



Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft e.V. (pmg)

**In a Time of Change:
The Greater Middle East and the Future
of the Atlantic Alliance**

In cooperation with the



Center for Strategic & International Studies

CONFERENCE REPORT

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Foreword

The Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the German Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft e.V. (pmg) organize regular gatherings of experts to address questions of transatlantic security relations. Initiated in 1999 in Washington and continued in Berlin in 2001 and Washington in 2002, the most recent conference took place in Berlin on 17 November 2003.

In addressing the topic “**In a Time of Change: The Greater Middle East and the Future of the Alliance**”, the two organizations recognized that the Middle East would be the focus of transatlantic security policy for years, if not decades, to come. As such, this issue will also affect the content and tone of German-American relations. German-American relations are not currently as good as they could be. Nevertheless, the reality is more differentiated and complex than suggested by most headlines. Germans and Americans continue to accomplish much together.

The November conference provided an opportunity to address the German-American relationship openly and comprehensively. Top rate panelists and participants engaged in substantive dialogue regarding Atlantic engagement in the Middle East and the transformations this will require. Discussion focused on four main themes:

- The State of the Transatlantic Partnership
- The Transformation of Security Policy and Defense Capabilities
- Challenges in the Greater Middle East
- One-Way Streets or Transatlantic Avenues in Future Crisis Management

As in previous years, the conference was fortunate to enjoy generous support from the German Economics Ministry and the ERP fund, as well as from the Sunday newspaper “Welt am Sonntag”, published by the Axel Springer AG. These supporters are to be thanked for enabling high-quality discussion replete with important insights regarding the future of the transatlantic relationship. The main conclusions, as we have interpreted them, are summarized in the following conference report. Input papers by the Americans Laurent Murawiec and Celeste A. Wallander, and the German member of the parliament, Eckart von Klaeden are included in the appendix.

*Ralph Thiele
Chairman, pmg*

The State of the Transatlantic Partnership

Panel I

Panelists

pmg : Col. (GS) Karl Müllner (MoD)
Dirk Brengelmann (Chancellery)

CSIS: Kenneth Huffman (U.S. mission to NATO)
Dr. Celeste A. Wallander (CSIS)

Assessing the State of the Transatlantic Partnership, panel deliberations proceeded from the observation that the transatlantic partnership has been changing fast. Rethinking and redefining the old division of labor between NATO and the European Union has thus become more necessary.

Germany's Atlantic Interests

- **German security policy will continue to strongly emphasize the importance of addressing the “full range” of causes, particularly “root causes.”** Germany will want to make security policy in a highly multilateral way.
- **Germany wants America to succeed in Iraq, and many Germans think success is best had by quickly giving authority to the Iraqis and the UN.**
- **A “Strategic Dialogue” between Berlin and Washington will help to preempt political problems.** Nevertheless, volatile issues will continue to challenge German-American relations, particularly those related to when and how to use

Force – whatever the precise agreed definition of “preemption,” “prevention” and “collective self-defense.”

- **The United States needs to do more to encourage and support the building of the European Union.** Being more diplomatic could be an easy first step. The NATO response force is important, but the United States should also lend greater assistance to creating better European Union capabilities – this will also reflect well on NATO’s NRF.
- **As a community of interests and a community of values, the Atlantic community needs a framework of international law that can provide legitimacy to the use of force in a rapidly changing world.**

NATO’s High Operational Tempo

- **If “operations” are a measure of Alliance output, then the “state of the transatlantic partnership” is quite healthy.** NATO headquarters is busier than ever, managing five concurrent Alliance operations. The trend: more deployable forces and to areas farther from Europe.
- **The usability of Europe’s forces is woefully inadequate.** Less than five percent of European NATO troops can actually deploy out of theater.
- **Wealthy European nations must accept more responsibility for peace and progress in the Greater Middle East.** NATO is an ideal tool for the job, but when it comes to military capabilities, the Atlantic Alliance is “running on empty.”

International Institutions and Self-Interest

- **Self-interest motivates states’ adherence to international law and their participation in international organizations.** Effectiveness in securing the intended interests becomes the key determinant of institutional relevance. When cooperative efforts give advantage (as often the case with modern challenges), then incentives do exist for states to commit to short-term restraints for long-term benefits.

- **Successful international conflict resolution requires a *variety* of engaged institutions and actors.** In the same way that states face a *variety* of security problems, states must also wield a *variety* of instruments. Networked societies and networked threats necessitate networked responses, particularly across the Atlantic. In Iraq, there are *multiple* tasks for peace and security and no *one* policy or institution can meet them all. It is a matter of the UN, NATO *and* the Coalition.
- **To restore American support for international law and institutions, friends and allies in Europe must see how American commitment and effectiveness are linked.** A highly unipolar world does not automatically imply a highly unilateralist America. Effective, interest-based multilateralism is very much in the U.S. character. Call it *Multilateralist Realism*.
- **The accomplishments of the Atlantic community are many and they are worthy of recognition.** But differences also need attention, as well as understanding, definition, and last but not least, mitigation.

Box 1

The German-American Alliance for the 21st Century

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Washington DC on 27 February 2004

„...We must build a genuine partnership, connecting Europe and America with the wider Middle East, aimed at cooperating with the countries and peoples of that region to achieve these just objectives, and to live side by side in peace. Together with our friends and allies in Europe and the Greater Middle East, we will coordinate our efforts closely to respond to calls for reform in the region, and to develop specific proposals to put before the G8, US-EU, and NATO Summit meetings, which will be held in June 2004.”

Box 2

NATO's Rapid Response Force

“The NRF is designed to be a robust, high readiness, fully trained and certified force that is prepared to tackle the full spectrum of missions, including force. When NATO decides to employ it, the NRF will be ready to deploy in five days and will be able to sustain itself for 30 days. Based of recent scenarios, planners consider this to be sufficient time to contain and deter a given threat and restore stability, or to signal that more robust, graduated readiness forces are required to stabilize a given situation.” Source: www.nato.int

The Transformation of Security Policy and Defense Capabilities

Panel II

Panelists

pmg: BG Manfred Engelhardt (MoD)

CSIS: Dr. Clark Murdock (CSIS)
BG Robert Osterthaler (SAIC)
LTC(P) Michael Coss (CSIS)

In assessing the Transformation of Security Policy and Defense Capabilities, panel and participants discussed the relationship of the US and the European militaries in a time of transformation. They concluded that the development (and divergence) of Alliance militaries will have significant political and geostrategic implications, particularly in the context of European Union and NATO defense cooperation.

