as a framework for organizing the combined defense efforts of European countries, as has been suggested above, the traditional political rationale of NATO as a forum for consultation with and access to U.S. decisionmaking would become less dominant. As a consequence, the proper restructuring of the political side of NATO would appear less critical, in terms of both time and substance, than the proper realignment of its military integration mechanisms.

Organizing the Alliance Politically

As it stands, NATO's political profile is not configured optimally for rapid, successful action. While little evidence exists that incoming new members would be less cooperative than existing ones, the expansion in numbers alone may well make discussions, decisions, and bureaucracies more cumbersome. Equally, while there is no real reason to believe that Russia's inclusion in decisions and common measures on a specific range of topics is going to weaken the alliance, this new arrangement is still perceived as lessening NATO's focus on defense.

The core group of force-contributing nations should be able to determine the conduct of NATO operations flexibly and efficiently, even if some other member countries hold reservations.

In spite of strong support for enlargement in the United States, there will be a need at one point to convince senators and the public that an enlarged NATO will not be a useless talking shop, or even an instrument to restrain U.S. power. The best way to do that would be to stress NATO's highly useful military integration aspect over its political aspects—with Europeans winning U.S. military support for European security and defense when required and the United States having capable allies who add to the overall ability to cope with international security problems. For this purpose, it would make sense to streamline NATO's political and diplomatic decisionmaking mechanisms in relation to the conduct of military operations. In particular, the core group of force-contributing nations should be able to determine the conduct of NATO operations flexibly and efficiently, even if some other member countries hold reservations.

The current widespread perception of an increasing alienation between the United States and its European allies—fed by a stream of heated, sometimes hypocritical, sometimes misinformed, and sometimes legitimate, commentary—is unlikely to persist. The current U.S. administration has actually, from the beginning, been more willing than its predecessors to share power cooperatively with regional allies. (It must be said, though, that this intention was not usually communicated with sufficient clarity and with the required awareness of the vastly different political styles and rhetoric in the United States and in Europe. It also has not been accepted by every individual U.S. official.)

What is decisive, however, is that despite a growing sense of U.S. dominance in the international system the broad vulnerabilities faced by the United States and others, and the limited resources at their command to support a sufficient ability to act, provide convincing evidence to the Bush administration that even the United States needs allies and that it must therefore provide determined but cooperative leadership to nurture such alliance relationships that promise practical success.

Defining Europe as a strategic antidote to the United States, as some have been suggesting, is not in European nations' best interest. European integration was made possible after 1945, because Europe was fundamentally bound together with the United States. Those who now claim that Europe can only assert itself by turning against the United States are attempting to redefine the very nature of the European integration process and its successes. As a consequence of the unprecedented degree of interdependence between Western democracies, there is only one agenda. There is no historical example of a constellation where two powers shared one economic space but chose rivalry over cooperation and did not end up in misery, like in the case of Britain and Germany in 1914.

To accommodate the new international standing of the EU, the new NATO will have to reflect a more mature transatlantic partnership, clearly different from the hierarchical structure maintained during the East-West confrontation.

The EU and European NATO members have recently shown in the Macedonian and Montenegrin crises that European nations have learned to act together in European unity as Europe's own pacifier, making the United States less essential in this peculiar role—but, in most cases, Europeans will damage their own ability to act successfully and jeopardize the combined international ability to act whenever they opt against working hand in hand with the United States.

With a single market and a common currency that give EU nations, as a group, similar international weight as the United States, Europeans will be less and less able to accept a junior partner role. They should however not lose sight of the fact that they will never have a vote in U.S. elections and will always have to live with the unpredictable dynamics of U.S. domestic policy that will continue to define the international agenda unilaterally to a considerable degree.

To accommodate the new international standing of the EU, the new NATO will have to reflect a more mature transatlantic partnership, clearly different from the hierarchical structure maintained during the East-West confrontation. To achieve this, Europeans will progressively want to act more responsibly, on the basis of having worked out their own wisely defined positions and prepared the capabilities for their implementation.

Organizing the Alliance Militarily

The devolution of operations in the Balkans to European control, the accession of new members and partners, the increased relevance of the Southern flank, the growth of ESDP and progress of force restructuring in European countries, the shifting of U.S. attention to other regions, the reorganization of the U.S. Unified Command Plan at the expense of NATO's Atlantic Command, European frustration with the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) during operations in Afghanistan, the transformed defense industrial and procurement landscape, the increasing focus on jointness and the impact of new technologies on the conduct of military operations and intelligence, all taken together, provide a situation that requires a fundamental rethinking of the way NATO's military structures are organized. Should France, after the elections that ended its structural political paralysis, decide to become an active part of NATO's military integration, this need would become even more pressing.

NATO can play an important role ... in providing non-U.S. members with a framework for adapting their defense priorities and programs in an expedited, focused, and harmonized way.