The Capabilities Gap

- **The current threat environment makes the capabilities gap about more than money.** In a global theater of ongoing operations, the gap is also about the use of force (who decides?) and the conduct of military operations (what rules of engagement?). When some countries have these capabilities and others do not, NATO's consensus decision-making process is challenged.
- **America's pursuit of advanced technology also makes the gap more than one of overall spending levels.** Europe spends much of its smaller defense budgets on sustaining large conscript armies (NATO's European members field 2.5 million troops while the United States fields 1.4 mil-

lion), thus leaving far less for advanced technology and procurement.

- **Whatever one thinks of European reluctance to take on the counter terrorism mission or develop the requisite military capabilities – it will force the United States and others to increasingly rely on coalitions of the “willing and able” rather than NATO and the UN.**
- **If American policy-makers are really serious about defense issues, they should be less concerned about the “independence” of an EU rapid reaction force, and more concerned about whether it can deploy and engage.**

The Transformation Mindset

- **The Department of Defense is fully committed to transforming defense capabilities, reforming the institutional processes associated with them, and doing so quickly.** The lightly armored, highly mobile Stryker Brigades are an example of this.
- **The Pentagon’s Transformation campaign is about uncertainty.** It is about the unknown unknowns. It is not an answer to a specific question, but a general one: What kind of capability is needed for an uncertain environment in the distant future?
- **Transformation is not just about change, but about mindset.** At the same time, planning alone will not suffice: money matters and redundancy costs. Role specialization and networking (interoperability) remain essential.

NATO and Transformation

- **The compatibility of NATO allies must be maintained.** To do so, allies must move away from reactive, static, platform-oriented forces, where de-confliction is the employment norm. They must move toward proactive, expeditionary, network-oriented forces, where integration is the employment norm.

- **Reconfiguring commands and forces is a permanent and slow process for NATO.** Political logjams are hard to avoid (e.g., the CJTF which after ten years is still more an idea than a capability). More of a transformation mindset could only help (and not just in NATO's new Transformation Command).
- **Basing modes in Europe will change, with US forces shifting east, and European forces looking for greater synergy and consolidation.** Efficiency should guide these decisions not politics – or retribution.
- **Bundeswehr planning has moved from a mission-based military to a capabilities-based one.** What the Bundeswehr can do has become the crucial issue. Some gaps will have to be consciously accepted so that other areas can be fully developed. Role specialization can help to make capabilities truly capable.

Box 3

Full Spectrum Dominance

Full spectrum dominance means a broad suite of capabilities that will enable the US to defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations, emphasizing adaptability, decentralized operations, and decision superiority to see first, understand first, and act first, before the enemy can adapt.

Challenges in the Greater Middle East

Panel III

Panelists

pmg: Laurent Murawiec (Hudson Institute)
Matthias Meyer (MFA)

CSIS: Dr. Shireen Hunter (CSIS)
LCDR Lance Leshner (CSIS)

Examining the wide variety of Challenges in the Greater Middle East, discussion noted the general systemic crisis in the Arab world and the unique challenges of hot spots from Kabul to Tehran to Jerusalem.

Modernization and Democracy in the Middle East

- **The global sweep of modernization and democratization has bypassed the Arab Moslem world.** Whether on education or women's rights, the rule of law or the growth of wealth, the number of young or the number of enraged – available social indicators provide a devastating picture of backwardness.
- **Democracy is a universal value; it is an exportable commodity, and an importable one.** Nobody loses their soul by becoming more democratic and less autocratic. To assert the contrary is racist, perhaps disguised as “respect for the culture of those people.”
- **There are many in the Arab world who aspire to achieve modernity and democracy.** They are now excluded from power and participation, yet the future of the Middle East is

tied to with them. They are our friends, our partners, our allies.

Mideast Terrorism

- **The price/earnings ratio (PER) of terrorism is high.** For the terrorist calculus, the strategic benefits are immense. The price, by contrast, of committing terrorist acts (murders, bombings, hijackings, and sundry other acts of destruction and disruption) is very moderate.
- **The primary units of terrorism are those states for which terrorism is an important part of the political calculus.** The individual terrorist or individual terrorist groups are manifestations – waxing and waning, recruiting and recombining all the time. Reversing the terrorist price/earnings ratio means going after states that harbor them, getting those states to work for you instead of against you.
- **The *jihadi* have awakened the slumbering U.S. giant and propelled it into action.** The Moslem Brotherhood joined hands with the Saudi Wahhabi to form an Islamintern, but this *jihadi* international had its roots among the “Four Aces” – Iran, Syria, Saddam’s Iraq, Saudi Arabia.
- **The War on Terrorism is a long war.** It will not end without addressing the root cause of terrorism: the stagnation and self-destruction brought about by the Arab Islamic world’s systemic crisis.


Local Struggles - Atlantic Responses

- **In Afghanistan, lacking security obstructs reconstruction and development.** Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) can bring security and development, creating islands of stability as example and incentive. Such local successes are as important as establishing a justice system or training police.
- **Partnerships with the locals promise success.** Trust must be established: that we are serious about cooperation; that

we seek to understand their interests; that we aspire to treat them as equals.

- **Iran is pivotal, because of its location and size, but also because of its impact on transatlantic relations and strategy toward the Greater Middle East.** Europe and America could play mutually reinforcing roles in Tehran, if coordination across the Atlantic runs smoothly.
- **Iran is at a watershed, facing fundamental choices and the possibility of great change, if not upheaval.** The West needs to offer carrots as well as sticks in its effort to shape this process. Closer relations with Iran would be of great value, both in Iraq (Shia make up 60 percent of the Iraqi population) and in the war on terrorism.
- **The West must be in agreement on what it would do in the case of Iranian development of nuclear weapons.** Closed ranks serve as a deterrent. If military action is decided upon, unity brings greater legitimacy and effectiveness. Iranian nuclear weapons are a line in the sand that should not be crossed.
- **Americans are pro-Israel, but their views on the Mideast conflict are multifaceted.** They are not fundamentally anti-Arab or anti-Islamic. They are, however, sympathetic with the plight of the Israelis. The survival of Israel is important to most Americans (not just to those “duped” by the Jewish lobby). For Americans, Israel is a democracy (albeit a troubled one) and it is home for a people who have suffered genocide (though that does not give them a blank check).
- **Americans oppose Israeli violence against Palestinian civilians.** At the same time, they think Israel’s army is fighting terrorists and that some collateral damage is unavoidable. When it comes to Israel, there is thus a “tolerance gap” across the Atlantic.

Box 4



From The Economist print edition, Jul 4th 2002

One-Way Streets or Transatlantic Avenues in Future Crisis Management

Panel IV

Panelists

pmg: Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt (MFA)
Dr. Horst Freytag (MFA)

CSIS: MAJ Jeff Oppenheim
(U.S. Military Delegation to NATO)
CAPT Steve Vanderplas (CSIS)
Robert McMullin (CSIS)

The final panel, One-Way Streets or Transatlantic Avenues in Future Crisis Management, looked at a variety of challenges arising from NATO's relations with the areas around its periphery, from Russia to the Greater Middle East. While discussion pointed to considerable, indeed remarkable, progress in reshaping relations with Moscow, there was concern about the prospects of agreeing on a common NATO strategy for the Greater Middle East.

NATO's New Endeavors

- **Under the rubric of “new members, new capabilities, and new relationships,” NATO has taken on an impressive, if not daunting, range of new tasks. Most remarkable is NATO's operation in Afghanistan. Germany's leadership role with ISAF and the Provincial Reconstruction Team in**

Konduz indicates the possibility of Atlantic cooperation when agreement on objectives can be found.

- **The NATO Russia Council is playing a crucial role in NATO's realignment.** In the Middle East, it can help to secure Russian cooperation, or at least prevent deliberate interference. There is no substitute for cooperation with Russia in the areas of counter-terrorism, crisis management and civil emergency response, which are three specific areas of emphasis for the NATO Russia Council. NATO clearly has a significant interest in the Russian armed forces remaining strong, in the same way that NATO has an interest in a strong and stable Russia.
- **The NATO Rapid Reaction Force is absolutely vital to the transformation effort and, if executed, will greatly enhance the Alliance's ability to be credible in the new security environment.** The NRF will also make Europe more convincing to U.S. policymakers who are reluctant to include a role for NATO in current operations.

NATO and the Greater Middle East

- **Even if the European NATO members found the political will for a larger role in crisis resolution in the Greater Middle East, lacking military capabilities would remain a major constraint.** European aspirations may be laudable, but the “show me the money” factor cannot be ignored. Reform is good, but many of the most important requirements can only be met through substantial investments of capital and realignment of politically sensitive personnel and legal policies. In this sense “talk is cheap.”
- **In Iraq, the common desire for success is nevertheless undermined by vastly different tactical approaches – and the limited willingness of other allies to devote the kind of resources necessary for success.** The donors' conference in Madrid demonstrated Europe's limited commitment. At the same time, the more NATO can do in Afghanistan, the more the United States will be freed up to concentrate on Iraq – on missions that may be politically untenable for European nations to currently conduct.

- **Expanding the partnership with the Mediterranean Dialogue nations also offers the prospect of helping to solve the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.** Few organizations have a better track record than NATO in dealing with ethnic and religious conflict.
- **A common Atlantic strategy for the Greater Middle East nevertheless remains elusive.** Differing intellectual approaches pose a major hurdle. Europeans emphasizes “stability” while the United States wants “transformation.” Europeans want “dialogue” while the United States wants to “challenge” the countries of the Middle East.

Appendix

Transatlantic Challenges

Eckart von Klaeden

The world appears to be in a state of disorder. The Western liberal way of life is the object of hatred and the most ruthless opposition. The challenge for the transatlantic partnership is to find a common agenda, a shared view about the role and the tasks of this alliance.

At the moment, European foreign policy shows little sign of unity or a common line. There is a lack of both clarity and reliability. But no one is quite sure what is really happening in America either: how it wants to shape its role in the world and how the United States sees the prospects for its relations with Europe and the non-Western world.

So there is certainly a lack of clarity on both sides of the Atlantic, which is also an indication that we are making too little effort to understand each other. This statement may sound simple, but I regard it as one of the crucial challenges for our future. America and Europe should withstand the temptation to simply sit back and accept that their interests, intentions and political perspectives will diverge even further. If the West can see itself as a community sharing the

ECKART VON KLAEDEN is member of the parliament in Berlin

same destiny, if it can pool its capabilities, then it will be better able to pursue its interests and meet its responsibilities in the globalized world. We must make the effort to put our relationship in order, to develop understanding for each other and to reach a common view of things.

In order to seek common ground in this situation, it is necessary to take a closer look at the challenges the transatlantic partnership has to face. Of course, the turbulence currently effecting transatlantic relationships would have been inconceivable only a short time ago. But as always, the current crisis calls attention not only to developments that have long been underway, but also to their underlying causes. Two dates symbolize this: November 9th, 1989, and September 11th, 2001.

The first represents the end of the post-World War II world order. The threat of East-West conflict, a concern shared on both sides of the ocean, was the basis for the Atlantic Alliance. But as the policy of detente began to reduce that feeling of threat, difficulties began to emerge. These difficulties are exemplified by conflicts about NATO's "Double Track" decision and about Star Wars, the space-based rocket defense system that President Reagan tried to develop in the 1980s.

This perception of a shared risk was an important foundation for transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, if we study the details of Cold War era security policy debates, we see numerous examples of disagreement about whether certain zones in the Atlantic Alliance re-

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quire different levels of security. This was part of the debate about the medium range rockets.

Then came the shock of September 11th. The vulnerability of modern civilization, with its grandiose opportunities and the potential dangers that necessarily accompany them, was revealed. The spread of weapons of mass destruction has merely intensified the situation. September 11th also symbolizes the fact that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US is the only remaining super power. America's military and political power is unchallenged.

When facing difficulties, we must remind ourselves both of the successes and of the significance of transatlantic relations. Then we can draw the correct conclusions for the future. In general, but particularly from the German and the European points of view, Atlantic relations since the end of the Second World War have been an extraordinary success story. We have seen over 50 years of peace, democratic freedom and political stability, as well as unprecedented economic progress.

Has our own success left us exhausted? Or is the Atlantic community losing its significance simply because the world has changed so much? Europe thinks that there is no need for an American partner for its security. The United States thinks, in its position of hegemony, that it no longer needs to rely on its long term, institutionally secured partnerships. Instead, Washington is directing its attention to new regions and new issues of global development.