The proposed establishment of a NATO Joint Transformation Command in Norfolk, Virginia, next to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), opens a highly attractive path that preserves and expands NATO's institutional presence on U.S. soil and facilitates European participation in the process of adapting forces and doctrines to the changing operational requirements and technological environment. To reap as much benefit as possible from such an arrangement, it might be worth setting up a new European Defense Academy for Jointness and Transformation in Norfolk, under a European commander, to develop a transformation strategy specifically adapted to European requirements, while keeping pace with U.S. approaches and experiences for the purpose of strategic compatibility and interoperability.

The asymmetric distribution of military roles in the alliance—with the United States, the only power with global military reach, being far more capable militarily than any other nation and even all its allies together—makes it impossible and undesirable for Europeans to simply copy the U.S. approach to transformation. The gap cannot be closed; in all likelihood, it is going to grow deeper and wider. Marginal increases in European defense spending will not change this picture.

European defense spending levels are not fundamentally inadequate and, in absolute terms, what Europeans spend on defense should be enough to supply them with all the military might they need to have. Due to traditional national approaches and structures adapted to Cold War allied defense, however, European capabilities are insufficiently focused, incoherent, and lacking the basis of any defined strategy and unified requirements. Outside the UK, too little is spent on defense research and development. Procurement budgets are burdened by expensive programs that are, in part, more a reflection of past strategies than of present requirements. Investment in readiness and excellence is also insufficient.

NATO can play an important role, building on the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), in providing non-U.S. members with a framework for adapting their defense priorities and programs in an expedited, focused, and harmonized way, including shared acquisition and operation as well as role specialization. It would be desirable to put Europeans in the driver seat here, with strong U.S. leadership, instead of presenting a U.S. wish list that reflects American strategic and industrial priorities rather than European needs.

From a European viewpoint, the task is to prepare the necessary set of capabilities to preserve NATO's military integration for the long term as a valued instrument of international security and defense in cooperation with the United States. In this context, it is very important that the United States now encourage its allies to engage in constructive duplication that would reduce reliance on U.S. military assets, thus alleviating pressures on limited U.S. resources and mitigating fears that the United States would be tied down by having to come to the rescue of failing European forces.

The progressive transition toward network-centric coalition operations will also require a more harmonized approach to defense industrial strategies and the sharing of technology. Without direct access to the U.S. defense market and U.S. defense research and development funds, European defense companies will either close down, be swallowed by U.S. competitors, turn themselves into U.S.-based companies, or lose their cutting-edge technological and systems-integration capacities. In the first three cases, European parliaments would be even less likely to spend money on defense modernization than before, as there would be much less return in terms of jobs, know-how, and tax revenues. In the fourth case, any money they spend would not result in increased capabilities.

Without the creation of an integrated transatlantic defense marketplace, the United States is much less likely to have capable allies in the future.

This means that without the creation of an integrated transatlantic defense marketplace, the United States is much less likely to have capable allies in the future. First of all, this would require a number of changes in U.S. legislation and administrative practices, some of which had already been advertised in the Pentagon's Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) that later got embroiled in Washington politics. While it would be an outdated idea to impose an intergovernmental regime on globalizing defense industrial firms, allied governments still are responsible for adjusting those rules that circumscribe what industry can and cannot do in response to changed priorities and requirements.

Winning Public Support for the New NATO

As in other phases of transformation in NATO's history, maintaining public support for the alliance is a crucial task for all member governments. Continental Europeans are facing a particularly challenging task in this sense in the years ahead. The absence of a clear sense of threat in Europe, uneasiness over U.S. dominance and perceived unilateralism, the political priority for establishing a strong European identity, and the unwillingness to spend more on defense at a time of macroeconomic difficulties and mundane voter expectations, all work together to weaken the political case for providing leadership for the strengthening of a new NATO.

Nonetheless, the realization is bound to gain hold that NATO's future is most of all in the interest of its European members, especially if they want to strengthen the EU's international role by providing it with some operational military power through combined national efforts and by mobilizing continued U.S. support. It will take some years, however, until Europeans have a clearer idea of what they want to do with their combined international responsibility and what the requirements are for realistically making good use of Europe's power.

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It will be necessary to develop a European vocabulary for security and defense, at both the national and European levels. The British experience of trying to combine a strong and trusted position in the transatlantic alliance and an equally strong spirit of national and European leadership in defense, as well as crisis management and international development, can provide some inspiration. Above all, European leaders should be exercising a new tone in justifying military decisions to their own publics—moving away from the easy line of argumentation that certain measures simply had to be taken because of U.S. insistence, and instead explaining and defending their actions as reflective of their own country's interest, largely overlapping with that of other allies.

Notes

[1] I recognize that the technocratic term "co-management"—like the related term "global governance"—does not do proper justice to the continuously shifting political dynamics in multiple democratic societies and might furthermore invite anti-colonialist sentiments in some quarters. For lack of a better term, I use it with some hesitation.

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