Anyone who takes a closer look at the global condition can see that the West, with its civilizing modernism, with its advantages and its darker sides, incites both envy and defensive actions. The close co-existence of poverty and affluence, of political stability and political disorder, of vastly different degrees of development, and of cultural and religious identities—all these things create divisions and tensions that affect the West as a whole. This is the other side to our achievements. It results from our shared history, experiences and persuasions, our comparatively high levels of economic and social prosperity, and our political freedom and stability. Just as many people in other parts of the world envy these qualities, many simultaneously reject the darker side of western life styles. One must not necessarily accept the prediction of a ‘clash of civilizations’ to understand the common nature of our interests and responsibilities. Moreover, we do in fact want to uphold and assert our achievements and our ideas about human life and governments in a changing world. So if a shared feeling of threat provides a foundation for alliances in general, and for the Atlantic Alliance in particular, then we should remember that these new risks that follow the collapse of the division between East and West threaten all of us.

The large number of regional conflicts and problems simultaneously demanding our attention have developed such momentum that neither America nor Europe is alone capable of keeping them in check, much less of managing them. Iran, North Korea, the Middle East conflict, regions like the Caucasus and Africa as well, will keep us

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busy for a long time to come, and they will demand joint action from the West.

A division of labor that allows different countries to assume different burdens would be a good way forward, but would demand a high degree of trust and desire for partnership on both sides. The strong French presence in the European interim peace keeping mission to Congo and the significant German commitment in Afghanistan point in this direction.

The appropriate response to all these challenges is cohesion in the West. We share the same destiny. This demands that we show a maximum amount of cooperation and make the effort required to reach strategic consensus, which means neither hasty unilateral action, nor the categorical refusal to get involved. The main point will be to establish clarity about decision-making mechanisms. These will be needed for the evaluation of when exactly which kind of action or measure is required. This decision-making must also be organized in a form that fits under international law.

International law cannot and will not replace military power or make such power superfluous. The law needs enforcement in the form of the sword. The transatlantic debate must address this reality, especially with regard to current threats. At the very least, Europeans must address the questions raised by America's new security policy, although the answer to these questions may not necessarily lie in Europe. Security can no longer rely on mutual capacity for overkill, as it did in the bipolar world of the Cold War. When the collapse of

order in 'failing states' poses a possible security threat for the entire world, then national sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law prohibiting intervention are increasingly problematic. This is the problem in Afghanistan with Al Qaeda, or in Somalia. The right to self-defense, as well as the notion of emergency intervention in others' defense and the principle of non-intervention, are no longer sufficient for securing peace, and international law must reflect this fact. If sovereignty thereby loses its significance, the need for decision-making processes that achieve legitimacy through international law becomes even more important. The more efficient the multilateral leadership structure, the more effective will be the threat of military force as a strategy against international terrorism and failing states. These goals are best achieved in conjunction with the Atlantic partnership, and not through disharmony and the building of 'axes.'

Could a politically united and economically strong Europe with sufficient military capabilities be an alternative to Atlantic partnership? This question lands us square in the middle of current disagreements. These disagreements have demonstrated yet again that Europe cannot be united against the United States of America. Any attempt to unite Europe against the United States is doomed to fail. Those who want to position Europe against America will divide it. A strong and united Europe that sees being a transatlantic partner as in its own interest will be able to make a much larger contribution to confronting common challenges. Therefore, strengthening Europe

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and the transatlantic partnership is the best way to prevent unilateral actions.

NATO has succeeded in giving itself a global orientation. As Europeans, we must strengthen the Alliance and relieve America's burden by building our own capabilities. As we do so, we must take care to avoid competition and ensure our resources are bundled sensibly. Otherwise, I fear that we – the West – may risk weakening ourselves as a result.

America and Europe must agree on a forward-looking definition of security that comprises a twin-track approach: Apart from the core function of defense and protection of the alliance territory and solidarity in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance should take on a broader political mission. NATO should offer our neighboring regions in the Middle East, on the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia assistance in regional stabilization by means of dialogue and cooperation.

NATO, being a transatlantic alliance of democracies, will only be able to adopt such a role if the partners meet their requirements as laid down at the Prague Summit. This is especially true in regard to building up the demanded capabilities for closing the technological gap within the Alliance—a gap that has come to endanger the military cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. Combat readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) resolved in Prague must be achieved as soon as possible and with top priority. The NRF is the result of the analysis of threats started in 1999 in the context of the New Strategic

Concept, and of NATO's readiness to make a contribution to global order. Therefore, whether or not NRF will be established is the litmus test of whether the Alliance can build new instruments capable of looking after our new security interests. For Germany to comply with the needs of the Alliance, the Bundeswehr must be reformed. The actual spectrum of tasks and the needs of NATO and the European defense identity should guide this process. While the Bundeswehr budget has undergone repeated cuts, resulting in less material provision over the past few years, the number of missions abroad has increased steadily. In the medium-term, defense spending will have to go up.

The German Bundestag is discussing ways of making the procedure for missions abroad more flexible. In contrast to other Western countries where the responsibility for a military operation lies with the government, in Germany, approval by Parliament is currently needed in advance of every single mission. This does not meet the requirements of participation in integrated missions or the NATO Response Force.

Another matter that has to be discussed is the fact that the German Bundeswehr is made up of conscripts. This was a valuable option for historical reasons: it was designed to strengthen the ties between the army and the people to avoid the danger of a state within a state. We now have to rethink this concept and possibly move to an army of professional soldiers where conscripts can serve but cannot be the basis of its structure.

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In conclusion, let me stress the following points: In my view the relatively prosperous West must respect the fact that different countries develop at different speeds. The West must find common concepts to promote the development of other societies in such a way that they are able to preserve their cultural identities. This is a task that we have inherited jointly and that the Western states cannot perform separately, and certainly not in competition with each other. They can only do it through cooperation. With this, I have raised what I am convinced is the most important task for Europe and the West: We must perceive the non-Western world and its variety as enrichment and use the opportunities presented by globalization to maintain diversity. If the West strives to homogenize the non-Western world in its own image, it will fail.

If we succeed in combining American determination with European experience, we will have great opportunities to shape our relationship with the non-Western world in positive ways. If we can succeed in directing the transatlantic dialogue towards the really decisive issues and conduct a debate in which there is no doubt about our mutual willingness to take joint decisions and share burdens fairly, we will have an opportunity to regain trust and re-establish a healthy balance in our relations.

The Significance of International Institutions and Law

Celeste A. Wallander

Being in the company of experts and officials who have dealt with these issues more extensively and directly, I will seek to contribute as an outside scholar. My focus is on understanding and explaining policy, rather than shaping and working it.

As a political scientist, I am most interested in why decision makers and leaders make the choices they do in regard to international institutions and law.

1. Why do states work (or not work) within international institutions?
2. What basis does international law provide?
3. Under which conditions do we see international institutions and law enhancing security cooperation and promoting effective strategies for sundry threats and challenges?

Let us start with why states use international institutions and law. There are three reasons common in scholarly analysis.

CELESTE A. WALLANDER is the director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program in Washington D.C.

1. Enforcement Incentives

This approach is based on the model of domestic politics, where rule of law and the background of enforcement by strong states guides choices. Clearly, this is not the correct model for compliance with international law and institutions. Compliance with law and reliance upon international institutions in the anarchic international system is not driven by “international” enforcement mechanism. A system where there is no world government or higher sovereign authority than states means international law and institutions are a matter of voluntary adherence and compliance.

2. Moral Obligation and Commitment

This approach is most important in European scholarly circles: the view sees compliance as normative and based on what states in the international community are morally obligated to do. Although this view is appealing, matching the rhetoric of international law and Europe’s reliance on institutions, it is problematic. In practice, commitment to international institutions and law is *selective*. For example, the European Union’s Stability Pact, where states have committed to its rules, particularly in limiting government deficits, but where they do not wish to comply when compliance becomes costly or constrains options in economic policy. Similarly, we see that many members of the World Trade Organization, including the United States and the EU members, violate its rules against protectionist policies when particular economic or sectoral interests demand protection from the disciplining effects of free markets.

In the case of Kosovo, European countries not only supported the use of military force against Serbia without a UN Security Council Resolution, but themselves sought this step. This was also in direct contradiction to NATO's commitment to Russia under the 1997 Founding Act: NATO would not use force out of area without such an enabling UN Security Council Resolution.

3. Self-Interest

The actual pattern of state choices and behaviors lends support to a third explanation: self-interest. Here, scholars argue that some security challenges and threats can only be met through cooperative effort. The list is long, including nonproliferation, counter terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking. Because of the nature of these 21st security threats and challenges, the actions of any one state alone will not be effective in securing stability and security. Therefore, states may seek to cooperate on these issues, and to do so, they will create and rely upon international law and institutions.

The key is that there are incentives for states to commit to rules in the short-term to obtain the long-term benefits of cooperation. International law can thus enable countries to cooperate for their long-term self-interest. It thwarts the temptation to act unilaterally for reasons of immediate and narrow self-interest. To join the World Trade Organization, a state must accept and implement rules that prevent protectionist measures (which help companies in the short run). Such rules favor long-term integration and competition on world markets.

Those who want states to follow international law and use international institutions to pursue peace and security must work to see that it is in states' long-term interest to do so.

Effectiveness is the key to getting states to follow international law: since compliance and reliance is because of self-interest, states must view the choice of international law as effective in meeting their security needs.

When do International law and Institutions Work?

The key is to recognize that states face a *variety* of security problems and that a *variety* of instruments are needed to solve them. Some conditions call for peacekeeping, others call for peace enforcement. The UN Charter reflects this in the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. Bosnia showed the disaster that can ensue when peacekeeping methods are used where when peace enforcement is required. Iraq is no different.

But there are *other* tasks in Iraq—within context of creating security and finishing the war. There are clear UN agency missions: health infrastructure and humanitarian missions, providing for children's schools and well being. Other international agencies bring their own particular strengths to other aspects of stabilizing Iraq, particularly aid and loans through the World Bank and IMF.

The key point is that there are *multiple* tasks for peace and security in Iraq and no *one* policy or institution can meet them all. It is not a

The Significance of International Institutions and Law

matter of Either-Or: either the UN, or the US-led coalition. It is a matter of the UN *and* the Coalition, each doing the tasks it is suited for, and which are required under current conditions, given the goal of a self-governing Iraq with the resources for the country to make it a contributor to peace and security.

Flexibility and complementarity in the choice of international institutions and agents is thus key. This can increase the effectiveness of international institutions and law, and this will increase the commitment of states. Nothing succeeds like success.

How does this fit with U.S. policy?

The U.S. public and political leadership have lost faith in international law and institutions, seeing these constructs as ineffective at the enormous security threats and challenges they see. The first commitment of American leadership is to security, so if international law and institutions fail to effectively meet that prime objective, neither the American leadership nor the American public will support them.

Restoring American support for international law and institutions will require our friends and allies in Europe to understand that commitment and effectiveness are linked. The UN is unquestionably effective for important peace and security tasks, including development, humanitarian assistance, and combating the global pandemic of HIV/AIDS.

But it *has not* been effective in the case of certain vital security challenges:

- Peace in the Middle East,
- Countering transnational terrorism
- Preventing proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, Russian, German, and French calls to bring the UN to the center of global policy on peace and security *can* be successful. Important American leaders believe cooperation in international institutions for peace and security *is* in the U.S. interest.

But they cannot make this “U.S. security interests” case unless they can make the case for *effectiveness*. The international community needs to play a role not merely by calling for the use of international law and institutions, but also by committing to the effectiveness of this approach. If the U.S., Europe, and Russia can move forward on this basis, we will find a promising basis for renewed partnership in meeting the threats and challenges that face all of our countries.

Challenges for the Greater Middle East

Laurent Murawiec

The 1980s and '90s were marked by a wave of modernization and democratization that swept entrenched tyrannies from the international political landscape. South Korea, Taiwan evolved from military dictatorship to democratic polities, the Philippines jettisoned its despotic ruler. When General Augusto Pinochet accepted the verdict of elections, Chile opened the floodgates to a sweeping wave that democratized the continent (with the exception of Cuba), freeing it of *pronunciamentos*, *juntas* and *caudillos*. The fall of Mexico's PRI brought to a momentous end the era of corporatism in Latin America, and its oldest dictatorship.

Central, Eastern and even Southeastern Europe (the Balkans) similarly turned from post-totalitarian to democratic. Russia, even Russia, the fiefdom of tyranny, evolved into a less monolithic system. India decided to de-bureaucratize itself and open its semi-autarchic system to the world. The Turkish Army decided to remain in its barracks, at a much greater distance from the political management of the country. Africa, the wretched of the wretched, somehow shook off the burden, though often without creating a new order where the

LAURENT MURAWIEC is senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C.

winner did not take all. Some of the worst offenders, though, left the stage, like Mengistu in Ethiopia.

Centrally-planned economic systems, systems of economic, but also political and cultural autarchy, had to retreat and often capitulate: over a period of two decades, pluralization and openness became the rule instead of the exception.

The only part of the world that remained utterly untouched by the sweep of modernization and democratization has been the Arab Moslem world. Its elites have exempted themselves from the general evolution afoot world-wide. Despotisms and tyrannies, despotic monarchies and tyrannical “republics,” have remained the norm and the practice. Democratization has not made any significant inroad in any part of the Arab world.

Democracy is certainly “one man, one vote, more than once,” as Nathan Sharansky felicitously put it, but it is much more than that: it must be based on the Rule of Law, equality of all in the courts, an independent magistracy, separation of powers, a degree of accountability for those in power, a degree of transparency in government. It needs the sanctity of contracts, the absence of government from wide swaths of life; it needs *habeas corpus* and the freedoms enshrined, *inter alia*, in the U.S. Bill of Rights. People must be free to speak publicly (and privately!), to congregate and associate freely, and to publish freely, without fear of government harassment, arbitrary arrest, torture and death at the hands of police. The closer to such a

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happy state a country is, the more truly democratic it may be said to be.

Of course, there are some differences. Here and there, one finds a measure of electoral freedom, a modicum of respect for law, a minimum of free speech – all of which are ever conditional, precarious, limited. See what happens to an Egyptian sociologist and pollster who also holds American nationality and is engaged in E.U.-funded research: 7 years' jail, says the first court; 7 years, confirms the appellate court; release him says political power.

The Arab world remains mired in a system where family, clan, tribe or religious group are able to monopolize power, including its privileges and perquisites. Political power supplies the leverage to appropriate wealth: a predatory system prevails, run by autocracy through an all-powerful bureaucracy.

Compare leading social, economic and cultural indicators: take South Korea, a country wrecked and razed by a terrible war less than a half-century ago. Take a somewhat comparable country, Egypt, with its modest endowment in oil, its above-average literacy, its long tradition as a nation-state, its multiple layers of civilization. Compare infant mortality – the index of how a society invests in its own future - electricity production per capita – an indicator of industrialization - Internet users – a reflection of how far a society has entered the digital age. Let me sum it up: male literacy in the Arab world is slightly above that of Black Africa, female literacy slightly below that of Africa. The picture this series of data implies is devastating.

Population growth has been high, vastly outstripping economic progress. The oil wealth has been squandered – a generation after the first oil shock, economic and industrial structures have not changed, the region is a net food importer, and is not exporting competitive products to world markets. The region’s share of world non-oil exports is negligible.

The Arab world is the sick man of the world. It has not entered modernity. And, there is a causal relationship between the denial of modernity and the disease.

Lest good-thinking and benevolent souls think that I am a biased analyst, this is precisely what a group of distinguished Arab intellectuals explained in harrowing detail in the report they were commissioned to write for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development under the title of “Arab Human Development Report 2002 – Creating Opportunities for Future Generations.”

Thrice in the modern era has the Arab world believed it was on the threshold of returning to earlier glory: in the aftermath of World War I when the Hashemite *sharif* of Mecca claimed that the British had made promises of empire to him for price of his leadership in the “Arab Revolt” against the Ottomans – much of this was delusional, self-aggrandizing, and Husayn’s contribution to the fall of the Ottomans was minute. No matter, the family, expelled from Hijaz by the al-Saud, a more efficient breed of pirates of the sand dunes, got

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Transjordan and Iraq, rather than the whole Arab world that it coveted¹.

The second dawn was after World War II, as Britain and France started retreating from Empire, and Arab independence arose. Lo! Kings and emirs behaved like autocrats, not like modernizers, and the presidents, generals, colonels and sundry “socialist” leaders like tyrants. Nasserism, the flagship of the Arab nationalist resurgence, went down on the *Rais*’s shipwreck. The third hope was brought about by the 1973 Oil Crisis - it bought the Arab countries automatic majorities, in alliance with the Soviet bloc, at the United Nations.

Failure after failure brought about an umpteenth return to the “pure roots of Islam,” spurred by the loathed Shiites of Iran and Ayatollah Khomeiny’s ruthless challenge. What neither the superficial and ephemeral toying with “liberal democracy,” nor the flirt with National-Socialism and Italian fascism, nor the *marriage de raison* with Soviet Socialism had succeeded in bringing about would now be attempted through radical Islam – the Moslem Brotherhood joined hands with the Saudi Wahhabi to form an Islamintern.

The refusal to face the challenge of modernity has led, in the words of historian Bernard Lewis, to a “systemic crisis.” This is a generalized crisis that affects all aspects of life and society, a dissonance that inflicts psycho-cultural pain, a sense of dislocation – something that tells members of a society that “something went wrong.”

See Efraim Karsh and I. Karsh,

The famed “frustration and rage” that are so often presented as powering the “Arab Street” come thence.

If you have been imbued with the idea that your God has given you, the Faithful, the world to be your conquest and your garden; if the Prophecy worked for a thousand years, and you conquered so much of the world, thus proving the prophecy; if two hundred years ago, ca. 1796, the prophesied world-empire started to shrink, and the Infidels starting rolling back the forces of Prophecy and occupy the *Dar al-Islam*, if you end up being materially, technologically, militarily inferior – you have a problem. The problem has three possible solutions, three possible outcomes:

- “God was wrong!” a very troubling perspective
- “I misread God’s writ”: the labor or reinterpretation, questioning, challenge, must begin
- “God was right. I read God properly. Reality is wrong. Reality must disappear!”

Whoever carries the unwelcome message – whoever represents the shocking, demoralizing reality – reminds and rekindles the burning, humiliating sting. As Professor Lewis perceptively put it, “they do not hate us because of what we *do* but because of what we *are*.” I will have to specify this “they” shortly.

Faced with challenge, the Arab world turned to *an Nahda*, a revival started by a handful of Beirut and Alexandria-Cairo intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century. It failed, never reaching critical

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mass. Elites were insufficiently supportive. Perversely, this is what deprived the Arab world of the means of resurgence. Contrary to Japan, it was not able to industrialize to defend.

What was done? In lieu of a true modernization, there was a retraction on the postulated identity of the Arab world as being purely “Islamic.” “Islam is our [only] constitution,” the founder of the Moslem Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna, exclaimed. All ye need to know is contained in Qoran, *Hadith* and *Sharia*. There was only minimal room for an instrumental use of Western products and technologies: penicillin and Kalashnikov. This was a regression, even on 19th century founder of pan-Islamism, al-Afghani, and a huge step backward on the attempted, and failed “Arab Renaissance” (*an-Nahda*) of the 19th and early 20th century.

How can change be effected from an unhappy situation to a better one? What are the known and habituated means of political action in the Arab world? Is there an *agora*, a *forum* where diverse interests and ideologies are recognized as legitimate and consequently may be aired and thrashed out, where a plurality of opinions and proposals may be debated and decided upon? There are not. Unless you are admitted at the *majlis* of the mighty, you have no voice. If you are admitted, it is as part of the tribal or client network.

Violence is the only way to achieve change. Riot, political assassination, putsch, civil war – this is the way change occurs. All of those must be prepared stealthily: the secret brotherhood (*ikhwan*) was ever the principal means. Furtive was the organization of opponents

in the Arab world, or even of people who were not part of the ruling elites. Preemptively, the ruling crowd turns the powers of violence on to anyone who could represent opposition. In the Arab world, violence is not the continuation of politics by other means, *violence is politics* and *politics is violence*.

The techniques of foreign policy are quite similar to those of domestic policy. The means are simply more limited: whereas there is zero incentive and little limitation to the domestic exertion of violence, it has to be carefully gauged and calibrated if used abroad. The history of inter-Arab relations since 1945 is nonetheless a long succession of violent actions, and wars and mutual terrorism. In no area of the world do we register such an interminable, quasi-permanent succession of violent conflicts, even excluding the conflicts between Arabs and Israel. Foreign policy is carried out primarily by means of clandestine operations waged by secret services.

Hence the role of terrorism – it is a natural outcome of the modern Arab Way of Politics. The methods are the same; the spirit is the same. Which also explains that the primary unit of terrorism is not the individual terrorist or individual terrorist groups – most of them wax and wane and recombine all the time. The primary unit is a set of states for which terrorism is a principal tool of statecraft.

The growth and success of terrorism in the Arab world needs to be explained. The lack of effective response by the targets of terrorism has enabled it to prosper. The calculus of terrorism may be represented as what stock markets call a price/earning ratio (PER):

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for terrorists, the state sponsors and their sponsored groups, the price of committing terrorist acts, bombings, murders, hijackings, etc., is very moderate. The strategic benefits are immense. Take the case of the expulsion of U.S. forces from Lebanon in the early 1980s: a couple of suicide operations organized by the Syrian and Iranian intelligence services through Hezbollah and the PLO. On the other side, more than 250 fatalities amongst the U.S. Marines and Embassy personnel: the U.S. pulls out of Lebanon, and the terrorists have been seen to cause it. The PER is gigantic.

On the other side, the costs of effective counter-action against elusive terror groups appear huge, and the pickings to be slim: the PER is abysmal.

Compare the two PERs: all benefit to terrorism. This is the history of the last 30 years, starting with the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre perpetrated by Yasir Arafat's "Black September," and ending with Sept. 11, 2001. In the meantime, the PLO was the battle-lab that first demonstrated the viability and the efficacy of terrorism, that tested methods and procedures, with the kind help of the KGB, the Stasi, the Securitate, etc.

This being said, we may properly envision long-range futures for the Middle East: they must start from a consideration of the "systemic crisis" of the Arab world, and the nature of the response its elites elected to promote. The *jihadi* international orchestrated by the Four Aces (Iran, Syria, Saddam's Iraq, Saudi Arabia) went too far. It awakened the slumbering U.S. giant and propelled it into action.

As president Bush said, first in September 2001, and repeatedly since, the war on terrorism is a long war, like the Cold War was. It cannot and will not end without bringing to some form of resolution what is the root cause of terrorism: the stagnation and self-destruction brought about by the “systemic crisis.”

That is why “regime change” and the democratization is the key to the future of the Middle East. Nobody may expect Middle Eastern democracy to talk the talk of Westminster or walk the walk of Jeffersonian mores by tomorrow morning. But remember that our own State Department was explaining during World War II that democracy was incompatible with the Japanese soul, and that direct analyses were made about the supposedly inherent tendencies of the German mind. Taiwan and Korea and Turkey, and, prominently, the Persia of the 1906 Constitution, and, (I doubt it not at all, the soon-to-come) de-ayatollahized Iran, all show that democracy is a universal value, an exportable commodity, and an importable one. Nobody loses their soul by becoming more democratic and less autocratic. Only the worst racism disguised as “respect for the culture of those people” may assert the contrary.

We coughed – it was Afghanistan, and we toppled the Taliban. We got into serious business, and we toppled Saddam. More regime change will be coming – short of which there is no war on terrorism but only the make-believe of the Clinton era. The Syrian dictatorship has been occupying Lebanon for several decades. As our forces entered Baghdad, the Assad regime was terrified, like the little pig of the story, that we were going to huff and puff and blow his house

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away. It was a grievous mistake not to do so – and we're paying a price for that. Jihadis and other killers have been entering the Iraqi territory through the benevolently porous borders of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. But imagine the effect of Syria being forced out of Lebanon: it represents the national liberation of the Lebanese nation; it is an immense, probably fatal loss of face for the vulnerable minority regime of the Alawites; it is a grievous loss for two countries whose client the Assads' Lebanon is – Saudi Arabia (Crown prince Abdullah personally) and Iran (and its fully-owned asset Hezbollah). Since Hezbollah is one of the most proficient terror groups in the world, the gain for us is immense. The PER calculus is inverted. By destroying one link in the terror chain, the entire chain is weakened.

In turn, the humiliation of terror and the reduction of terror regimes disproves the idea that “terror pays,” and disabuses anyone in the Middle East from the delusion that we are easy prey, or prey at all. On the other hand, it is a wonderful encouragement to the numerous silent but strong minority in the region whose desires have to do with stability and prosperity. Like Eastern Europeans in the late '80s and early '90s, who wanted to “join Europe” not in order to cease being Czechs or Bulgarians, but in order to be themselves, but unoppressed, free and prosperous.

I began by stating that the Arab elites had exempted themselves from an otherwise universal movement toward modernity and democracy. There are many in the Arab world who are not in power, who are excluded from power and participation, who aspire precisely to that.

Laurent Murawiec

The future of the Middle East is bound with them. They are our friends, our partners, our allies.

In a Time of Change: The Greater Middle East and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance

pmg / CSIS - Seminar in Berlin,
17 November 2003

AGENDA

- 08:45 **Welcome**
Host (Axel Springer AG/Welt am Sonntag)
Dr. Celeste Wallander, Col. Ralph Thiele, Prof. Ernst
Cramer
- 09:00-10:30 **Panel I: State of the Transatlantic Partnership**
Panelists:
pmg : Col. (GS) Karl Müllner
 (MoD)
 Dirk Brengelmann
 (Chancellery)
- CSIS: Kenneth Huffman
 (U.S. mission to NATO)
 Dr. Celeste Wallander
 (CSIS)
- 10:30-11:00 Break

11:00-12:30 **Panel II: Transformation of Security Policy and Defense Capabilities**

Panelists

pmg: BG Manfred Engelhardt
(MoD)

CSIS: Dr. Clark Murdock
(CSIS)
BG Robert Osterthaler
(SAIC)
LTC(P) Michael Coss
(CSIS)

12:30-14:00 Lunch

Keynote Speaker: “Transatlantic Challenges”

Eckart von Klaeden (MP)

14:00-16:00 **Panel III: Challenges in the Greater Middle East**

Panelists

pmg: Laurent Murawiec
(Hudson Institute)
Matthias Meyer (MFA)

CSIS: Dr. Shireen Hunter (CSIS)
LCDR Lance Leshner (CSIS)

16:00-16:15 Break

16:15-17:45 **Panel IV: Lost in the Desert? One-Way Streets or Transatlantic Avenues in Future Crisis Management**

Panelists

pmg: Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt (MFA)
Dr. Horst Freytag (MFA)

CSIS: MAJ Jeff Oppenheim (U.S. Military Delegation to NATO)
CAPT Steve Vanderplas (CSIS)
Robert McMullin (CSIS)

17:45 **Conclusions**
 Dr. Celeste Wallander, Col. Ralph Thiele

18:00 Reception/ Dinner

Conference site: Axel Springer Haus, 10888 Berlin,
 Axel-Springer-Straße 65
 (**Entrance Kochstraße**).

For **entrance** in the Axel Springer Haus please take your **invitation** with you!
Please note, that there is almost no parking space available at the Axel Springer Haus.

Participants

Agüera	Martin	Editor Defense News, Büchenbeuren
Becher	Klaus	Managing Partner Knowledge & Analysis LLP, London
Dr. Boehlke	Ewald	Senior Research Society and Technology Research Group; Daimler Chrysler
Brengelmann	Dirk	Head of Division 211 Federal Chancellery, Berlin
Dr. Brüggemann	Ulf	Bundesnachrichtendienst, Pullach
Cimander	Volker	
Clages	Christian	German Delegation NATO Headquarters, Brussels
Dr. Clostermeyer	Claus-Peter	Permanent representation of the state of Baden-Württemberg in Berlin, Berlin
Prof. Cramer	Ernst	Axel Springer Foundation, Berlin
LTC(P) Coss	Michael	Army Fellow Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
Brigadier General Engelhardt	Manfred	Armed Forces Staff V Ministry of Defense, Bonn
Forster	Karina	IPA Network, International Public Affairs GmbH, Berlin
Dr. Freytag	Horst	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin
LTC (GS) von Harling	Georg A.	Armed Forces Staff IV 1 Ministry of Defense, Bonn

Huffman	Kenneth	Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
Dr. Hunter	Shireen	Program Director, Islam Program Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
Dr. Kinkela	Claudia	Visiting Assistant Professor Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
Von Klaeden	Eckart	Member of the Parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Berlin
Krüger	Jens	Editor Welt am Sonntag, Berlin
Dr. Krüger	Michael K.-D.	Head of Concepts and Studies; De- fense and Civil Systems; EADS, München
CAPT (GE Navy) Kupferschmidt	Frank-Ulrich	Armed Forces Staff III 3 Ministry of Defense, Berlin
LCDR Leshner	Lance	Military Fellow Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
McMullin	Robert	Visiting Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
Col. (GS) Müllner	Karl	Armed Forces Staff III 1 Ministry of Defense, Berlin
Prof. Dr. Mey	Holger H.	President Institute for Strategic Analyses (ISA), Bonn
Meyer	Matthias	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin

Col. (GS) Meyer zum Felde	Rainer	Deputy Chairman Long Range, Transformation Team NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, VA
Moniac	Rüdiger	Redaktionsbüro rmc, Berlin
Murawiec	Laurent	Senior Fellow Hudson Institute, Washington D.C.
Dr. Murdock	Clark	Senior Fellow, International Security Program Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
MAJ Oppenheim	Jeff	U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels
BG Osterthaler	Robert	Senior Vice President Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Washington D.C.
Prüfert	Andreas	General Secretary Euromil, Brussels
Dr. Roell	Peter	Minister Counsellor Permanent Representation of the F.R.G. to the EU, Brussels
Prof. Dr. Schlie	Ulrich	Permanent representation of the state of Hessen in Berlin, Berlin
Schreer	Benjamin	Senior Research Associate, Research Unit European and Atlantic Security Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
Dr. Schuller	Konrad	Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszei- tung, Berlin

Col. (GS) Schulz	Gerhard	Armed Forces Staff V 1 Ministry of Defense, Bonn
Dr. Schwegmann	Christoph	Office Volker Rühle, MP Deutscher Bundestag, Berlin
Dr. Seidt	Hans-Ulrich	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin
Siemes	Ludger	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin
Dr. Spies	Thomas M.	Corporate Center, Compliance Geld- wäsche/AWG Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/Main
Prof. Dr. Stürmer	Michael	Welt am Sonntag, Berlin
Sturm	Anna	Assistant Institute for Strategic Analyses (ISA), Bonn
Col. (GS) Thiele	Ralph	Commander Bundeswehr Center for Analyses and Studies, Waldbröl
CAPT Vanderplas	Steve	Coast Guard Fellow Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
Dr. Wallander	Celeste	Director, Russia and Eurasia Program and Trustee Fellow Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.
LTC (GS) Dr. Will	Thomas	Deputy Chief, Security Pol- icy/Military Strategy Branch Bundeswehr Center for Analyses and Studies, Berlin
BG Wittmann	Klaus	Director of Faculty Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Hamburg



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c/o Office Prof. Dr. Holger H. Mey
Zipperstraße 24-26
53227 Bonn
Germany

Phone: +49 (2 28) 9 70 99-0
Fax: +49 (2 28) 9 70 99-13
E-Mail: info@pmg-ev.com
Website: www.pmg-ev.com

